PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARDS IN MASSACHUSETTS STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS

Concurrent jurisdiction frequently allows attorneys the choice of filing a complaint in state or federal court. State courts presumptively have jurisdiction over claims rooted in federal law. At times, state courts are required to entertain federal claims. Similarly, federal courts have authority over state claims because of diversity, federal question, and supplemental jurisdiction. Many claims are rooted in both state and federal law, such as antitrust, civil rights, environmental, consumer protection, and civil liberties. Confronted with the choice of state or federal court, the attorney must evaluate a variety of factors before deciding in which court to file. In a civil action where the plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction, the selection of a state or federal court may determine the success of the motion for temporary relief. The reason is simple: state and federal courts frequently apply differing standards to such preliminary motions. Massachusetts state and federal courts apply different standards, although some courts have indicated to the contrary. In the federal courts, the matter of differing standards is compounded by the complex Erie/Hanna doctrine. State courts may be similarly bound by the much less well known reverse-Erie doctrine. Consequently, the Massachusetts federal and state courts may be required to apply state standards to state claims and federal standards to federal claims. This Article explores the standards for preliminary injunctions in Massachusetts state and federal courts, and the intricacies that attend their application. Part I provides background for the examination of state and federal standards. Part II addresses the criteria for temporary relief in the Massachusetts state courts, while Part III reviews the comparable standards in the Massachusetts federal courts. Part IV inquires into the Erie/Hanna doctrine as it applies to preliminary relief in the federal courts. The Article concludes with the author\u27s observations about the issues raised

Consolidating the Preliminary Injunction Hearing and Trial: Changing the Rules in the Middle of the Game

In this Article the Author addresses the issues surrounding consolidation, the situation that arises when a court decides the merits of a dispute based solely on the record produced at a hearing on motion for a preliminary injunction. The Author identifies some of the more flagrant abuses that trial and appellate courts have committed in reaching the merits after only a hearing on a motion for preliminary relief. The proposed amendments discussed in the Article would serve both courts and parties. They would prevent the kind of abuses discussed in this article by requiring that the parties be informed of the procedural setting in which the court intends to operate. They would also afford the parties the opportunity to object to a consolidation order in much the same way as parties do when faced with a summary judgment motion. The provisions would insure that due process is provided and that parties have the chance to present all the evidence they plan to introduce. The proposed amendments are also designed to avoid tying the hands of the courts. While the judges may still play an active role in litigation, the proposed changes clarify what that role should be by adding specific procedures to govern a disposition on the merits after only a hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction

Preliminary Injunction Standards in Massachusetts State and Federal Courts

Concurrent jurisdiction frequently allows attorneys the choice of filing a complaint in state or federal court. State courts presumptively have jurisdiction over claims rooted in federal law. At times, state courts are required to entertain federal claims. Similarly, federal courts have authority over state claims because of diversity, federal question, and supplemental jurisdiction. Many claims are rooted in both state and federal law, such as antitrust, civil rights, environmental, consumer protection, and civil liberties. Confronted with the choice of state or federal court, the attorney must evaluate a variety of factors before deciding in which court to file. In a civil action where the plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction, the selection of a state or federal court may determine the success of the motion for temporary relief. The reason is simple: state and federal courts frequently apply differing standards to such preliminary motions. Massachusetts state and federal courts apply different standards, although some courts have indicated to the contrary. In the federal courts, the matter of differing standards is compounded by the complex Erie/Hanna doctrine. State courts may be similarly bound by the much less well known reverse-Erie doctrine. Consequently, the Massachusetts federal and state courts may be required to apply state standards to state claims and federal standards to federal claims. This Article explores the standards for preliminary injunctions in Massachusetts state and federal courts, and the intricacies that attend their application. Part I provides background for the examination of state and federal standards. Part II addresses the criteria for temporary relief in the Massachusetts state courts, while Part III reviews the comparable standards in the Massachusetts federal courts. Part IV inquires into the Erie/Hanna doctrine as it applies to preliminary relief in the federal courts. The Article concludes with the Author\u27s observations about the issues raised

