Corporate Governance, Compensation Consultants, and CEO Pay Levels

This study investigates the relation between corporate governance and CEO pay levels and the extent to which the higher pay found in firms using compensation consultants is related to governance differences. Using proxy statement disclosures from 2,110 companies, we find that CEO pay is higher in firms with weaker governance and that firms with weaker governance are more likely to use compensation consultants. CEO pay remains higher in clients of consulting firms even after controlling for economic determinants of compensation. However, when consultant users and non-users are matched on both economic and governance characteristics, differences in pay levels are not statistically significant, indicating that governance differences explain much of the higher pay in clients of compensation consultants. We find no support for claims that CEO pay is higher in potentially “conflicted” consultants that also offer additional non-compensation-related services

Bayesian Covariance Matrix Estimation using a Mixture of Decomposable Graphical Models

Estimating a covariance matrix efficiently and discovering its structure are important statistical problems with applications in many fields. This article takes a Bayesian approach to estimate the covariance matrix of Gaussian data. We use ideas from Gaussian graphical models and model selection to construct a prior for the covariance matrix that is a mixture over all decomposable graphs, where a graph means the configuration of nonzero offdiagonal elements in the inverse of the covariance matrix. Our prior for the covariance matrix is such that the probability of each graph size is specified by the user and graphs of equal size are assigned equal probability. Most previous approaches assume that all graphs are equally probable. We give empirical results that show the prior that assigns equal probability over graph sizes outperforms the prior that assigns equal probability over all graphs, both in identifying the correct decomposable graph and in more efficiently estimating the covariance matrix. The advantage is greatest when the number of observations is small relative to the dimension of the covariance matrix. The article also shows empirically that there is minimal change in statistical efficiency in using the mixture over decomposable graphs prior for estimating a general covariance compared to the Bayesian estimator by Wong et al. (2003), even when the graph of the covariance matrix is nondecomposable. However, our approach has some important advantages over that of Wong et al. (2003). Our method requires the number of decomposable graphs for each graph size. We show how to estimate these numbers using simulation and that the simulation results agree with analytic results when such results are known. We also show how to estimate the posterior distribution of the covariance matrix using Markov chain Monte Carlo with the elements of the covariance matrix integrated out and give empirical results that show the sampler is computationally efficient and converges rapidly. Finally, we note that both the prior and the simulation method to evaluate the prior apply generally to any decomposable graphical model.Covariance selection; Graphical models; Reduced conditional sampling; Variable selection

The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting: Evidence From Equity Compensation Plans

This study examines the effects of shareholder support for equity compensation plans on subsequent CEO compensation. Using cross-sectional regression, instrumental variable, and regression discontinuity research designs, we find little evidence that either lower shareholder voting support for, or outright rejection of, proposed equity compensation plans leads to decreases in the level or composition of future CEO incentive compensation. We also find that, in cases where the equity compensation plan is rejected by shareholders, firms are more likely to propose, and shareholders are more likely to approve, a plan the following year. Our results suggest that shareholder votes for equity pay plans have little substantive impact on firms’ incentive compensation policies. Thus, recent regulatory efforts aimed at strengthening shareholder voting rights, particularly in the context of executive compensation, may have limited effect on firms’ compensation policies

The Incentives for Tax Planning

We use a proprietary data set with detailed executive compensation information to examine the relationship between the incentives of the tax director and GAAP and cash effective tax rates, the book-tax gap, and measures of tax aggressiveness. We find that the incentive compensation of the tax director exhibits a strong negative relationship with the GAAP effective tax rate, but little relationship with the other tax attributes. We interpret these results as indicating that tax directors are provided with incentives to reduce the level of tax expense reported in the financial statements

Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities

This study examines whether Chief Executive Officer (CEO) equity-based holdings and compensation provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports. While several prior studies have examined this important question, the empirical evidence is mixed and the existence of a link between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities remains an open question. Because inferences from prior studies may be confounded by assumptions inherent in research design choices, we use propensity-score matching and assess hidden (omitted variable) bias within a broader sample. In contrast to most prior research, we do not find evidence of a positive association between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities after matching CEOs on the observable characteristics of their contracting environments. Instead, we find some evidence that accounting irregularities occur less frequently at firms where CEOs have relatively higher levels of equity incentives

