“They Came and Destroyed Our Village Again" The Plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Karen State

While the nonviolent struggle of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi against the Burmese military government’s continuing repression has captured the world’s attention, the profound human rights and humanitarian crisis endured by Burma’s ethnic minority communities has largely been ignored. ¶ Decades of armed conflict have devastated ethnic minority communities, which make up approximately 35 percent of Burma’s population. The Burmese army, or Tatmadaw, has for many years carried out numerous and widespread summary executions, looting, torture, rape and other sexual violence, arbitrary arrests and torture, forced labor, recruitment of child soldiers, and the displacement and demolition of entire villages as part of military operations against ethnic minority armed opposition groups. Civilians bear the brunt of a state of almost perpetual conflict and militarization. ¶ Violations of international human rights and humanitarian law (the laws of war) by the Tatmadaw have been particularly acute in eastern Karen state, which runs along the northwestern border of Thailand. One woman described to Human Rights Watch more than twenty years of Tatmadaw brutality: ... One result of the Tatmadaw’s brutal behavior has been the creation of large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees among Burma’s ethnic minority communities. Conflict and its consequences have been going on for so long that in many ethnic minority-populated areas, continuous forced relocations and displacement–– interspersed with occasional periods of relative stability––have become a fact of life for generations of poor villagers. ¶ The scale of the IDP problem in Burma is daunting. Estimates suggest that, as of late 2004, as many as 650,000 people were internally displaced in eastern Burma alone. According to a recent survey, 157,000 civilians have been displaced in eastern Burma since the end of 2002, and at least 240 villages destroyed, relocated, or abandoned. The majority of displaced people live in areas controlled by the government, now known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), or by various ethnic armed groups that have agreed to ceasefires with the government. But approximately eighty-four thousand displaced people live in zones of ongoing armed conflict, where the worst human rights abuses continue. Many IDPs live in hiding in war zones. Another two million Burmese live in Thailand, including 145,000 refugees living in camps. ¶ Karen State is the location of some of the largest numbers of IDPs in Burma. Since 2002, approximately 100,000 people have been displaced from Karen areas, which include parts of Pegu and Tenasserim Divisions. Though a provisional ceasefire was agreed in December 2003 between the SPDC and the Karen National Union (KNU), sporadic fighting continues. Tatmadaw military operations against the KNU’s army, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), in the first months of 2005 caused numerous deaths and injuries to civilians in poor villages along the Thai border. They also forced many civilians to flee internally or to Thailand. For example, at least 9,000 civilians were displaced in Toungoo District, in the far north of Karen State bordering Karenni State, and in Nyaunglebin District in northwest Karen State, during major Tatmadaw offensives between November 2004 and February 2005. ¶ The majority of Karen IDPs have been forced out of their homes as a direct result of the Tatmadaw’s “Four Cuts” counter-insurgency strategy, in which the Burmese army has attempted to defeat armed ethnic groups by denying them access to food, funds, recruits, and information from other insurgent groups. H.T., a twenty-eight year-old Karen from Dooplaya District, described his experience with the Tatmadaw in January 2005: ... ¶ This report describes the situation in government-controlled areas, including relocation sites, which are generally not accessible from across the Thailand border. The report identifies two main causes of displacement: • Displacement due to armed conflict as a direct result of fighting, or because armed conflict has undermined human and food security and livelihood options; and • Displacement due to human rights violations, particularly land rights caused by Tatmadaw and militia confiscation of land and other violations of land rights, especially in the context of natural resource extraction, such as logging and mining. Other rights violations, such as forced labor, killings, torture, and rape, also cause displacement. ¶ The report describes patterns of abuse and forced relocation over a period of many years. It documents how serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses continue to occur in some parts of Karen State, such as Toungoo and Nyaunglebin Districts, while other areas are relatively quiet. It recommends a need to think of new and more realistic answers to the dilemmas faced by IDPs, many of whom may not be able––or may not want––to go home again. ¶ For this report, Human Rights Watch interviewed community leaders, representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), staff at community-based organizations (CBOs), U.N. officials, and many others. Most important, we interviewed forty-six Karen IDPs living in the Papun hills, in mid-late 2003, and along the Thai border, in