Preliminary Injunction Standards in Massachusetts State and Federal Courts

Concurrent jurisdiction frequently allows attorneys the choice of filing a complaint in state or federal court. State courts presumptively have jurisdiction over claims rooted in federal law. At times, state courts are required to entertain federal claims. Similarly, federal courts have authority over state claims because of diversity, federal question, and supplemental jurisdiction. Many claims are rooted in both state and federal law, such as antitrust, civil rights, environmental, consumer protection, and civil liberties. Confronted with the choice of state or federal court, the attorney must evaluate a variety of factors before deciding in which court to file. In a civil action where the plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction, the selection of a state or federal court may determine the success of the motion for temporary relief. The reason is simple: state and federal courts frequently apply differing standards to such preliminary motions. Massachusetts state and federal courts apply different standards, although some courts have indicated to the contrary. In the federal courts, the matter of differing standards is compounded by the complex Erie/Hanna doctrine. State courts may be similarly bound by the much less well known reverse-Erie doctrine. Consequently, the Massachusetts federal and state courts may be required to apply state standards to state claims and federal standards to federal claims. This Article explores the standards for preliminary injunctions in Massachusetts state and federal courts, and the intricacies that attend their application. Part I provides background for the examination of state and federal standards. Part II addresses the criteria for temporary relief in the Massachusetts state courts, while Part III reviews the comparable standards in the Massachusetts federal courts. Part IV inquires into the Erie/Hanna doctrine as it applies to preliminary relief in the federal courts. The Article concludes with the Author\u27s observations about the issues raised

Preliminary Injunctions: The Varying Standards

The Author undertakes a survey in this Article which shows that the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals have not articulated or applied consistent criteria for preliminary injunctive relief. Their decisions have described a sinuous path through primary standards, alternative tests, and sliding scale variations. Part of the difficulty may be because the Supreme Court has not taken a firm hand in resolving conflicts between and among the circuits on critical issues involving interlocutory injunctions. In addition while the courts of appeals make reference to each others\u27 opinions, they have not demonstrated a desire to achieve uniformity in their approaches to interim relief. In some cases, the non-uniformity is intra-circuit as well as inter-circuit. Because there are so many currently applicable tests and variations, a moving party asserting the same facts and legal principles in different circuits could easily secure different results on motions for preliminary relief. While non-uniformity of decisions may serve a creative purpose in the short run, over time it tends to breed disrespect for and discontent of the law and advance the perception that judicial decisionmaking is largely arbitrary. Furthermore from a practical perspective, non-uniformity, especially of the intra-circuit variety, tends to undermine the goal of predictability which is vital for lawyer and client in ordering their affairs to conform with established legal norms. If the principles are uncertain, both counseling and compliance become chancy at best

Consolidating the Preliminary Injunction Hearing and Trial: Changing the Rules in the Middle of the Game

In this Article the Author addresses the issues surrounding consolidation, the situation that arises when a court decides the merits of a dispute based solely on the record produced at a hearing on motion for a preliminary injunction. The Author identifies some of the more flagrant abuses that trial and appellate courts have committed in reaching the merits after only a hearing on a motion for preliminary relief. The proposed amendments discussed in the Article would serve both courts and parties. They would prevent the kind of abuses discussed in this article by requiring that the parties be informed of the procedural setting in which the court intends to operate. They would also afford the parties the opportunity to object to a consolidation order in much the same way as parties do when faced with a summary judgment motion. The provisions would insure that due process is provided and that parties have the chance to present all the evidence they plan to introduce. The proposed amendments are also designed to avoid tying the hands of the courts. While the judges may still play an active role in litigation, the proposed changes clarify what that role should be by adding specific procedures to govern a disposition on the merits after only a hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS: THE VARYING STANDARDS

The Author undertakes a survey in this Article which shows that the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals have not articulated or applied consistent criteria for preliminary injunctive relief. Their decisions have described a sinuous path through primary standards, alternative tests, and sliding scale variations. Part of the difficulty may be because the Supreme Court has not taken a firm hand in resolving conflicts between and among the circuits on critical issues involving interlocutory injunctions. In addition while the courts of appeals make reference to each others\u27 opinions, they have not demonstrated a desire to achieve uniformity in their approaches to interim relief. In some cases, the non-uniformity is intra-circuit as well as inter-circuit. Because there are so many currently applicable tests and variations, a moving party asserting the same facts and legal principles in different circuits could easily secure different results on motions for preliminary relief. While non-uniformity of decisions may serve a creative purpose in the short run, over time it tends to breed disrespect for and discontent of the law and advance the perception that judicial decisionmaking is largely arbitrary. Furthermore from a practical perspective, non-uniformity, especially of the intra-circuit variety, tends to undermine the goal of predictability which is vital for lawyer and client in ordering their affairs to conform with established legal norms. If the principles are uncertain, both counseling and compliance become chancy at best

Codification of Supplemental Jurisdiction: Anatomy of a Legislative Proposal

The historic nature of congressional action in codifying supplemental jurisdiction in section 1367 calls for a close examination of the legislative process and product. Section I of this Article presents a brief survey of the development of supplemental jurisdiction. Section II examines the history of the legislative process that produced section 1367. Section III contains a preliminary review of judicial decisions under the new supplemental jurisdiction statute. The Article concludes with some editorial remarks regarding the statute and the process by which it became public law