Searching for a just and lasting peace? Anglo-American relations and the road to United Nations Security Council Resolution 242

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 continues to rank as a key point of reference for the Arab-Israeli peace process. The resolution laid down a 'land for peace' formula for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, under which Israel would withdraw from territories occupied during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War in exchange for full peace agreements with her Arab neighbours. This article analyses the Anglo-American diplomacy at the United Nations which led to the passing of the resolution. It argues that the policy-making of the Johnson Administration was rendered incoherent by internal rivalries and disorganisation. US Ambassador to the UN, Arthur Goldberg, was perceived as excessively sympathetic to Israel by the Arab delegations. The British approach, by contrast, was perceived by all parties as more even-handed. The clear position adopted by Foreign Secretary George Brown on Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, together with the skilful diplomacy of the Ambassador to the UN, Lord Caradon, explains the British success in sponsoring resolution 242. The episode holds broader lessons for the conduct of Anglo-American relations showing that Britain was better placed to achieve diplomatic success when it retained its freedom of manoeuvre in relations with the US

Jordan’s frustration with the Middle East peace process

In a widely quoted interview with The Times last May King Abdullah of Jordan warned that ‘if we delay our peace negotiations then there is going to be another conflict between Arabs or Muslims and Israel in the next 12-18 months’. 12 of the 18 months are now up and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations seem further away than ever from even beginning, never mind reaching, fruition. If King Abdullah’s frustrations were great a year ago, they have only increased in the course of the past month. The recent collapse of Palestinian-Israeli proximity talks before they had even begun, coupled with the intransigence of the Netanyahu government on the issue of settlement-building, give little reason to believe that the next six months will bring significant progress

Gulf War syndrome: British warnings over the risk of chemical and biological weapons release were ignored by the US in 1991

Nigel Ashton writes that British scientific warnings about the dangers of bombing Iraqi chemical and biological weapon installations were ignored by the US during the First Gulf War. Such warnings, eventually dropped in order to maintain Anglo-American solidarity, were nevertheless well placed: a recent study has identified the release of Sarin gas as the probable cause of ‘Gulf War syndrome’ among US and British personnel

Chemical Maggie? Thatcher’s handling of the crisis caused by Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait and lessons for Boris Johnson

Nigel Ashton discusses Margaret Thatcher’s handling of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and draws lessons for future prime ministers

Gulf War Syndrome: British warnings over the risk of chemical and biological weapons release were ignored by the US in 1991

Nigel Ashton writes that British scientific warnings about the dangers of bombing Iraqi chemical and biological weapon installations were ignored by the US during the First Gulf War. Such warnings, eventually dropped in order to maintain Anglo-American solidarity, were nevertheless well placed: a recent study has identified the release of Sarin gas as the probable cause of ‘Gulf War syndrome’ among US and British personnel

King Hussein of Jordan

King Hussein of Jordan has been described as a prisoner of history and geography.1 In fact, he saw both as presenting him with opportunities as well as constraints. In terms of geography, Jordan is a classic buffer state, sandwiched between more powerful neighbours: to the north is Syria; to the south Egypt and Saudi Arabia; to the east Iraq and, most importantly, to the west Israel. But throughout his long reign (1953–99) Hussein made playing off enemies and rivals into an art form to ensure both the survival of Jordan as an independent state and the survival of the Hashemite dynasty. In terms of history, Hussein inherited both the incorporation into Jordan of the West Bank acquired in the war of 1948–49 and hence of the Palestinian national question, and a sense of a broader dynastic mission from his grandfather, Abdullah. While his West Bank inheritance made political strife endemic to the Hashemite Kingdom, his sense of dynastic mission led Hussein to dream of a Hashemite purpose which was always larger than the boundaries imposed on Jordan. As Hussein described matters in private, Jordan had to have ‘a larger future than a few thousand square miles of sand’

Three-body interactions in complex fluids: virial coefficients from simulation finite-size effects

A simulation technique is described for quantifying the contribution of three-body interactions to the thermodynamical properties of coarse-grained representations of complex fluids. The method is based on comparing the third virial coefficient $B_3$ for a complex fluid with that of an approximate coarse-grained model described by a pair potential. To obtain $B_3$ we introduce a new technique which expresses its value in terms of the measured volume-dependent asymptote of a certain structural function. The strategy is applicable to both Molecular Dynamics and Monte Carlo simulation. Its utility is illustrated via measurements of three-body effects in models of star polymer and highly size-asymmetrical colloid-polymer mixtures.Comment: 13 pages, 8 figure

British policy and Qaddafi's Libya: landmark victory in the battle for information rights

Following the end of a long-running Freedom of Information battle with the Cabinet Office over the release of files relating to UK policymaking and the Qaddafi regime between 1988 and 2011, Nigel Ashton reflects on the process and its importance for information rights

A local terrorist made good: the Callaghan government and the Arab-Israeli peace process, 1977-79

The British government had played an important role during the 1950s and 1960s as a mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict, most notably through the development of Project Alpha between 1954 and 1956, and through the negotiation of United Nations Security Council resolution 242 in 1967. Between 1977 and 1979, British Prime Minister James Callaghan played a supporting role to US President Jimmy Carter as he negotiated the Camp David Accords of 1978. Callaghan adopted a pro-Israeli stance, cultivating close relations with the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and defending Begin’s position over key issues, particularly his reluctance to remove settlements from the occupied territories. In this respect Callaghan’s government departed from established British policy, even abstaining over United Nations Security Council resolution 446 in March 1979 which condemned continuing Israeli settlement activity. This resulted in damage to Britain’s relations with moderate Arab states such as Egypt and Jordan