Evolution of Co-operation When the Strategies are Hidden: The Human Mating Game

Defection is frequently seen in co-operative systems [1-3]. Game theoretical solutions to stabilize cooperation rely on reciprocity and reputation in iterated games[4-5]. One of the basic requirements for reciprocity or reputation building is that the strategies of players and the resulting payoffs should be open at the end of every interaction. For games in which the strategies and payoffs remain hidden, these stabilizing factors are unlikely to work. We examine the evolution of cooperation for hidden-strategy games using human mating game as an example. Here faithful parenting can be considered as cooperation and extra-pair mating (EPM) or cuckoldry as defection. Cuckoldry may get exposed only occasionally and the genetic benefits of cuckoldry also remain hidden from the players. Along with mate guarding, social policing is enabled in humans by language and gossiping. However, social policing can be invaded by second order free riders. We suggest that opportunistic blackmailing, which is unique to hidden strategy games can act as a keystone strategy in stabilizing co-operation. This can counteract free riding and stabilize policing. A game theoretical model results into a rock - paper – scissor (R-P-S) like situation with no evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). Simulations result into a stable or stably oscillating polymorphism. Obligate monogamy is an essential trait in the co-existence. In a gender difference model too, polymorphism is seen in both genders but with different traits predominating in the two genders. The model explains intra-gender, inter-gender as well as cross cultural variability in mating strategies in humans

Blackmailing: the keystone in the human mating system

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>The human mating system is characterized by bi-parental care and faithful monogamy is highly valued in most cultures. Marriage has evolved as a social institution and punishment for extra pair mating (EPM) or adultery is common. However, similar to other species with bi-parental care, both males and females frequently indulge in EPM in secrecy since it confers certain gender specific genetic benefits. Stability of faithful monogamy is therefore a conundrum. We model human mating system using game theory framework to study the effects of factors that can stabilize or destabilize faithful committed monogamy.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Although mate guarding can partly protect the genetic interests, we show that it does not ensure monogamy. Social policing enabled by gossiping is another line of defense against adultery unique to humans. However, social policing has a small but positive cost to an individual and therefore is prone to free riding. We suggest that since exposure of adultery can invite severe punishment, the policing individuals can blackmail opportunistically whenever the circumstances permit. If the maximum probabilistic benefit of blackmailing is greater than the cost of policing, policing becomes a non-altruistic act and stabilizes in the society. We show that this dynamics leads to the coexistence of different strategies in oscillations, with obligate monogamy maintained at a high level. Deletion of blackmailing benefit from the model leads to the complete disappearance of obligate monogamy.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>Obligate monogamy can be maintained in the population in spite of the advantages of EPM. Blackmailing, which makes policing a non-altruistic act, is crucial for the maintenance of faithful monogamy. Although biparental care, EPM, mate guarding and punishment are shared by many species, gossiping and blackmailing make the human mating system unique.</p

Presence of two types of flowers with respect to nectar sugar in two gregariously flowering species

Many species of animal-pollinated flowers are known to vary widely in the nectar content of flowers. Some proportion of flowers in many species is apparently nectarless, and such flowers are believed to be 'cheaters'. Cheating may explain a part of the variability in nectar content. If cheating exists as a qualitatively different strategy then we expect bimodality in the distribution of nectar content of flowers. It has been shown in a multispecies study that gregarious species have a higher proportion of cheater flowers. We studied the frequency distribution of total nectar sugar in two gregariously flowering species Lantana camara and Utricularia purpurascens, which differed in other floral and ecological characters. At the population level, both the species showed significant bimodality in the total sugar content of flowers. The obvious sources of heterogeneity in the data did not explain bimodality. In Lantana camara, bimodality was observed within flowers of some of the individual plants sampled. In Utricularia purpurascens the proportion of nectarless flowers was more in high-density patches, suggesting that the gregariousness hypothesis may work within a species as well. The results support the hypothesis of cheating as a distinct strategy since two distinct types of flowers were observed in both the species. The effect of density in Utricularia purpurascens also supports the gregariousness hypothesis