Demography, credit and institutions: A global perspective

This paper examines the role of age structure and its interaction with various capital market imperfections in driving international capital �ows in an empirical framework. Using panel data covering the period 1970 to 2000 for up to 115 countries, results indicate the existence of a di¤erentiated e¤ect in the relationship between age structure and international capital flows. Good institutions allow for a differentiated impact of age structure on saving and investment, opening the scope for an impact of age structure in driving international capital flows. In contrast, bad institutions result in no e¤ect of age structure on international capital flows. Despite increased credit availability contributing to reduced aggregate saving, this will nevertheless magnify the role of the population age structure in driving international capital flows. Over the past three decades, age structure changes are estimated to have contributed to improve the current account position by five percent of GDP in more advanced aging countries. However, around the year 2020, population age structure changes are projected to deteriorate the current account position in the latter countries which will experience a drop in saving. In other regions, the faster the current aging process, the sharper the projected improvement in the current account position. This improvement is projected to reverse itself, at a later stage in time in regions with a slower aging process. Also, our results suggest that in order to take advantage of their younger population in the form of increased foreign capital in�ows, countries that are less advanced in the demographic transition would need to improve the quality of their institutional arrangements before the "window of opportunity" closes.F2; F4

Asymmetric demographic shocks and institutions: The impact on international capital flows and welfare

This paper examines the consequences of an asymmetric negative fertility shock on capital formation, saving/investment imbalance, and welfare. The framework of analysis is a Diamond-type overlapping-generations small open economy with capital market imperfection. The capital market imperfection is modelled through a symmetric wedge between foreign investor and domestic investor return on capital. The shock is transmitted to the small open economy depending on whether the wedge is below a given threshold. If the wedge is not too high, capital first flows in the small open economy to exploit the di¤erence in returns on capital. After the shock has occurred, capital is repatriated in order to �nance the old age consumption of rest of the world investors. If capital flows internationally, lifetime utility in the small open economy decreases unambiguously for individuals born one period before the shock occurs. Provided that the small open economy is initially below its golden rule, individuals born after the time the shock has occurred experience an increase in their lifetime utility.population aging; capital market imperfection; open economy; capital flows; welfare

Commodity Windfalls, Democracy, and External Debt

We examine the effects that revenue windfalls from international commodity price booms have on external debt in a panel of 93 countries during the period 1970-2007. Our main finding is that increases in the international prices of exported commodity goods lead to a significant reduction in the level of external debt in democracies, but to no significant reduction in the level of external debt in autocracies. To explain this result, we show that in autocracies commodity windfalls lead to a statistically significant and quantitatively large increase in government expenditures. In democracies on the other hand government expenditures did not increase significantly. We also document that following commodity windfalls the risk of default on external debt decreased in democracies, but increased significantly in autocracies.commodity windfalls, debt, political institutions

Resource Rents, Democracy and Corruption: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa

We examine the effect of the interaction between resource rents and democracy on corruption for a panel of 29 Sub-Saharan countries during the period from 1985 to 2007. We find that higher resource rents lead to more corruption and that the effect is significantly stronger in less democratic countries. Surprisingly, we also find that higher resource rents lead to fewer internal conflicts and that less democratic countries face not a higher but a lower likelihood of conflicts following an increase in resource rents. We argue that these findings can be explained by the ability of the political elites in less democratic countries to more effectively quell the masses through redistribution of rents to the public. We support our argument by documenting that higher resource rents lead to more (less) government spending in less (more) democratic countries. Our findings suggest that the mechanisms through which resource rents affect corruption cannot be separated from political systems.resource rents, corruption, political systems, internal conflicts

Food Prices and Political Instability

We examine the effects that variations in the international food prices have on democracy and intra-state conflict using panel data for over 120 countries during the period 1970-2007. Our main finding is that in Low Income Countries increases in the international food prices lead to a significant deterioration of democratic institutions and a significant increase in the incidence of anti-government demonstrations, riots, and civil conflict. In the High Income Countries variations in the international food prices have no significant effects on democratic institutions and measures of intra-state conflict. Our empirical results point to a significant externality of variations in international food prices on Low Income Countries' social and political stability.food prices, conflict, political institutions

Commodity Windfalls, Polarization, and Net Foreign Assets: Panel Data Evidence on the Voracity Effect

This paper examines the effect that windfalls from international commodity price booms have on net foreign assets in a panel of 145 countries during the period 1970-2007. The main finding is that windfalls from international commodity price booms lead to a significant increase in net foreign assets, but only in countries that are ethnically homogeneous. In ethnically polarized countries, net foreign assets significantly decreased. To explain this asymmetry, the paper shows that in ethnically polarized countries commodity windfalls lead to large increases in government spending, political corruption, and the risk of expropriation, with no overall effect on GDP per capita growth. The paper's findings are consistent with theoretical models of the current account that have a built-in voracity effect.commodity windfalls; net foreign assets, polarization, political economy

Food Prices, Conflict, and Democratic Change

We examine the effects that variations in the international food prices have on democracy and intra-state conflict using panel data for over 120 countries during the period 1970-2007. Our main finding is that in Low Income Countries increases in the international food prices lead to a significant deterioration of democratic institutions and a significant increase in the incidence of anti-government demonstrations, riots, and civil conflict. In the High Income Countries variations in the international food prices have no significant effects on democratic institutions and measures of intra-state conflict. Our empirical results point to a significant externality of variations in international food prices on Low Income Countries' social and political stability.food prices, conflict, political institutions

Resource Windfalls and Emerging Market Sovereign Bond Spreads: The Role of Political Institutions

We examine the effect that revenue windfalls from international commodity price booms have on sovereign bond spreads using panel data for 36 emerging market economies during the period 1997-2007. Our main finding is that commodity price booms lead to a significant reduction in the sovereign bond spread in democracies, but to a significant increase in the spread in autocracies. To explain our finding we show that, consistent with the political economy literature on the resource curse, revenue windfalls from international commodity price booms significantly increased real per capita GDP growth in democracies, while in autocracies GDP per capita growth decreased.commodity price shocks; sovereign bond spread; political institutions