Life, procreation, and transcendence : toward an ethic for the future of humanity

Abstract: Anti-natalism is the view that it is (almost) always wrong to bring people into existence. This view is most famously defended by David Benatar. I attempt to answer the following question in this thesis: If we are to take the badness of extinction seriously, are there conditions under which procreation may still be permissible, despite the fact that it (currently) involves the creation of beings who will suffer—conditions Benatar and other anti-natalists have either overlooked or under-explored? My approach is unique relative to other discussions of Benatar, in the sense that I grant that his arguments are strong, and that procreation is indeed morally problematic. But I deny that procreation is wrong all things considered, because, as I discuss in depth in this thesis, there are some morally relevant things he does not consider. Specifically, I introduce unexplored non-welfarist (dignity, meaning in life) and welfarist (transhumanism) considerations to the natal debate. The strategy I adopt undercuts many of the anti-natal prescriptions Benatar thinks necessarily follow from his arguments for the pro tanto moral wrongness of procreation, and also apply to other forms of anti-natalism.Ph.D. (Philosophy

The hypothetical consent objection to anti-natalism

Abstract: A very common but untested assumption is that potential children would consent to be exposed to the harms of existence in order to experience its benefits (if it were possible for us to ask and for them to respond). And so, would-be parents might appeal to the following view: Procreation is all-things-considered permissible, as it is morally acceptable for one to knowingly harm an unconsenting patient if one has good reasons for assuming her hypothetical consent—and procreators can indeed reasonably rely on some notion of hypothetical consent. I argue that this view is in error. My argument appeals to a consent-based version of anti-natalism advanced by Seana Valentine Shiffrin. Anti-natalism is the view that it is (almost) always wrong to bring people (and perhaps all sentient beings) into existence. While, like Shiffrin, I stop short of advocating a thoroughgoing anti-natalism, I nevertheless argue that procreators cannot appeal to hypothetical consent to justify exposing children to the harms of existence. I end by suggesting a more promising route by which this justification might be achieved

Assessing anti-natalism : a philosophical examination of the morality of procreation

M.A. (Philosophy)Consider a couple planning to have children. There are many reasons one could offer these potential parents for reconsidering bringing new people into existence. One could for instance say to them that they currently lack the finances, or maturity, to adequately take care of any children they produce. If it were almost certain that this couple would pass on a terrible genetic disease to their offspring, one could see it as one’s duty to warn them against reproduction. One could even draw attention to the plight of orphans, and suggest to these (and other) potential parents that a more pressing responsibility lies not in planning to give homes to persons not yet in existence, but in attempting to give homes to those already in existence. However, when deciding whether or not to create children, rarely does one consider, over and above the preceding considerations, whether there might be some fundamental wrongness to the very act of procreation. In other words, rarely does one consider the possibility that creating people might, all things considered, never be permissible. At its extreme, “anti-natalism” implies the view that coming into existence is always a harm that outweighs any of its benefits. This position is defended by David Benatar (Benatar 1997, 2006). However, one need not believe that coming into existence is always an overall harm in order to favour an anti-natal perspective; one need only believe that it is morally problematic to inflict serious, preventable harms upon others without their consent. Such a consent-based anti-natal position can be derived from the argument put forth by Seana Shiffrin (1999). To be clear, according to either of these versions of anti-natalism, creating a new person is considered an impermissible harm. When I refer to “anti-natalism” in this dissertation, I will be referring to this negative judgement regarding procreation. Anti-natalism has a rich philosophical heritage, with its roots stretching back to antiquity. For instance, Ecclesiastes (1:1-18) of the Hebrew Bible bemoans the apparent meaninglessness and futility of existence—a state of affairs with which any number of generations of humans must cope. Not until very recently, however, has the anti-natal position been given due consideration by philosophers. Arthur Schopenhauer (1851), for instance, is perhaps best known for advocating a pessimistic philosophy that is, broadly speaking, anti-natal in its implications. The key figure in this field, however, is Benatar, who defends an unequivocally anti-natal position

Electron acceleration by a tightly focused laser pulse in an ion channel

We examine the electron acceleration by tightly focused radially polarized laser beam in a preformed ion channel. The tight focusing and polarization of laser beam takes the advantage of extremely intense and asymmetric fields. The longitudinal electric field component at the beam center helps in trapping of electrons. For effective acceleration, the preformed ion plasma channel behaves as an applied external magnetic field. The electrostatic space charge field of this preformed ion channel helps in trapping of electrons and confined them to the accelerating phase. The gain in the energy of the electron is due to the fact that the radial component of electric field becomes zero on the propagation axis and only longitudinal component survives which accelerate the electrons in the longitudinal direction to high energy. The electrostatic space charge field assists in confining the motion of electrons from transverse oscillation and injects them to accelerating field which causes a resonance between electric field of laser and electrons. Because of combined role of tightly focused radially polarized laser and ion channel, the electrons can gain energy of the order of GeV