Rape in Victoria as a crime of absolute liability : a departure from both precedent and progressivism

In recent decades, a disturbing trend has emerged in Victoria and elsewhere that has witnessed the emergence of statutory rules that accord preferential treatment to prosecutors and complainants in instances where allegations of rape are made. This article examines not only the manifestations of such treatment in the form of Victorian crime legislation, but the means by which the statutory crime of rape in Victoria has been transformed into an offence which, though technically one of mens rea, can effectively be prosecuted as an offence of absolute liability. The piece concludes with a discussion of the likely reasons for this trend as well as the implications of allowing such a serious offence to be prosecuted as one of absolute liability.<br /

Ignorance of the law as a defence to rape : the destruction of a maxim

In DPP v Morgan, the House of Lords correctly concluded that an accused who entertained a genuine belief that a woman was consenting to carnal knowledge of her person could not be convicted of the common law crime of rape as such a belief and the requisite mens rea to convict were mutually exclusive of one another. Though England and Wales have resiled from this position by virtue of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 1 (b), which allows for conviction upon proof that the accused did not reasonably believe that the complainant was consenting, the Morgan principle has retained its vitality at common law as well as under the various statutory crimes of rape that exist throughout Australia, most notably the provisions of s. 38 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). Despite a long line of Victorian Court of Appeal decisions which have reaffirmed the Morgan principle, the court has construed s. 37AA(b)(ii) of the Act as leaving open the possibility of an acquittal despite the fact that the accused acted with an awareness that one or more factors that are statutorily deemed as negating consent under s. 36(a)-(g) of the Act were operating at the time of his or her sexual penetration; specifically, the court held that the foregoing factors do not necessarily preclude a jury from finding that the accused acted in the genuine belief that the complainant was consenting. This article endeavours to explain how the accused could be aware of such circumstances at the time of penetration, yet still entertain such a belief. The article ultimately concludes that such an anomaly can only be explained through a combination of the poor drafting of s. 37AA(b)(ii) and the court\u27s apparent refusal to follow the longstanding precept that ignorance of the law is never a defence to a crime, ostensibly prompted by its adherence to the cardinal precept that legislation is not to be construed as superfluous.<br /

Rejection of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in Australia : a retreat from progressivism

This article canvasses the key Australian exclusionary rules and discretions to exclude evidence under both the common law and its statutory counterparts in the Uniform Evidence Legislation now in effect in the Commonwealth, Victoria, New South Wales, the Australian Capital Territory and Tasmania. In examining these exclusionary rules and discretions, an analysis is made as to whether evidence derived from primary evidence excluded under one or more of these rules should also be excluded under an American style \u27fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine\u27 - and why or why not. Finally, the article compares the current Australian approach to this doctrine with the present state of the American doctrine and the recognised exceptions thereto. The article concludes with recommendations for applying the doctrine in both countries, subject to suggested changes in the Jaw that take the realities of political correctness and human frailty into account.<br /

Thabo Meli revisited : the pernicious effects of results-driven decisions

Despite the hackneyed expression that &lsquo;judges should interpret the law and not make it&rsquo;, the fact remains that there is some scope within the separation of powers doctrine for the courts to develop the common law incrementally. To this extent, the courts can effectively legislate, but only to this limited extent if they are to respect the separation of powers doctrine. On occasion, however, the courts have usurped the power entrusted to Parliament, and particularly so in instances where a strict application of the existing law would lead to results that offend their personal notions of what is fair and just. When this occurs, the natural consequence is that lawyers, academics and the public in general lose respect for both the judges involved as well as the adversarial system of criminal justice. In order to illustrate this point, attention will focus on the case of Thabo Meli v United Kingdom in which the Privy Council, mistakenly believing that it could not reach its desired outcome through a strict application of the common law rule of temporal coincidence, emasculated the rule beyond recognition in order to convict the accused. Moreover, the discussion to follow will demonstrate that not only was the court wrong in its belief that the case involved the doctrine of temporal coincidence, but the same result would have been achieved had the Council correctly identified the issue as one of legal causation and correctly applied the principles relating thereto.<br /

An entrenched bill of rights : a protection for the rights of minorities

This paper is concerned with the question of whether Australia would be better served by the inclusion of an entrenched Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia. In particular, attention will focus on the abuses of minorities that are all but certain to arise in any society that is based on majoritarian rule. This paper will also examine the question of whether an entrenched Bill of Rights would serve as an effective safeguard against such abuses, especially where the rights of unpopular minorities are involved. The analysis to follow is undertaken against the backdrop of the efficacy, or the lack thereof, of the Constitution of the United States in preventing such abuses, and particularly that portion of the American Constitution that is known as the Bill of Rights.<br /

The chaotic state of the law of rape in Victoria: a mandate for reform

This article is intended as a final commentary and sequel to two earlier articles in this journal that have examined the arcane and circular wording of s. 37AA of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) and its patent incompatibility with ss 36 and 38 of that Act that define the elements of rape. In particular, this article will revisit many of the essential points raised in the first two articles in order to afford readers with an appropriate backdrop against which the Victorian Court of Appeal&rsquo;s decision in GC v The Queen will be examined. The article concludes with a strenuous recommendation that&nbsp;s. 37AA be repealed or substantially amended in order to comport with&nbsp;ss 36 and 38 as well as the Court of Appeal&rsquo;s decision in NT v The Queen&nbsp;that significantly reshaped the Morgan principle