Endogenous Selection and Moral Hazard in Compensation Contracts

The two major paradigms in the theoretical agency literature are moral hazard (i.e., hidden action) and adverse selection (i.e., hidden information). Prior research typically solves these problems in isolation, as opposed to simultaneously incorporating both adverse selection and moral hazard features. We formulate two complementary generalized principal-agent models that incorporate features observed in real-world contracting environments (e.g., agents with power utility and limited liability, lognormal stock price distributions, and stock options) as mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). We use state-of-the-art numerical algorithms to solve the resulting models. We find that many of the standard results no longer obtain when wealth effects are present. We also develop a new measure of incentives calculated as the change in the agent\u27s certainty equivalent under the optimal contract for a change in action evaluated at the optimal action. This measure facilitates interpretation of the resulting contracts and allows us to compare contracts across different contracting environments

Geographical and temporal trends in imported infections from the tropics requiring inpatient care at the Hospital for Tropical Diseases, London - a 15 year study.

BACKGROUND: Understanding geographic and temporal trends in imported infections is key to the management of unwell travellers. Many tropical infections can be managed as outpatients, with admission reserved for severe cases. METHODS: We prospectively recorded the diagnosis and travel history of patients admitted between 2000 and 2015. We describe the common tropical and non-tropical infectious diseases and how these varied based on region, reason for travel and over time. RESULTS: A total of 4362 admissions followed an episode of travel. Falciparum malaria was the most common diagnosis (n=1089). Among individuals who travelled to Africa 1206/1724 (70.0%) had a tropical diagnosis. The risk of a tropical infection was higher among travellers visiting friends and relatives than holidaymakers (OR 2.8, p<0.001). Among travellers to Asia non-tropical infections were more common than tropical infections (349/782, 44.6%), but enteric fever (117, 33.5%) of the tropical infections and dengue (70, 20.1%) remained important. The number of patients admitted with falciparum malaria declined over the study but those of enteric fever and dengue did not. CONCLUSIONS: Most of those arriving from sub-Saharan Africa with an illness requiring admission have a classical tropical infection, and malaria still predominates. In contrast, fewer patients who travelled to Asia have a tropical diagnosis but enteric fever and dengue remain relatively common. Those visiting friends and relatives are most likely to have a tropical infection

The Relation Between Equity Incentives and Misreporting: The Role of Risk-Taking Incentives

Prior research argues that a manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in the firm׳s stock price has a greater incentive to misreport. However, if the manager is risk-averse and misreporting increases both equity values and equity risk, the sensitivity of the manager׳s wealth to changes in stock price (portfolio delta) will have two countervailing incentive effects: a positive “reward effect” and a negative “risk effect.” In contrast, the sensitivity of the manager׳s wealth to changes in risk (portfolio vega) will have an unambiguously positive incentive effect. We show that jointly considering the incentive effects of both portfolio delta and portfolio vega substantially alters inferences reported in prior literature. Using both regression and matching designs, and measuring misreporting using discretionary accruals, restatements, and enforcement actions, we find strong evidence of a positive relation between vega and misreporting and that the incentives provided by vega subsume those of delta. Collectively, our results suggest that equity portfolios provide managers with incentives to misreport when they make managers less averse to equity risk

Corporate Governance, Incentives, and Tax Avoidance

We examine the link between corporate governance, managerial incentives, and corporate tax avoidance. Similar to other investment opportunities that involve risky expected cash flows, unresolved agency problems may lead managers to engage in more or less corporate tax avoidance than shareholders would otherwise prefer. Consistent with the mixed results reported in prior studies, we find no relation between various corporate governance mechanisms and tax avoidance at the conditional mean and median of the tax avoidance distribution. However, using quantile regression, we find a positive relation between board independence and financial sophistication for low levels of tax avoidance, but a negative relation for high levels of tax avoidance. These results indicate that these governance attributes have a stronger relation with more extreme levels of tax avoidance, which are more likely to be symptomatic of over- and under-investment by managers