Computing and Organizations: What We Know and What We Don\u27t Know

In examining the literature on the impact of computers on organizations, we find it puzzling that many people are willing to speak and write as though the overall effects of computing technologies were a foregone conclusion. Many observers seem to believe that computer impacts can be determinedapriori by deducing fromabstractprinciples whatthe effects of computersareboundtobe. Wearguetheopposite: thatevidenceonthesesubjectsisactually fragmentary and very mixed, and that a priori arguments are particularly inappropriate in light of the wide range and variety of variables at work in these situations. In the following pages we examine the literature on the effects of computing on the numbers and quality of jobs on management decision-malcing and on organizational dealings with clients and customers. We alsoconsidervariousperspectivesonthecausesoforganizationaldecisionsto adopt computing in the first place. Our conlusions are similar for all of these areas: virtually none of the studies mounted to date has been capable of yielding a persuasive and comprehensive view of computer-induced social change. We need to go beyond individual case studies, to initiate a program of comparative research on representative samples of organizations. QUALITY OF WORK The research literauire on the impact of new information technologies onjobcontentandjobsatisfactionprovides amass ofcontradictoryfindings.The wide range of informed opinion can best be illustrated by describing the two extreme positions: deskilling versus upgrading. The deskilling perspective suggests that automation is used to striprelatively-skilledjobsoftheirconceptualcontent(Braverman).Thoseconceptualtasks previously integrated into work are either built into computer algorithms, or are transferred to a numerically smaller number of high-level specialists. This deskilling manifests itself in two distinct ways: intro-occupational changes, where the skill content of a particular job decreases overtime; andinter-occupational changes where the numberof personsin skilled jobs shrink andthenumberof employees inunskilled jobs rises. Inthe secondofthese cases, one empirical indicator of computer-generated deskilling is a shift in the occupational structure of the white-collar workforce. The deslcilling position implies a more polarized pyramidal distributionof skill: a mass of unskilled clerical workers atthe bottomand a small number of conceptual workers at the top (Driscoll). Kraft and Greenbaum have taken the analysis even further, arguing that even conceptual jobs like programming are being increasingly deskilled. In contrast, Guiliano andothers have arguedthat computerization and othernew information technologies upgrade rather than deslal white-collar workers The upgrading thesis suggests that automation primarily occurs in already-routinized contexts; the new technology takes the drudge work out of information processing by automating the most repetitious manual aspects, leaving humans to concentrate on conceptual and decision-making tasks. The potential victims of such upgrading are the lowest levels of clerical workers who manually manipulate data However, this lowest stratum need not be adversely affected by automation because the introduction of computers manifests itself in the relative growth of higher-level jobs and the relative shrinkage of lowerpositions. The absolute number of low-level workers need not decline, because total white- collar employment is still growing. Thus, in direct contrast to the deskilling approach, the impact of computer technology is said to be an increase in worker satisfaction, and a shift in occupational structure away from a pyramid shape (few skilled, many semi- or unskilled) toward a diamond shape (few top managers, many professionals and middle managers, few clericals) (Zuboff). Many case studies of intra-occupational change describe loss of conceptual content, fragmentation, and deskilling of white-collar work after computers are introduced. However, some observers also find consolidation of tasks, and upgrading. Attewell\u27s study of the insurance industry confirms that both upgrading and deskilling occur within occupations being computerized, but finds that upgrading predominates Several quantitative studies of the whole economy find little evidence for intra-occupational desldlling since 1949, but these studies are based on government data whose quality has been disputed Evidence on interoccupational change is similarly contradictory, althoughmostcase studiesreportupgrading. Quantitative studies based on disputed DOT data don\u27t find deskilling. Studies which ask workers about their experiences with computerized work are typically positive, although some report increased time pressure and increased supervision. We conclude that both deskillingand upgrading canoccurfollowingcomputerization. Theoretically, whatmattersis to find out what factors and situations produce these vatious outcomes, and the relative frequency of each effect We propose systematic surveys to answer these questions. EFFECTS ON EMPLOYMENT Pessimists anticipate substantial unemployment due to the labor saving effects of new information technologies. Several input/output models of European economies confirm this, albeit based upon shaky data Certain case studies show employment losses of up to 50% in fields like metalworking. But these studies are not from representativesamplesof businessesand somustbetreated with caution Optimistspointto earlier periods of technological change when rapid growth in productivity did not create unemployment If goods become cheaper, demand grows, and total production increases Thus, even with more pivductive technology one still needs as many workers as previously. This optimistic position uses the concept of long waves of economic boom and bust, in which the introduction of new technologies (steam power, electricity, automobiles, microelectronics) causes sudden surges in investment, an upswing in economic activity, and increases in employment At present, insufficient evidence exists to decide between the optimistic and pessimistic analyses. We need careful studies of representative samples of firms, documenting their employment levels at various stages of computer automation, to properly evaluate the employment impact of the new technologies. MANAGEMENT EFFECTS Students of organizations have frequently observed that control over information is a source of powerin organizations. As such, new technologies that alter the quality and availability of information are likely to shift balances of power between organizational groups: workers, supervisors, middle managers executives (Olson and Lucas). Laudon and others viewed such processes as leading to increased centrolization of power in computer-automated organizations. Leavitt and Whisler predicted that new information technologies would eliminate whole layers of middle management as improved information led to centralized decision making higher up the corporate heirarchy. Several case studies have supported this view; and recent research on MIS and computer mail emphasize top down controL However, there is some evidence for the opposite view, that the increase in communication resulting from new technologies can decentralize decision making. Blau et aL have found that, far from eliminating levels of management computers are associated with an increased number of levels of line management and with enhanced local management decision making. In several studies of the introduction of computers in local governments Danziger, Dutton, Kling, Kraemer, and Northrop have documented subtle shifts in power among supervisors, bureaucrats, andmanagers. Contextualvariables werealso foundtobeimportant the effects in small municipalities were not the same as those in larger ones, for example. Robey offers a complementaly view, arguing that sometimes computers don\u27t effect the distribution of power at all sometimes they reinforce the status quo, sometimes they aid decentralization. If we assume that there must be a single effect of computers on management then these case studies appear contradictory. However, if we assume a range of effects is possible, then the taskof future researchbecomes clear. We mustidentifythose variables whichcanaccount for differential outcomes through comparative research on representative samples of organizations, examining factors such as size, industry type, degree of prior routinization of work, skill-level of workforce, and soon ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR PUBLICS Changing information flows will also alter relationships between organizations and their environments- particularly the general public. Rule, Shills, and others have focused on how computers whet the appetite of organizations, especially government:, for information on the people with whom they deal Others have speculated on new kinds of informational services which may become available to the populace because of computers. Much additional research is needed in this area. THE LMPETUS FOR INNOVATION There is a common belief that organizations adopt computer and information technologies in order to pursue goals of efficiency and costeffectiveness. Againstthis view is a position firstarticulated byE ulthattechnologyisa selfsustaining force, which generates needs for itself: once a technology is available it is inevitably used, applications are found for it Odd as this latter position sounds, there is certain evidence for it Several writers have found that whateverthe intentions of managers, computers do not necessarily save money or increase efficiency. Rather than improve activities already in place, computers may be adopted for, or give rise to qualitatively new organizational activities. The application and spread of computers can reflect power politics within organizations rather than efficiency and so on. Such preliminary insights also suggest the need for futire comparative research into the causes of the introduction of new computer-based technologies

