Corporate Restructuring and Corporate Auctions

We study 298 firms that announce the intent to consider restructuring during the 1989 to 1998 period. We find that the actions taken subsequent to the initial restructuring consideration are equally divided between (i) being acquired, (ii) divesting one or more subsidiaries, or (iii) either terminating the process or declaring bankruptcy. There is a greater completion rate in the second half of the sample, which suggests that economywide factors influence the restructuring decision. For the average firm in the sample, restructuring is a positive net present value decision, although sustained positive shareholder returns accrue only to the firms that actually complete restructuring. For a sub-sample of firms that are acquired, we detail the private auction process that is initiated and conducted by the selling firms and their investment banks. In the private auction, 80 percent of the selling firms have multiple bidders, even though only 20 percent of these cases have more than one publicly announced bidder. The depth of the private auction affects the runup of stock prices prior to the formal acquisition offer, suggesting a reinterpretation of the traditional explanations for the variation in premiums across target firms. The use of private auctions by selling firms also suggests one reason for the absence of toeholds in many mergers as well as the occurrence of multiple public bids even when there is only a single public bidder in a merger.

Valuing the Process of Corporate Restructuring

We study the process of corporate restructuring for a sample of 298 firms during the 1989-98 period that announce that they are considering restructuring alternatives. We find that restructuring is a lengthy process, with the majority of the restructuring period occurring prior to any definitive proposals for corporate change. Only 70 percent of the firms that initially propose restructuring later make a definitive proposal to sell either all or part of the firm, with other firms taking themselves out of play or declaring bankruptcy. Hence, the market reaction to the initial restructuring announcement underestimates the full wealth effects of completed restructurings. The estimate of the full value of restructuring across the sample firms averages 7.5 percent, with the greatest gains of 30 percent accruing to firms that are acquired. The average gain for the full restructuring period for firms divesting a unit is 5 percent, which is roughly double that estimated for the initial announcement in prior studies of corporate divestitures.

\u27Struggling with Language\u27 : Indigenous movements for Linguistic Security and the Politics of Local Community

In this article, I explore the relationship between linguistic diversity and political power. Specifically, I outline some of the ways that linguistic diversity has served as a barrier to the centralization of power, thus constraining, for example, the political practice of empire-formation. A brief historical example of this dynamic is presented in the case of Spanish colonialism of the 16th-century. The article proceeds then to demonstrate how linguistic diversity remains tied to struggles against forms of domination. I argue that in contemporary indigenous movements for linguistic security, the languages themselves are not merely conceived of as the object of the political struggle, but also as the means to preserve a space for local action and deliberation – a ‘politics of local community’. I show that linguistic diversity and the devolution of political power to the local level are in a mutually reinforcing relationship. Finally, I consider the implications of this thesis for liberal theorizing on language rights, arguing that such theory cannot fully come to terms with this political-strategic dimension of language struggles