When Does Inflation Hurt Economic Growth? Different Nonlinearities for Different Economies

We show that the effects of inflation on growth change substantially as the inflation rate rises. Moreover the nonlinearities are quite different for industrial economies than for developing countries. We find that the threshold at which inflation first begins to seriously negatively affect growth is around 8% for industrial economies but 3% or less for developing countries. Marginal growth costs for developing countries then decline significantly above 50% inflation. Failure to account for nonlinearity biases downward the estimated effects of inflation on growth. Mixing industrial and developing economies together also produces unreliable results.inflation; growth; non-linearity

The Falsification of Four Popular Hypotheses about International Financial Behavior during the Asian Crisis

Various claims have been made about the causes of the Asian crisis and its spread. Here, we use data on the behavior of capital flows during the crisis to test the strong forms of four such hypotheses, including the dominant role of portfolio investors and hedge funds in initiating and spreading the crisis; moral hazard; and, finally, the role of Japanese banks in spreading the trouble to countries in which they were the largest source of funds. All are falsified as monocausal explanations. For example, portfolio investments that could not have been subject to substantial moral hazard continued to flow into Asia until very shortly before the crisis. Likewise, contrary to common expectations banks were a much larger source of capital outflows during the crisis than were portfolio investors. While falsified in their strongest forms, several of these hypotheses in less strong form should play a role in a more nuanced analysis. It is time to move past simple single-factor approaches in order to produce a more complete, synthetic explanation of this episode.

The Falsification of Four Popular Hypotheses about International Financial Behavior during the Asian Crisis

Various claims have been made about the causes of the Asian crisis and its spread. Here, we use data on the behavior of capital flows during the crisis to test the strong forms of four such hypotheses, including the dominant role of portfolio investors and hedge funds in initiating and spreading the crisis; moral hazard; and, finally, the role of Japanese banks in spreading the trouble to countries in which they were the largest source of funds. All are falsified as monocausal explanations. For example, portfolio investments that could not have been subject to substantial moral hazard continued to flow into Asia until very shortly before the crisis. Likewise, contrary to common expectations banks were a much larger source of capital outflows during the crisis than were portfolio investors. While falsified in their strongest forms, several of these hypotheses in less strong form should play a role in a more nuanced analysis. It is time to move past simple single-factor approaches in order to produce a more complete, synthetic explanation of this episode

When Does Inflation Hurt Economic Growth? Different Nonlinearities for Different Economies

We show that the effects of inflation on growth change substantially as the inflation rate rises. Moreover the nonlinearities are quite different for industrial economies than for developing countries. We find that the threshold at which inflation first begins to seriously negatively affect growth is around 8% for industrial economies but 3% or less for developing countries. Marginal growth costs for developing countries then decline significantly above 50% inflation. Failure to account for nonlinearity biases downward the estimated effects of inflation on growth. Mixing industrial and developing economies together also produces unreliable results

Pass a Law, Any Law, Fast! State Legislative Responses to the Kelo Backlash

The Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New London left protection of property against takings for economic development to the states. Since Kelo, thirty-seven states have enacted legislation to update their eminent domain laws. This paper is the first to theoretically and empirically analyze the factors that influence whether, in what manner, and how quickly states change their laws through new legislation. Fourteen of the thirty-seven new laws offer only weak protections against development takings. The legislative response to Kelo was responsive to measures of the backlash but only in the binary decision whether to pass any new law. The decision to enact a meaningful restriction was more a function of relevant political economy measures. States with more economic freedom, greater value of new housing construction, and less racial and income inequality are more likely to have enacted stronger restrictions, and sooner. Of the thirteen states that have not updated, Arkansas, Oklahoma and Mississippi are highly likely to do so in the future. Hawaii, Massachusetts and New York are unlikely to update ever if at all

Corporate Campaign Contributions as a Predictor for Abnormal Stock Returns After Presidential Elections

Contributions by investor-owned companies play major roles in financing the campaigns of candidates for elective office in the United States. We look at the presidential level and analyze contributions by companies before an election and their stock market performance following US presidential elections from 1992 to 2004. We find that companies experienced abnormal positive post-election returns with (i) a higher percentage of contributions given to the eventual winner and (ii) with a higher total contribution given. Hypothetical portfolios of the 30 largest corporate contributors formed according to (i) the percentage of contributions given to the winner in a presidential election and (ii) the total contribution (divided by market capitalization) would have earned significant abnormal returns in the two years after an election. While all results hold for Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, they are stronger by a magnitude of two to three under W. Bush

Is a Federal European Constitution for an Enlarged European Union Necessary? Some Preliminary Suggestions Using Public Choice Analysis

In order to guarantee a further successful functioning of the enlarged European Union a Federal European Constitution is proposed. Six basic elements of a future European federal constitution are developed: the European commission should be turned into an European government and the European legislation should consist of a two chamber system with full responsibility over all federal items. Three further key elements are the subsidiarity principle, federalism and the secession right, which are best suited to limiting the domain of the central European authority to which certain tasks are given, such as defense, foreign and environmental policy. Another important feature is direct democracy, which provides the possibility for European voters to participate actively in the political decision making, to break political and interest group cartels, and to prevent an unwanted shifting of responsibilities from EU member states to the European federal level