Legitimacy In A Bastard Kingdom

"Now, gods, stand up for bastards!" No, this is not the prayer of the New York litigator; it is the battle cry of Edmund, bastard son of the Earl of Gloucester and one of the great early modern theorists of political legitimacy. Edmund is scheming to usurp the earldom with the invention of a forged letter that frames the legitimate heir, his half-brother Edgar. Edmund’s political philosophy is laid out in his first soliloquy in King Lear, which I quote below in its entirety. Why I believe Edmund to be a great theorist of legitimacy will become more clear over time

All Foundings Are Forced

Days after the beginning of the Libyan uprising in February 2011, a self-appointed group of human rights lawyers and defectors from Qaddafi’s regime announced the formation of the Transitional National Council and declared itself “the only legitimate body representing the people of Libya and the Libyan state.” Five days later, France recognized the Transitional National Council as “the legitimate representative of the Libyan people.” What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the normative success of such a claim to political legitimacy? This article argues that A legitimately governs B only when A governs B in such a way that both A and B remain free moral agents over time. This is so only when A’s governance of B realizes and protects B’s freedom over time, and this in turn is so only when A is a free group agent that counts a free B as a member. Three ways of constituting a free group agent are explored: constitution through shared aims, through representation, and through procedure. Three ways of conscripting free members to a group agent are explored: conscription through consent, through fair play, and through practical necessity. The progress of a stylized Libyan revolution is traced through the resulting nine ways of constituting group agents and conscripting to it members. The conclusion: though no assertion of political legitimacy is self-enacting, some assertions of political legitimacy can be self-fulfilling

Forcing a People to Be Free

Is forcing a people to be free possible, and if so, is it ever morally permissible? The question in some form is very much on our minds, provoked by the war in Iraq and one of its stated justifications: freeing the Iraqi people from tyranny. An account of normative peoplehood is presented under which a people can fail to be a competent group agent, and so be a justified target of paternalism, even though the natural persons who make up the people are competent agents who are not justified targets of paternalism. Connections between a competent group agent, a free people, and a legitimate government are drawn. In response to the worry that this view permits limitless and never-ending regime change, an asymmetry between criteria for initiating intervention and criteria for ending intervention is shown to follow from the account of minimal legitimacy presented.