early 2005. These forty-six individuals altogether were displaced more than one thousand times. Incredibly, five individuals had been forcibly displaced more than one hundred times. One of these five, an elderly woman, first fled to the jungle during World War II, when Japanese soldiers came to her village. ¶ All the interviewees for this report had been farmers and continue to derive most of their food from working their own or others’ rice fields. These fields remain susceptible to destruction by Tatmadaw patrols. Displacement often means that new land must be cleared for farming, rather than farmers being able to return to former swidden fields in sustainable rotation after fallow swiddens have regained their fertility. Over time, the disruption of traditional agricultural practices has seriously undermined livelihoods and caused encroachment by swidden farmers into primary forest, rather than rotating their plots in secondary forest customarily used for swidden agriculture. ¶ Many IDPs have been displaced for some time, and live alongside others who are not–– or have not recently been––displaced. Their needs may therefore be similar to those of other vulnerable populations in peri-urban and rural Burma. ¶ The main problems identified by interviewees were lack of consistent access to food; insufficient income and livelihood problems; human rights abuses and poor physical security related to displacement and fighting; lack of access to education and health services; and, finally, the problem of landmines, which destroy both land and their victims’ lives. Their primary need is to be able to farm properly, without disturbance, and thus improve income and food security, as well as better access to education and health services. All wanted to, as one interviewee put it, “live in peace and with justice.” Most of these problems are linked to longer-term structural problems, and can only be addressed in the context of socio-economic––and above all political––solutions to Burma’s protracted ethnic conflicts. ¶ The findings of this report caution against assuming that all IDPs necessarily want to return “home.” Returning home can be a problematic concept for people who have been on the move for long periods of time. Many IDPs may wish to return home, if it still exists, but others may want to stay put or resettle elsewhere. Some who have returned home or have otherwise resettled still face major problems, while others have not. Some have not moved and built new lives in the place to which they were displaced, often in the jungle hills or in a relocation site. ¶ Thus, those providing assistance should avoid taking a one-size-fits all approach to meeting the needs of IDPs. Instead, the focus should be on individual choice and the needs of specific communities. Indeed, the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which summarize existing international law as it applies to IDPs, make choice the touchstone. Competent authorities have a duty to “establish conditions, as well as provide the means” to allow voluntary resettlement and integration in the place to which people are displaced, if that is their choice. ¶ An understanding of long-term patterns of forced displacement should inform the design of humanitarian, development, and socio-political interventions on behalf of the displaced. One aspect that deserves careful consideration is the effect of ceasefires on the human rights situation and on displacement. Over the past decade many armed ethnic groups have entered into ceasefires with the military government in Rangoon. In some parts of the country, ceasefires have meant a reduction in the most severe forms of human rights abuses, though this has not usually led to greater respect for other basic rights, such as freedom of expression or the right to due process of law. But in many cases, ceasefires have been quietly accompanied by the reemergence of local civil society actors. This has been one of the most important, yet under-studied, aspects of the ceasefires in Burma. ¶ The SPDC and KNU agreed to an informal ceasefire in December 2003. In some parts of Karen State, the situation began to stabilize. Across the whole of Tenasserim Division, and much of lower and western Karen State, there has been less fighting and fewer of the most severe type of human rights violations, such as extrajudicial executions and torture, than before. Some IDPs are beginning to return from hiding places in the jungle and from relocation sites to build more permanent houses and grow crops other than swidden rice. However, the Tatmadaw continues its aggressive use of forced labor, especially on road-building projects, land confiscation, and arbitrary taxation in many areas. It has recently stepped up attacks on a variety of armed ethnic groups. Under the right conditions, a ceasefire between the SPDC and the KNU could deliver a substantial improvement in the human rights situation, creating the space in which local and international organizations can begin to address the urgent needs of Karen IDPs. But the situation may yet return to guerilla warfare and full-scale counterinsurgency. ¶ Many of the ceasefires are now under threat. Since the purging of General Khin Nyunt last October, hard-liners in the SPDC have attempted to undermine ceasefires agreed between Rangoon and several armed ethnic groups since 1989. In mid-2005, the future of these ceasefires looks more and more uncertain. ..

