Income and Occupations of Deaf Former College Students

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Regulation of vascular endothelial growth factor bioactivity in patients with acute lung injury

Background: Reduced bioactive vascular endothelial growth factor (VEGF) has been demonstrated in several inflammatory lung conditions including the acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS). sVEGFR-1, a soluble form of VEGF-1 receptor, is a potent natural inhibitor of VEGF. We hypothesised that sVEGFR-1 plays an important role in the regulation of the bioactivity of VEGF within the lung in patients with ARDS. Methods: Forty one patients with ARDS, 12 at risk of developing ARDS, and 16 normal controls were studied. Bioactive VEGF, total VEGF, and sVEGFR-1 were measured by ELISA in plasma and bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL) fluid. Reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction for sVEGFR-1 was performed on BAL cells. Results: sVEGFR-1 was detectable in the BAL fluid of 48% (20/41) of patients with early ARDS (1.4– 54.8 ng/ml epithelial lining fluid (ELF)) compared with 8% (1/12) at risk patients (p = 0.017) and none of the normal controls (p = 0.002). By day 4 sVEGFR-1 was detectable in only 2/18 ARDS patients (p = 0.008). Patients with detectable sVEGFR-1 had lower ELF median (IQR) levels of bioactive VEGF than those without detectable sVEGFR-1 (1415.2 (474.9–3192) pg/ml v 4761 (1349–7596.6) pg/ml, median difference 3346 pg/ml (95% CI 305.1 to 14711.9), p = 0.016), but there was no difference in total VEGF levels. BAL cells expressed mRNA for sVEGFR-1 and produced sVEGFR-1 protein which increased following incubation with tumour necrosis factor a. Conclusion: This study shows for the first time the presence of sVEGFR-1 in the BAL fluid of patients with ARDS. This may explain the presence of reduced bioactive VEGF in patients early in the course of ARDS

False positive dobutamine stress echocardiograms: Characterization of clinical, echocardiographic and angiographic findings

AbstractObjectives. This study was designed to characterize the clinical, echocardiographic and angiographic findings in patients who have regional wall motion abnormalities predictive of coronary artery disease on dobutamine stress echocardiograms, although coronary angiography reveals no critical stenoses.Background. The specificity of dobutamine stress echocardiography has been reported to be lower than its sensitivity; the sources of false positive findings on dobutamine stress echocardiograms have not been previously defined.Methods. Clinical and echocardiographic characteristics were retrospectively reviewed for patients who had both a dobutamine stress echocardiogram indicate of coronary artery disease on the basis of wall motion abnormalities and <50% stenoses reported on coronary angiography performed within 6 weeks of the echocardiogram. A 16-segment model was used to perform wall motion scoring. Angiograms were independently reviewed, and stenosis severity was quantified with the use of digital calipers.Results. Thirty-nine (11.4%) of 342 studies met criteria for false positive test results, which occurred predominantly in women (72%, p < 0.601). Regional wall motion abnormalities were evident more often in the posterior circulation (62%), and 65% of them were limited to the basal segments. Twelve (28%) of 43 wall motion abnormalities were associated with coronary stenoses of at least intermediate grade (lumen diameter 40.3% to 68.1%). Abnormalities confined to basal segments of the posterior circulation were unlikely to have associated coronary lesions (p = 0.03).Conclusions. False positive findings on dobutamine stress echocardiograms tend to involve small wall motion abnormalities that are frequently located in basal segments of the posterior myocardial circulation. Approximately one third of false positive results occurred in patients with intermediate-grade coronary stenoses, and these studies may reflect true inducible ischemia. Additional sources of false positive study results may include poor endocardial visualization and abnormal motion dye to tethering to the fibrous skeleton of the heart. Altered echocardiographic diagnostic criteria may be appropriate for small wall motion abnormalities confined to basal segments of the posterior circulation

The Incentives for Tax Planning

We use a proprietary data set with detailed executive compensation information to examine the relationship between the incentives of the tax director and GAAP and cash effective tax rates, the book-tax gap, and measures of tax aggressiveness. We find that the incentive compensation of the tax director exhibits a strong negative relationship with the GAAP effective tax rate, but little relationship with the other tax attributes. We interpret these results as indicating that tax directors are provided with incentives to reduce the level of tax expense reported in the financial statements

