The Consequences of Teenage Childbearing

We examine the effect of teenage childbearing on the adult outcomes of a sample of women who gave birth, miscarried or had an abortion as teenagers. If miscarriages are (conditionally) random, then if all miscarriages occur before teenagers can obtain abortions, using the absence of a miscarriage as an instrument for a live birth provides a consistent estimate of the effect of teenage motherhood on women who give birth. If all abortions occur before any miscarriage can occur, OLS on the sample of women who either have a live birth or miscarry provides an unbiased estimate of this effect. Under reasonable assumptions, IV underestimates and OLS overestimates the effect of teenage motherhood on adult outcomes. For a variety of outcomes, the two estimates provide a narrow bound on the effect of teenage motherhood on adult outcomes and which is relatively modest. The bounds can also be combined to provide consistent estimates of the effects of teen motherhood. These effects are generally adverse but modest.

Are banks really special? New evidence from the FDIC-induced failure of healthy banks

The FDIC used cross-guarantees to close thirty-eight subsidiaries of First RepublicBank Corporation in 1988 and eighteen subsidiaries of First City Bancorporation in 1992 when lead banks from each of these Texas-based bank holding companies were declared insolvent. I use this exogenous failure of otherwise healthy subsidiary banks as a natural experiment for studying the impact of bank failure on local-area real economic activity. I find that the closings of the subsidiaries were associated with a significant decline in bank lending that led to a permanent reduction in real county income of about 3 percent

Defaults and losses on commercial real estate bonds

We employ a unique data set of public commercial real estate (CRE) bonds issued during the Great Depression era (1920-32) to determine their frequency of default and total loss given default. Default rates on these bonds far exceeded those originated in subsequent periods, driven in part by the greater economic stress of the Depression as well as the lower level of financial sophistication of investors and structures that prevailed in 1920-32. Our results confirm that making loans with higher loan-to-value ratios results in higher rates of default and loss. They also support the business cycle's significance to the performance of CRE assets. Despite the large number of defaults in the early 1930s, the losses, which typically occurred after 1940, are comparable to those for contemporary loans, largely due to the rapid recovery of the economy from the Depression. This finding has relevance today, as numerous entities have a large amount of sub-performing CRE assets to work out. While the data point to better loss performance the quicker a problem loan is worked out, this may not hold true when there is a rapid recovery around the corner

Borrowers' financial constraints and the transmission of monetary policy: Evidence from financial conglomerations

Building on recent evidence concerning the functioning of internal capital markets in financial conglomerates, we conduct a novel test of the balance-sheet channel of monetary policy. Specifically, we investigate how the response of lending to monetary policy differs across small banks that are affiliated with the same bank holding company but operate in different geographical areas. These banks face similar constraints in accessing internal and external sources of funds, but have different pools of borrowers. Because they typically concentrate their lending with small local businesses, we can exploit cross-sectional differences in local economic indicators at the time of a policy shock to study whether the strength of borrowers' balance sheets affects the response of bank lending. We find evidence that the negative response of bank loan growth to a monetary contraction is significantly stronger when borrowers have weaker balance sheets

Are Bank Holding Companies a Source of Strength to Their Banking Subsidiaries?

I present evidence that the cross-guarantee authority granted to the FDIC by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 has unexpectedly strengthened the Federal Reserve's source-of-strength doctrine. In particular, I find that a bank affiliated with a multi-bank holding company is significantly safer than either a stand-alone bank or a bank affiliated with a one-bank holding company. Not only does affiliation reduce the probability of future financial distress, but distressed affiliated banks are more likely to receive capital injections and recover more quickly than other banks. Moreover, the effects of affiliation are strengthened for an expanding bank holding company. However, the effects of affiliation are weakened when the parent has less than full ownership of the subsidiary. Most interestingly, my results show that these differences in behavior across affiliation did not exist before 1989, when the cross-guarantee authority was introduced

Email from Adam Ashcraft Regarding AIG and the Discount Window

Email (9/14/2008 9:31 am)From: Adam Ashcraft To: Jamie McAndrews; cc: Alejandro LaTorre, Arthur Angulo, Beverly Hirtle, Brian Peters, Catherine Voigts, Chris Burke, Hayley Boesky, Jim Mahoney, Meg McConnell, Patricia Mosser, Simon Potter, Til Schuermann, Tobias Adrian, Warren Hrung re: Re: AIG and the discount windo

Has the credit default swap market lowered the cost of corporate debt?

There have been widespread claims that credit derivatives such as the credit default swap (CDS) have lowered the cost of firms’ debt financing by creating for investors new hedging opportunities and information. However, these instruments also give banks an opaque means to sever links to their borrowers, thus reducing lender incentives to screen and monitor. In this paper, we evaluate the effect that the onset of CDS trading has on the spreads that underlying firms pay at issue when they seek funding in the corporate bond and syndicated loan markets. Employing matched-sample methods, we find no evidence that the onset of CDS trading affects the cost of debt financing for the average borrower. However, we do find economically significant adverse effects to risky and informationally-opaque firms. It appears that the onset of CDS trading reduces the effectiveness of the lead bank’s retained share in resolving any asymmetric information problems that exist between a lead bank and non-lead participants in a loan syndicate. On the plus side, we do find that CDS trading has a small positive effect on spreads at issue for transparent and safe firms, in which the lead bank’s share is much less important. Moreover, we document that the benefit of CDS trading on spreads increases once the market becomes sufficiently liquid. In sum, while CDS trading has contributed to the completeness of markets, it has also created new problems by reducing the effectiveness of lead banks’ loan shares as a monitoring device—thus creating a need for regulatory intervention

Two Monetary Tools: Interest Rates and Haircuts

We study a production economy with multiple sectors financed by issuing securities to agents who face capital constraints. Binding capital constraints propagate business cycles, and a reduction of the interest rate can increase the required return of high-haircut assets since it can increase the shadow cost of capital for constrained agents. The required return can be lowered by easing funding constraints through lowering haircuts. To assess empirically the power of the haircut tool, we study the introduction of the legacy Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF). By considering unpredictable rejections of bonds from TALF, we estimate that haircuts had a significant effect on prices. Further, unique survey evidence suggests that lowering haircuts could reduce required returns by more than 3% and provides broader evidence on the demand sensitivity to haircuts.