Crisis on the Burma Border

The brutal and ongoing suppression of the 'saffron revolution' has refocused international attention on the appalling human rights and political situation in Burma. Civilized people have been shocked by the images of Buddhist monks and other civilians being arrested and killed on the streets of Yangon and other cities. Understandably, revulsion at the actions of the SPDC military regime has led to calls for firm action to be taken against the generals who have mismanaged Burma for nearly half a century (since the military takeover of 1962). The challenge facing the international community is how to persuade the junta to better respect the human, civil and political rights of citizens. Whether this requires reform of the military government - and some kind of gradual transition to democracy - or a more abrupt form of ‘regime change’ is debatable. What is clear, however, is that Burma needs change - and soon. In the meantime, for people living in rural areas, not much has changed in recent months. Communities continue to be subject to a range of abuses committed by the Burmese military and government, and sometimes by armed nonstate groups. The situation is especially difficult for ethnic nationality people living in areas affected by armed conflict, or who are threatened by the construction of large-scale infrastructure projects, such as hydropower dams, and whose livelihoods have been undermined by natural resource extraction (logging and mining), or because their land has been confiscated by the army or other powerful actors

Ceasefires and Civil Society: The Case of the Mon

This chapter represents the author’s analysis as of late 2002. As far as possible, the facts cited were up-dated in September 2004. In general, the situation on the ground had not changed greatly in the interim. However, the case study does not take account of the government-organised National Convention in Burma (re-convened in May 2004). ¶ This chapter addresses three interrelated questions: ¶ How has the structure of the Burmese state determined the formation and projection of group identities, and in particular, what has been the impact of more than six decades (1941-2003) of conflict on concepts of ethnicity and modes of social organisation among minority groups? What is the relationship between the configuration of the state - including the de facto, insurgent-controlled ‘micro-state’ - and the existence (or lack) of a functioning ‘civil society’? How should the international community respond to the tentative re-emergence of civil society networks in Burma? ¶ These questions are examined in relation to the ceasefire agreed in June 1995 between the SLORC and the New Mon State Party (NMSP). It is proposed that the Mon and some other ceasefires have created the political space within which ethnic minority civil society networks may re-emerge. Mon community networks inside Burma have generally developed beyond the sway of the NMSP’s political-cultural paradigms, which have sometimes stifled the development of civil society in the party’s ‘liberated zones’. Unlike the military regime and its state nationalism, or the unreconstructed ethnic nationalist reaction to this, these new community initiatives and leaders are challenging the NMSP - both for leadership of the nationalist movement, and to examine its basic values and practices. ¶ However, such developments have had a limited impact on people’s daily lives, particularly in rural areas. Villagers’ basic rights continue to be abused, although probably to a lesser degree than before the ceasefire. In order for the tentative re-emergence of civil society to significantly affect state-society relations, and influence democratic transition, community development must be accompanied by initiatives in the political arena, including negotiation of a new relationship between Burma’s diverse ethnic minority groups and the state. ¶ The on-going realignment of ethnic politics in Burma has generally been neglected by outside observers - both academics and activists. As in transition processes the world over, the situation on the ground is a complex mixture of positive and negative elements. It remains to be seen whether recent developments in Burma’s state-society relations represent a new - or a false - dawn. ¶ This chapter sketches the development of Mon and other ethnic identities in pre-colonial Burma and since, and examines the suppression of Burmese civil society since 1962. The bulk of original research is contained in the following sections, which describe the development of the ‘ethnocratic state’ in Burma, and outline ethnic nationalist responses to the perceived Burmanisation of culture and politics. The final sections analyses the ceasefire process, which since 1989 has seen the majority of armed groups negotiate truces with Rangoon

