222 research outputs found
Capture and Corruption in Public Utilities: the Cases of Water and Electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa
A Theory of BOT Concession Contracts
In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and Â
rm managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice governments to choose BOT concessions. This result stems from a trade-o€ between the governmentâs shadow costs of Â
nancing the construction and the operation of the facility and the excessive usage price that the consumer may face during the concession period. The incentives to choose BOT concessions increase as a function of ex-ante informational asymmetries between governments and potential BOT concession holders and with the possibility of transferring the concession cost characteristics to public Â
rms at the termination of the concession.Public-private-partnership, privatization, adverse selection, regulation, natural monopoly, infrastructure, facilities
The Marginal Cost of Public Funds in Developing Countries: An Application to 38 African Countries
Status and Incentives
The paper introduces status as reflecting an agent's claim to recognition in her work. It is a scarce resource: increasing an agent's status requires that another agent's status is decreased. Higher status agents are more willing to exert effort in exchange for money; better-paid agents would exert a higher effort in exchange for an improved status. Results are coherent with actual management practices: (i) egalitarianism is desirable in a static context; (ii) in a long-term work relationship, juniors' compensations are delayed; past performances are recompensed by pay increases along with an improved status within the organization's hierarchy.repeated moral hazard, internal labor markets, social status
Sale of Visas: A Smugglerâs Final Song?
Is there a way of eliminating human smuggling? We set up a model to simultaneously determine the provision of human smuggling services and the demand from would-be migrants. A visa-selling policy may be successful at eliminating human smugglers by eroding their profits but it necessarily increases immigration. In contrast, re-enforced repression decreases migration but uses the help of cartelized smugglers. To overcome this trade-off we study how legalisation and repression can be combined to eliminate human smuggling while controlling migration flows. This policy mix also has the advantage that the funds raised by visa sales can be used to finance additional investments in border and internal controls (employer sanctions and deportations). Simulations of the policy implications highlight the complementarities between repression and legalisation and call into question the current policies.migration, migration policies, market structure, legalisation, human smuggling.
- âŠ