Discrete Model of Ideological Struggle Accounting for Migration

A discrete in time model of ideological competition is formulated taking into account population migration. The model is based on interactions between global populations of non-believers and followers of different ideologies. The complex dynamics of the attracting manifolds is investigated. Conversion from one ideology to another by means of (i) mass media influence and (ii) interpersonal relations is considered. Moreover a different birth rate is assumed for different ideologies, the rate being assumed to be positive for the reference population, made of initially non-believers. Ideological competition can happen in one or several regions in space. In the latter case, migration of non-believers and adepts is allowed; this leads to an enrichment of the ideological dynamics. Finally, the current ideological situation in the Arab countries and China is commented upon from the point of view of the presently developed mathematical model. The massive forced conversion by Ottoman Turks in the Balkans is briefly discussed.Comment: 24 pages, with 5 figures and 52 refs.; prepared for a Special issue of Advances in Complex System

Globalization, democratization, and the Arab uprising : the international factor in MENA's failed democratization

What explains the almost negative impact of international factors on post-Uprising democratization prospects? This article compares the utility of rival “diffusionist” and neo-Gramscian political economy frames to explain this. Three international factors deter democratization. The failure of Western democracy promotion is rooted in the contradiction between the dominance of global finance capital and the norm of democratic equality; in the periphery, neo-liberalism is most compatible with hybrid regimes and, at best, “low intensity democracy.” In MENA, neo-liberalism generated a crony capitalism incompatible with democratization; while this also sparked the uprisings, these have failed to address class inequalities. Moreover at the normative level, MENA hosts the most credible counter-hegemonic ideologies; the brief peaking of democratic ideology in the region during the early uprisings soon declined amidst regional discourse wars. Non-democrats—coercive regime remnants and radical charismatic movements--were empowered by the competitive interference of rival powers in Uprising states. The collapse of many Uprising states amidst a struggle for power over the region left an environment uncongenial to democratization.PostprintPeer reviewe

Islamism and the state after the Arab uprisings: Between people power and state power

The authors would like to thank the Arts and Humanities Research Council for facilitating the research for this article through their support of the research network People Power versus State Power of the Centre for the Advanced Study of the Arab World.This paper examines the trajectories of different Islamist trends in the light of the Arab uprisings. It proposes a distinction between statist and non-statist Islamism to help understand the multiplicity of interactions between Islamists and the state, particularly after 2011. It is outlined how statist Islamists (Islamist parties principally) can contribute to the stabilization and democratization of the state when their interactions with other social and political actors facilitate consensus building in national politics. By contrast when these interactions are conflictual, it has a detrimental impact on both the statist Islamists, and the possibility of democratic politics at the national level. Non statist-Islamists (from quietist salafi to armed jihadi) who prioritize the religious community over national politics are directly impacted by the interactions between statist Islamists and the state, and generally tend to benefit from the failure to build a consensus over democratic national politics. Far more than nationally-grounded statist Islamists, non-statist Islamists shape and are shaped by the regional dynamics on the Arab uprisings and the international and transnational relations between the different countries and conflict areas of the Middle East. The Arab uprisings and their aftermath reshaped pre-existing national and international dynamics of confrontation and collaboration between Islamists and the state, and between statist and non-statists Islamists, for better (Tunisia) and for worse (Egypt).PostprintPeer reviewe

Stato ed economia nel mondo arabo

Il volume, scritto da studiosi arabi, discute i rapporti fra stato e mercato, il crescente ruolo del Maghreb, i nodi irrisolti delle relazioni con l'Europa e i problemi della cooperazione nel Mediterraneo.- Indice #6- Prefazione #8- Esperienze di cooperazione e di integrazione economica nel mondo arabo, con particolare riferimento al ruolo svolto dalla Lega araba, Mahmoud Abdel Fadil #10- Dalla burocrazia alla privatizzazione: ripercussioni interne, internazionali e per il mondo arabo, Nazih N. Ayubi #30- Complementarietà e concorrenzialità delle economie arabe: dal progetto panarabo ai complessi regionali, Fathallah Oualalou #56- Stato e legittimità nel Maghreb, Abdelbaki Hermassi #70- Bibliografia #8