Burma: The Changing Nature of Displacement Crises

Patterns of forced migration in Burma (Myanmar1) have been structured by the changing nature of conflict in the country. Since independence in 1948, Burma has been subject to armed conflict, in the form of a communist insurgency – which came close to seizing state power in the late 1940s and early 1950s (Taylor 1987) – and a series of inter-linked ethnic rebellions (Smith 1999). Following a turbulent decade of parliamentary politics, the Burma Army (or Tatmadaw) temporarily assumed state power between 1958–60, before consolidating its control, following a coup d’etat in 1962 (Callahan 2003). Since the 1960s, above-ground politics and state-society relations in Burma have been dominated by the military, in the form of a state-socialist polity (1962–88: Taylor 1987) and – since the military coup of September 1988 – in a more market-oriented, but still highly authoritarian form of military rule (South 2005). ¶ In 1989 the once-powerful Communist Party of Burma (CPB) collapsed, allowing the Tatmadaw to concentrate its forces on the ethnic insurgencies, which by this time were mostly confined to the northern and eastern border areas. Between 1989-95, some two dozen ceasefires were agreed between the military regime, and the majority of armed ethnic groups (Smith 1999, South 2005). ¶ By 2007, only two significant insurgent organizations remained at war with the regime in Yangon (Rangoon). However, more than two million people of Burmese origin were still displaced outside the country, including more than 150,000 refugees in Thailand, the first of whom had sought shelter in the kingdom in the mid-1980s (Lang 2002, TBBC July 2006). In addition, over half a million people remained internally displaced within Burma (HRW 2005, TBBC November 2006). ¶ The shifting nature of conflict in Burma over the past fifteen years has structured a range of inter-linked displacement crises. In this paper, three main types of forced migration in – and from – the country are identified: Type 1 – armed-conflict-induced displacement; Type 2 – State/society-induced displacement; and Type 3 – livelihood/vulnerability-induced displacement. Each is addressed in a case study, with material drawn from different geographic areas, illustrating different aspects and impacts of (armed and state-society) conflict in Burma. ¶ This paper shows that internal displacement in Burma is not only caused by armed conflict in the insurgent-prone eastern borderlands. While the most acutely vulnerable internally displaced persons (IDPs) do live in those few areas of the country still affected by significant levels of armed conflict, the phenomenon of forced migration is more complex and widespread – the product of decades of mis-governance by the militarized state. ¶ The paper is based on more than two hundred interviews and focus groups, conducted between 2001-06 in Kachin, Karen, Mon and Shan States, in Tenasserim and Yangon Divisions, and along the Thailand and China borders. Informants included: different categories of migrants (including IDPs and refugees) from various ethnic, social and gender groups; ‘host communities’; previously displaced communities which have found solutions to their plight; political organisations; armed ethnic groups (with and without ceasefires); local NGOs and CBOs; UN agencies, the ICRC, and INGOs; diplomats, academics and journalists. Secondary material comes from a survey of published (including electronic) sources and limited circulation (‘grey’) literature

Mon Nationalist Movements: insurgency, ceasefires and political struggle

This paper briefly outlines the development of Mon ethnicity as a politically salient characteristic, during the pre-colonial and colonial periods in Burma. It goes on to describe the emergence of Mon ethno-nationalist movements (both insurgent and non-armed) in the postindependence period. The paper examines the ways in which nationalist elites have mobilized support around ideas of Mon ethnic identity, and the various political strategies adopted in relation to ‘others’ - including elaboration of a federalist platform, in alliance with other ethno-nationalist groups; cooperation with the ‘pan-Burmese’ democracy movement; and uneasy accommodations with the militarized state. ¶ The paper outlines the dynamics of armed ethnic conflict in ‘Monland’, and reviews the political and humanitarian impacts of this ‘low-intensity’ civil war, as well as positive and negative developments since the ceasefire agreed in 1995 between the military government and the New Mon State Party. It examines how Mon civil society groups in Burma have over the past decade promoted community development, and limited democratization ‘from below’, within the constraints of an oppressive and predatory state structure. ¶ The paper concludes with an assessment of the strategic options available to Mon and other ethno-nationalist communities in 2007. This includes a critical analysis of federalist politics, and the roles of armed ethnic groups. The arguments and analysis are primarily drawn from the author’s two books: Mon Nationalism and Civil War in Burma: the Golden Sheldrake (RoutledgeCurzon 2003; reprint edition 2005) and States of Conflict: Ethnic Politics in Burma (Routledge 2008 - forthcoming)

