Should Social Amplification of Risk Be Counteracted?

The importance of the conceptual statement, by Roger Kasperson et al., on social amplification of risk lies, firstly, in the identification of a phenome-non as one worth studying, instead of being irritated and frustrated ibout it and concerned only to get it out of the way. Accusations of “public hysteria ” and “ irresponsible media ” are commonplace, without any real attempt at understanding causes and mecha-nisms, let alone a closer look at the normative qualifications of “ hysteria ” and “irre~ponsibility”.~ Kasperson et al. provide a forceful summing up of the limitations of traditional, technical risk analysis, and propose to overcome the limitations by adding the phenomenon of public reactions to risk and further repercussions (“secondary impacts”). One may wonder whether this is sufficient; but it clearly is necessary. Secondly, the attempt at systematic description usefully articulates a number of dimensions and aspects of the problem. The added benefit is that, in doing so, some of the ambiguities become apparent-of the proposed analysis, but also of the way we tend to treat the phenomena of social amplification of risk. For example, although the phenomenon is defined in a neutral way, in the introduction and later when communications theory is invoked (“amplification denotes the process of intensifying or attenuating signals during the transmission of infor

The Republic of Science in the 1990s

Research councils began as channels for state patronage of science (a widespread phenomenon after World War II) and were captured by the scientists: peer review of proposals, panels, board membership. In this way, they became an important organ of the lsquoRepublic of Sciencersquo (Michael Polanyi's concept). Being awarded a grant is now as important for the reputation or status of a scientist as the money value per se: research councils have become part of the reward system of science. Credibility-cycle analysis (Latour and Woolgar) is used to show this; and then applied to the research council itself, between the State and the national scientific community. Current concerns about proposal success rates and conservatism are analysed in terms of dynamics of this research world. This sociological approach to research councils allows analysis of changes in the reward system of science (where lsquorelevancersquo is becoming an accepted criterion world-wide) and of the complex environment of research councils, where many actors now compete for the intermediary role. Research councils must also become entrepreneurial-or become obsolete

A cognitive approach to science policy

Recent work in the social studies of science has emphasized the importance of studying both the social and cognitive aspects of the evolution of scientific specialties and disciplines. This has implications for science policies that aim at the direction of scientific fields toward external goals: the cognitive state and dynamics of the field have to be taken into acount. Such a cognitive approach to science policy has been elaborated by a number of German science scholars. The three-phase model of scientific developments and the finalization thesis of the Starnberg group is discussed, and the policy implications are critically reviewed. A group based in the University of Bielefeld has published case studies designed to trace the role of cognitive factors in explaining the impact of science policy programmes on scientific fields. It turns out that mutual adaptation processes occur in the course of formulating the programmes which reduce conflict and resistance. In conclusion, some perspectives for further work are noted