Nontariff barriers Africa faces : what did the Uruguay Round accomplish, and what remains to be done?

Perhaps the major accomplishment of the Uruguay Round is agreements reached on nontariff barriers (NTBs). All NTBs imposed under the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) will be phased out over 10 years, and all"voluntary"export restraints will be abolished. OECD countries'NTBs on agricultural goods will be converted to tariffs and then reduced by an average of 36 percent. Agreement was also reached on limiting subsidies and other agricultural export incentives. As a result, the profile of OECD nontariff protection Africa faces will change dramatically. Formerly, about 11 percent of all sub-Saharan Africa exports encountered NTBs; now this ratio will fall to about 2 percent. Formerly, 83 percent of Reunion's pre-Uruguay Round exports were affected by NTBs; now none will. Some African countries, however, will be largely unaffected by the Uruguay Round's accomplishments. No NTBs on energy products were liberalized so coverage ratios for Angola, Congo, ad Nigeria are still high - but the measures applied (largely quantitative restrictions and special import charges) apparently do not raise the cost of imports significantly. The exclusion of fish from the agreement on agriculture also limited the potential benefits to countries like the Seychelles. Others simply faced no (or few) nontariff restrictions before the negotiations. The new developments are regarded as positive for developing countries as a group, although some countries may incur losses. Trade in textiles and clothing has been closely regulated for three decades through MFA quotas. Phasing these restrictions out will subject African countries to aggressive international competition. Whether they can maintain a viable textile and clothing export sector depends on whether they can achieve reforms aimed at cost-cutting. The MFA liberalization is heavily backloaded, with roughly half the restrictions being removed at the end of 10 years, so there is ample time for adjustment. Africa should also face more vigorous competition on footwear and ferrous metals when"voluntary"restraints on some other developing countries are lifted. Any losses in market share that may occur, however, may not reflect welfare changes, especially if African exports were heavily subsidized. Agriculture could also be harmed unless appropriate domestic policies are adopted. The tariffication (and reduction) of NTBs, along with limits on export subsidies, could raise international prices on some staples, which would hurt net food importers. Reforms to ensure that prices paid to domestic producers increase in line with international prices (thus stimulating a local supply response) could limit increases in the food import bill. In the post-Uruguay Round world, it is increasingly important to remove domestic constraints that prevent local producers from taking full advantage of new export opportunities."Unfinished business"includes further initiatives needed to address NTBs on fish, chemicals and energy products which the Round bypassed. Stricter regulations on safeguards and the use of antidumping duties are also needed to ensure that these measures are not substituted for those eliminated. But much of the unfinished business involves domestic reform needed to ensure that African countries can react to new export opportunities and competitive challenges.Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Trade Policy,Agribusiness&Markets,Export Competitiveness,Economic Theory&Research,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Environmental Economics&Policies,Trade Policy,Agribusiness&Markets

Transport costs and"natural"integration in Mercosur

The authors explore the argument that trade between the Mercosur countries should be stimulated by preferential policies because of their geographic proximity. That is, that the Mercosur countries are candidates for natural integration. They find that, on average, transportation margins on trade within Mercosur and between Mercosur and Chile are about 6 percentage points lower than on trade with the rest of the world. That is a significant margin, and one that was reflected in the countries'trade patterns even before regional trade agreements reduced the policy-based barriers to mutual trade. But it is probably not large enough, in and of itself (without other benefits), to make the introduction of trade preferences desirable. The authors also explore the argument that absolutely high transportation costs between Mercosur and the rest of the world (that is, not relative to intra-Mercosur costs) justify regional trade preferences. For this to apply, the introduction of trade preferences must cause the Mercosur countries to cease importing some goods from the rest of the world completely. While Mercosur --rest-of-the-world transport costs certainly are high, trade patterns suggest that very few goods will cease to be imported from the rest of the world. Finally, the authors find that transport margins on imports are, on average, 2 to 4 percentage points higher for Mercosur countries than for the United States. Further research on why this is so is necessary before one can conclude that avoidable inefficiencies are involved.Development Economics&Aid Effectiveness,Trade Policy,Environmental Economics&Policies,Agribusiness&Markets,Consumption,Economic Theory&Research,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Environmental Economics&Policies,Trade and Regional Integration,Trade Policy

Have transport costs contributed to the relative decline of sub-Saharan African exports? Some preliminary empirical evidence

From the mid-1950s to 1990, sub-Saharan Africa's share of global exports fell from 3.1 to under 1.2 percent, a decline that implies associated export earning losses of about $65 billion annually. Previous studies show that foreign trade barriers do not account for this poor performance. Indeed, African exports enjoy OECD tariff preferences. In the sub-Saharan African countries, too high a proportion of foreign exchange earnings is paying for Africa's high export transport costs. The authors demonstrate that relatively high transportation costs - especially for processed products - often place African exporters at a serious competitive disadvantage. African countries must use a far larger share of their foreign exchange earnings to pay for international transport services than other developing countries do - and the relative importance of those payments has been increasing. Why are Africa's transport costs so high? Ill-advised policies on the part of some African governments seem to have played a role, as their cargo reservation policies produced high"rents"for lines that have been shielded from the effects of competition. The failure to maintain or improve port and transport infrastructure has also played a role.Rural Roads&Transport,Economic Theory&Research,Transport and Trade Logistics,Common Carriers Industry,Environmental Economics&Policies,Transport and Trade Logistics,Common Carriers Industry,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research

Transport Costs and "Natural" Integration in Mercosur

The paper explores the argument that trade between the Mercosur countries should be stimulated by preferential policies because of their geographic proximity. That is, that the Mercosur countries are candidates for "natural" integration. The paper finds that, on average, transportation margins on trade within Mercosur and between Mercosur and Chile are about 6 percentage points lower than on trade with the rest of the world. That is a significant margin, and one that was reflected in the countries' trade patterns even before regional trade agreements reduced the policy-based barriers to mutual trade. But it is probably not large enough, in and of itself (without other benefits), to make the introduction of trade preferences desirable. The paper also explores the argument that absolutely high transportation costs between Mercosur and the rest of the world (that is, not relative to intra-Mercosur costs) justify regional trade preferences. For this to apply the introduction of trade preferences must cause the Mercosur countries to cease importing some goods from the rest of the world completely. While Mercosur- - - rest-of-the-world transport costs certainly are high, trade patterns suggest that very few goods will cease to be imported from the rest of the world

Transport Costs and Economic Integration in the Americas

We discuss three models from the literature in which transportation costs play a critical role in evaluating international economic integration. One considers costs on intra-bloc trade, one those of extra-bloc trade, and one the relativity of the two. We then examine estimates of the actual transportation costs on Latin American exports to the United States. These are significant - generally higher than trade barriers - and are higher on Latin American exports than European exports. The paper concludes that transportation costs do not provide a strong incentive for integration in the Americas, and that reducing such costs could be an important complement to integration

Transport Costs and Economic Integration in the Americas

We discuss three models from the literature in which transportation costs play a critical role in evaluating international economic integration. One considers costs on intra-bloc trade, one those of extra-bloc trade, and one the relativity of the two. We then examine estimates of the actual transportation costs on Latin American exports to the United States. These are significant - generally higher than trade barriers - and are higher on Latin American exports than European exports. The paper concludes that transportation costs do not provide a strong incentive for integration in the Americas, and that reducing such costs could be an important complement to integration.