Closure and matching payoffs from college majors

This article examines the undergraduate major as a closure mechanism in occupations among college graduates, using the American Community Surveys. We measure the college major density of occupations, termed “major specialization”, finding that greater major specialization of an occupation is associated with higher earnings, over and above previously identified closure devices (licensure, unionization, and vertical educational credentialing), and college selectivity. We conclude that major specialization operates as a powerful earnings-boosting closure device within higher-educated labor markets. Additional analyses regarding premiums from individuals matching their own college major with their occupation’s typical major indicate comparatively small earnings payoffs. Hence, deviating from one’s occupation’s usual credential does not generate a substantial earnings penalty. Furthermore, payoffs from major-occupation matching have a ceiling: there is no further payoff above the average match level. These findings demonstrate how occupational closure theory helps explain the substantial earnings advantages of certain college majors in the labor force

Delayed time-to-degree and post-college earnings

Increasingly, undergraduates take more than 4 years to complete a baccalaureate, a situation widely perceived as a waste of time and money, for students, their families, and taxpayers. We first identify several phenomena that result in a longer time to degree and document the frequency of such delays. Then, using nationally representative data from the Baccalaureate & Beyond 1993–2003 surveys, we estimate the relationship between delayed time-to-degree and later employment and postcollege earnings, using negative binomial hurdle models. We find that delayed time-to-degree is not related to employment chances but is associated with lower post-college earnings: averaging 8–15%, depending on the length of delay. This average disadvantage is in line with signaling theory. The unique contribution of this study is its thorough analysis of different types of delay, as caused by stopping out and employment. Contrary to the popular assumption that delay is a waste of college resources or a student’s time, we find that delayed graduation in combination with working full-time during college has no negative relationship to post-college earnings. We discuss the time-investment trade-offs and the implications for the applicability of human capital theory to college graduation delays

