A Generalization of the AL method for Fair Allocation of Indivisible Objects

We consider the assignment problem in which agents express ordinal preferences over $m$ objects and the objects are allocated to the agents based on the preferences. In a recent paper, Brams, Kilgour, and Klamler (2014) presented the AL method to compute an envy-free assignment for two agents. The AL method crucially depends on the assumption that agents have strict preferences over objects. We generalize the AL method to the case where agents may express indifferences and prove the axiomatic properties satisfied by the algorithm. As a result of the generalization, we also get a $O(m)$ speedup on previous algorithms to check whether a complete envy-free assignment exists or not. Finally, we show that unless P=NP, there can be no polynomial-time extension of GAL to the case of arbitrary number of agents

A note on the undercut procedure

The undercut procedure was presented by Brams et al. [2] as a procedure for identifying an envy-free allocation when agents have preferences over sets of objects. They assumed that agents have strict preferences over objects and their preferences are extended over to sets of objects via the responsive set extension. We point out some shortcomings of the undercut procedure. We then simplify the undercut procedure of Brams et al. [2] and show that it works under a more general condition where agents may express indifference between objects and they may not necessarily have responsive preferences over sets of objects. Finally, we show that the procedure works even if agents have unequal claims.Comment: 5 page

Random assignment with multi-unit demands

We consider the multi-unit random assignment problem in which agents express preferences over objects and objects are allocated to agents randomly based on the preferences. The most well-established preference relation to compare random allocations of objects is stochastic dominance (SD) which also leads to corresponding notions of envy-freeness, efficiency, and weak strategyproofness. We show that there exists no rule that is anonymous, neutral, efficient and weak strategyproof. For single-unit random assignment, we show that there exists no rule that is anonymous, neutral, efficient and weak group-strategyproof. We then study a generalization of the PS (probabilistic serial) rule called multi-unit-eating PS and prove that multi-unit-eating PS satisfies envy-freeness, weak strategyproofness, and unanimity.Comment: 17 page