Humanitarian aid to IDPs in Burma: activities and debates

There is a need for greater understanding and coordination between groups working inside Burma and those operating cross-border. The majority of assistance and advocacy – and most research - regarding forced migration in Burma has focused on the situation in armed-conflict-affected areas along the Thailand border. As international agencies do not have direct access to conflict-affected parts of eastern Burma, they provide aid in partnership with local agencies. Assistance for displaced people inside Burma, sent from Thailand or other neighbouring countries is by definition illegal, as it challenges the sovereignty of the Burmese government (which most cross-border actors in fact consider illegitimate). Some crossborder activities are carried out from Bangladesh and India (very limited amounts of relief and documentation on human rights) and also from China (including low-profile medical assistance). Most Thailand-based cross-border groups work in Karen areas but also in Mon and Karenni States; security and local capacity constraints mean that much less work is undertaken in Shan State. Cross-border programmes provide aid which may be characterised as impartial – inasmuch as it is distributed according to need – but it is far from neutral. Cross-border aid networks are closely associated with armed opposition groups, on which they rely for security and logistical arrangements. In fact, most cross-border personnel are members (or affiliates) of insurgent organisations. A number of local NGOs and CBOs are also engaged in human rights documentation and advocacy work, and capacity building with a range of opposition groups. As Burma’s ethnic insurgency groups lost control of their remaining ‘liberated zones’ in the early/mid-1990s, civilians displaced by armed conflict could no longer settle behind the front-lines of conflict, and IDP numbers increased substantially. With the help of international NGOs and donors who had been supporting refugees in Thailand for decades, Karen and Mon IDP assistance programmes were established. By April 2002, the annual cross-border aid budget had grown to $1m, distributed through local Karen and, to a lesser extent, Karenni and Shan groups. ¶ Short-term humanitarian aid was intended to supplement villagers’ rice-sharing and other coping mechanisms, offering them a chance to reconstruct their communities once the immediate crisis had passed. In 2005 several cross-border groups began to implement a range of community-based development initiatives, stimulated by the injection of significant new US Governmnet funds for cross-border work in 2006. Several of these organisations also implemented sometimes quite extensive health and education programmes in partnership with local communities

Beyond the National Convention

Burma’s ceasefire groups look ahead. It is never wise to try and second-guess the turn of events in Burma, but it’s safe to say that the current constitution-drafting National Convention is widely perceived as illegitimate—both inside Burma and abroad. This perception won’t change unless the process is broadened to include meaningful participation on the part of the National League for Democracy, or NLD, and the United Nationalities Alliance, or UNA, a coalition of ethnic nationality parties elected in 1990, which has always worked closely with the NLD. Despite the legitimacy deficit of the constitution-drafting exercise, the convention has emerged as the most important political arena since the 1990 election—and perhaps even since the military takeover of 1962. For Burma’s ethnic nationalist communities in particular, it represents a milestone in efforts to have their concerns registered on the national political stage

Border-based Insurgency: Time for a Reality Check

The days of Burma’s border-based insurgency may be drawing to a close. As elements of the Karen nationalist community barter for an unofficial ceasefire with the junta, armed rebel groups on the border are growing increasingly marginalized

The Quest for Karen Unity

If the Karen National Union wants to continue playing a useful role in Burma, it should stop trying to impose an artificial unity on Karen society. Karen identity means different things to different people. Since before Burmese independence in 1948, elites have sought to mobilize political support around competing ideas of “Karen-ness”. The best known nationalist projects have been those emerging in western-oriented, mostly Christian-led, S’ghaw dialect-speaking communities. For many observers and supporters, the militarized nation-building project of the Karen National Union is the only authentic expression of Karen nationalism in Burma. Indeed, international agencies have played important roles in legitimizing the KNU’s version of Karen nationalism, especially through the provision of humanitarian relief to displaced people, via organizations linked to the KNU. However, the KNU is only one among a number of actors on the Karen political stage and represents only one strand of Karen nationalism

Mahn Sha La Phan: Resistance leader of Burma's Karen people, he tried to keep the opposition united

In 2000, Mahn Sha La Phan, who has been assassinated aged 64, became general secretary of Burma's most significant insurgent organisation, the Karen National Union (KNU). With the death of its chairman, General Bo Mya, in 2006, Mahn Sha, a man of talent and integrity, had become the most significant figure within the KNU, and its chief ideologue. He was also a leader of the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB), and other opposition movements. Unlike most leaders of the Christian-dominated KNU, he came from a Buddhist background and was a speaker of the Pwo dialect. His murder is a great setback to the KNU, and for the wider Burmese opposition, whose strained unity he did so much to support