Corporate Governance, Compensation Consultants, and CEO Pay Levels

This study investigates the relation between corporate governance and CEO pay levels and the extent to which the higher pay found in firms using compensation consultants is related to governance differences. Using proxy statement disclosures from 2,110 companies, we find that CEO pay is higher in firms with weaker governance and that firms with weaker governance are more likely to use compensation consultants. CEO pay remains higher in clients of consulting firms even after controlling for economic determinants of compensation. However, when consultant users and non-users are matched on both economic and governance characteristics, differences in pay levels are not statistically significant, indicating that governance differences explain much of the higher pay in clients of compensation consultants. We find no support for claims that CEO pay is higher in potentially “conflicted” consultants that also offer additional non-compensation-related services

The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting: Evidence From Equity Compensation Plans

This study examines the effects of shareholder support for equity compensation plans on subsequent CEO compensation. Using cross-sectional regression, instrumental variable, and regression discontinuity research designs, we find little evidence that either lower shareholder voting support for, or outright rejection of, proposed equity compensation plans leads to decreases in the level or composition of future CEO incentive compensation. We also find that, in cases where the equity compensation plan is rejected by shareholders, firms are more likely to propose, and shareholders are more likely to approve, a plan the following year. Our results suggest that shareholder votes for equity pay plans have little substantive impact on firms’ incentive compensation policies. Thus, recent regulatory efforts aimed at strengthening shareholder voting rights, particularly in the context of executive compensation, may have limited effect on firms’ compensation policies

Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities

This study examines whether Chief Executive Officer (CEO) equity-based holdings and compensation provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports. While several prior studies have examined this important question, the empirical evidence is mixed and the existence of a link between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities remains an open question. Because inferences from prior studies may be confounded by assumptions inherent in research design choices, we use propensity-score matching and assess hidden (omitted variable) bias within a broader sample. In contrast to most prior research, we do not find evidence of a positive association between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities after matching CEOs on the observable characteristics of their contracting environments. Instead, we find some evidence that accounting irregularities occur less frequently at firms where CEOs have relatively higher levels of equity incentives

Endogenous Selection and Moral Hazard in Compensation Contracts

The two major paradigms in the theoretical agency literature are moral hazard (i.e., hidden action) and adverse selection (i.e., hidden information). Prior research typically solves these problems in isolation, as opposed to simultaneously incorporating both adverse selection and moral hazard features. We formulate two complementary generalized principal-agent models that incorporate features observed in real-world contracting environments (e.g., agents with power utility and limited liability, lognormal stock price distributions, and stock options) as mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). We use state-of-the-art numerical algorithms to solve the resulting models. We find that many of the standard results no longer obtain when wealth effects are present. We also develop a new measure of incentives calculated as the change in the agent\u27s certainty equivalent under the optimal contract for a change in action evaluated at the optimal action. This measure facilitates interpretation of the resulting contracts and allows us to compare contracts across different contracting environments

The Perceived Uniqueness of the IS Profession: The Role of Gender

This research investigated gender differences in the characteristics IS managers perceive to be unique to the IS profession. Aninterpretivist perspective, qualitative data collection (i.e., focus group interviews) and the revealed causal mapping dataanalysis method were used to evoke and represent mental models (i.e., cognitive structures) of men and women in the IS fieldregarding the unique characteristics of their profession. By comparing these mental models we uncovered different strategicviews of professional identity within our participants. A lack of consistency in how IS professional identity is conceptualizedcould lead to a fragmented sense of professional community and disengagement at the individual level

The Relation Between Equity Incentives and Misreporting: The Role of Risk-Taking Incentives

Prior research argues that a manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in the firm׳s stock price has a greater incentive to misreport. However, if the manager is risk-averse and misreporting increases both equity values and equity risk, the sensitivity of the manager׳s wealth to changes in stock price (portfolio delta) will have two countervailing incentive effects: a positive “reward effect” and a negative “risk effect.” In contrast, the sensitivity of the manager׳s wealth to changes in risk (portfolio vega) will have an unambiguously positive incentive effect. We show that jointly considering the incentive effects of both portfolio delta and portfolio vega substantially alters inferences reported in prior literature. Using both regression and matching designs, and measuring misreporting using discretionary accruals, restatements, and enforcement actions, we find strong evidence of a positive relation between vega and misreporting and that the incentives provided by vega subsume those of delta. Collectively, our results suggest that equity portfolios provide managers with incentives to misreport when they make managers less averse to equity risk