Tax compliance costs and non-filing behaviour.

Tax compliance cost

With non-competitive firms, a turnover tax can dominate the VAT

In an example with monopoly final and intermediate goods firms and substitutable primary and intermediate inputs, it is shown that there exist turnover taxes that yield more revenue than any feasible value-added tax. Second, simultaneously higher welfare, revenue and output are possible with the turnover tax.

VAT versus the turnover tax with non-competitive firms.

The VAT is compared to a turnover tax (TT) given monopoly final goods and intermediate goods firms interacting strategically. Linear demands and constant costs are assumed. Via examples it is shown that for both "Cournot" and "Stackelberg" games, a revenue neutral VAT may not exist to a given turnover tax; and the TT can dominate the VAT simultaneously in welfare, revenue and output terms. In other examples it is shown that the VAT dominating the TT by all three indicators is also possible. It is also shown that outcomes are identical to the "Cournot" game when the consumer goods firm is the strategic leader. When the intermediate goods firm is the leader, intermediate price distortion is lower and welfare higher than in the "Cournot" game under both taxes; and the output neutral VAT rate to any feasible TT rate is higher than in the "Cournot" game.VAT ; Retail sales tax ; Turnover tax ; Welfare ; Tax revenue ; Cournot ; Stackelberg

Economic theory of tax compliance with special reference to tax compliance costs.

Tax compliance cost

Implications of Tax Administration for Tax Design: a Tentative Assessment

The paper focuses on how administration influences tax policy: It does not go into prescriptions on how tax administration effectiveness and efficiency can be increased through other institutional, incentive and management reforms.Working Paper Number 04-37

The Income tax compliance cost of corporations in India, 2000-01.

Tax compliance cost

Corporate ownership and bribery

10.2139/ssrn.113179

Reforming tax systems - the World Bank record in the 1990s

The main constraint on world Bank operations in tax and customs administration is the Bank's inadequate institutional framework for accumulating knowledge from loan operations, concludes this review of the Bank's record on reform of tax systems in the 1990s. The Bank's theoretical basis for reforming tax and customs administration is still rudimentary. Recent theories stress the importance of institutions that harness voice and improve transparency and contestability, but there is little evidence that reform of these factors alone makes tax administration more effective. Improvements are needed in pre-project diagnosis and project design, especially for examining accountability, administration costs, managerial autonomy, performance incentives for staff, taxpayer equity and services, and environmental factors. Pre-project work could draw more systematically on lessons from previous experience. Institutional components of project design have been biased toward organization, manpower upgrading, and procedures related to information technology. Too little attention has been paid to improving accountability, administrative cost-effectiveness, and anticorruption institution-building. Projects have made inadequate use of different kinds of performance indicators, with little uniformity in those applied. Methods used to evaluate project outcomes could be better and more uniform. Suggestions for future Bank operations: 1) doing better background work and articulating a strategy and comprehensive framework for Bank involvement in reform of tax administration. 2) Possibly supporting and strengthening regional tax administration associations, which could serve as catalysts for change. 3) Strengthening partnering and supporting private sector consultant organizations, so they can manage major components of administrative reform. 4) Institutionalizing the accumulation of knowledge about tax administration (which might require changing staff recruitment, the mix of staff skills, and training plans). The authors provide recommendations for improving project diagnosis, design, performance indicators, and appraisal, as well as a short list of projects that serve as guides to good practice.Enterprise Development&Reform,Decentralization,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Banks&Banking Reform,Municipal Financial Management,Banks&Banking Reform,National Governance,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Municipal Financial Management,Tax Policy and Administration

Decomposing Revenue Effects of Tax Evasion, Base Broadening and Tax Rate Reduction

This paper proposes a method for evaluating the impact of tax reform on tax revenues and the distribution of the tax burden. The technique consists of decomposing actual revenue relative to potential revenue into components attributable to (i) changes in the tax rate structure (ii) deductions and (iii) tax evasion. If the standard reform package is successful, revenue loss from deductions should be curtailed by base broadening. Furthermore, revenues lost by lowering tax rates should be more than compensated by the induced decline in tax evasion. We use the method to examine tax reforms in India. Our results indicate that, for the reform episode we examine, reform did have the looked for effect but that these gains could not be sustained over time. The magnitude of the gains from the reform were limited and failed to curtail losses from tax evasion to any significant extent. At a disaggregated level, gains to the exchequer from the tax reform have arisen mainly from low income taxpayers without having much impact on upper income group taxpayers. Furthermore, the reforms had little or no impact on deductions taken by business income earners and professionals. This raises questions about the desirability of base-broadening and rate-cum-slab reduction from the perspective of equity

Value Added Tax Evasion, Auditing and Transactions Matching

This paper extends the standard theoretical model of tax enforcement by allowing for the cross- matching of transactions in addition to the auditing of taxpayers. For the Value Added Tax (VAT) the matching of purchase and sales invoices is an important enforcement technique. The paper examines the impact such enforcement on the revenue effectiveness and efficiency consequences of the VAT. Transactions matching is shown to have very different effects from auditing: Even when auditing alone is unable to induce non-zero taxpayer reports, and regardless of the expected success rate in auditing of the tax administration, sufficiently intensive cross- matching can induce truthful reporting. On the other hand, matching leads to distorted purchase and sales transactions. It can also distort input use and output decisions even if auditing alone has no adverse effects. In the model, conditions under which the VAT leaves input prices undistorted are found and the content of the often made claim, that a VAT is self-enforcing, is explored. The ability of the tax administration to enforce compliance with the VAT is shown to be sensitive to the knowledge that the tax administration has about the production technology