Social Dimensions of Student Debt: A Data Mining Analysis

Media commentary on undergraduates\u27 loan debt portrays a crisis in which many students are unable to pay back their loans, having borrowed large sums and lacking sufficient post-college income to repay. Several scholars have questioned the media accounts, noting that indebtedness is highest among students from high income families, while defaults predominate among low debt students. Using a data mining technique known as CART, we analyze national data on the indebtedness of recent baccalaureate graduates, to uncover combinations of social characteristics that are associated with loan pressure: the ratio of indebtedness to post-college earnings. We find that students from lower income families who attend expensive institutions - especially for-profit colleges - accumulate high debt. In contrast to earlier scholarship, after controlling for the net cost of attending a college, we find that lower-income students face much higher loan pressure than students from more affluent families

The STEM grading penalty: an alternative to the “leaky pipeline” hypothesis

The low number of baccalaureates in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) is often viewed as problematic for the US's economic competitiveness, leading scholars to search for explanations for STEM retention. Our analyses of the Beginning Postsecondary Students Longitudinal Study indicate that the notion of a so-called “leaky STEM pipeline” out of STEM majors overstates the problem because it neglects the substantial influx into STEM from other majors throughout college. Researchers concerned with STEM retention should focus on a broader defined group of “STEM-actives”: A combination of freshman students who declared a STEM major or who take a considerable number of STEM credits. Among these students (N = 3,020) we examine the variation in the relatively lower grades that many individuals earn in STEM courses compared to their non-STEM courses. The size of an undergraduate's “STEM-grading penalty”—an individual grading disparity—in the first couple of college semesters is significantly associated with the probability of leaving STEM. The influence of this STEM-penalty on STEM graduation chances is robust to college students’ variation in both general academic achievement and STEM-specific preparation, thereby eliminating a large portion of the effect due to skills, performance, and selection. Our analyses expands on previous research regarding relative grading conducted within STEM-fields

Black-White incentive inequality for college persistence

Despite similar educational aspirations, black students persist in higher education at much lower rates than white undergraduates. This paper advances a theoretical explanation for the racial gap in persistence by examining whether the differential attrition in college reflects contrasting incentives for educational persistence. To account for the highly unequal hurdles faced by black men and women in college and in the labor market, we propose a method that addresses race-gender-specific opportunity structures in both institutions simultaneously. This approach is based on forward-looking estimates of outcomes where students draw information from their race-gender reference group ahead of them. The model estimates the earnings payoffs of persistence separately for each race-gender group at three consecutive educational decision nodes: at high school graduation, college entry, and after one year in college. We subsequently apply one version of this model to data from the American Community Surveys (2001–2017), calculating the absolute and relative incentives for educational persistence across racial groups. In addition to large dollar earnings differentials, the analyses reveal striking racial gaps of the relative incentives to stay enrolled: “incentive inequality.” This incentive race gap is largest at the earliest stages of the higher education career—high school graduation and college entry—where the black undergraduate dropout rate is highest. Our findings have substantive and methodological implications for situations where returns to investments are unequal across groups affected by discrimination

The Relationship Between Work During College and Post College Earnings

© Copyright © 2019 Douglas and Attewell. Prior research suggests that undergraduates employed during term time are less likely to graduate. Using transcript data from a large multi-campus university in the United States, combined with student earnings data from state administrative records, the authors find that traditional-age students who worked for pay during college on average earned more after leaving college than similar students who did not work. This post-college earnings premium is on par with the benefit from completing a degree, even after controlling for demographic and academic achievement characteristics, across various student sub-groups, and including models that account for selection bias. Implications of these findings for theories of education and social stratification, and for educational policy are considered

Characteristics or Returns: Understanding Gender Pay Inequality among College Graduates in the USA

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The Effects of Home Computers on Educational Outcomes: Evidence from a Field Experiment with Schoolchildren

Are home computers are an important input in the educational production function? To address this question, we conduct a field experiment involving the provision of free computers to schoolchildren for home use. Low-income children attending middle and high schools in 15 schools in California were randomly selected to receive free computers and followed over the school year. The results indicate that the experiment substantially increased computer ownership and total computer use among the schoolchildren with no substitution away from use at school or other locations outside the home. We find no evidence that the home computers improved educational outcomes for the treatment group. From detailed administrative data provided by the schools and a follow-up survey, we find no evidence of positive effects on a comprehensive set of outcomes such as grades, test scores, credits, attendance, school enrollment, computer skills, and college aspirations. The estimates also do not indicate that the effects of home computers on educational outcomes are instead negative. Our estimates are precise enough to rule out even modestly-sized positive or negative impacts. The lack of a positive net effect on educational outcomes may be due to displacement from non-educational uses such as for games, social networking, and entertainment. We find evidence that total hours of computer use for games and social networking increases substantially with having a home computer, and increases more than total hours of computer use for schoolwork