Scandinavian Higher Education Governance – Pursuing Similar Goals through Different Organizational Arrangements

Under embargo until: 2022-02-03The differences and similarities among the three Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden have been discussed by social scientists on several occasions. Focusing on higher education (HE) governance systems, this paper raises three questions. (1) What are the differences and similarities among the three countries? (2) How can the similarities and differences be explained? (3) Are the similarities strong enough to justify the common label of a Scandinavian model of HE governance? The three HE governance systems are briefly described and compared. They are then analyzed as, respectively, outcomes of partisan politics or politico-administrative regimes. The paper argues that similarities such as publicness, massive investments, and emphasis on access are best explained in terms of partisan politics, while the variation in governance arrangements can best be explained by path dependencies following choices made at critical junctures within similar politicoadministrative regimes.acceptedVersio

Incisional hernia following colorectal cancer surgery according to suture technique: Hughes Abdominal Repair Randomized Trial (HART).

BACKGROUND: Incisional hernias cause morbidity and may require further surgery. HART (Hughes Abdominal Repair Trial) assessed the effect of an alternative suture method on the incidence of incisional hernia following colorectal cancer surgery. METHODS: A pragmatic multicentre single-blind RCT allocated patients undergoing midline incision for colorectal cancer to either Hughes closure (double far-near-near-far sutures of 1 nylon suture at 2-cm intervals along the fascia combined with conventional mass closure) or the surgeon's standard closure. The primary outcome was the incidence of incisional hernia at 1 year assessed by clinical examination. An intention-to-treat analysis was performed. RESULTS: Between August 2014 and February 2018, 802 patients were randomized to either Hughes closure (401) or the standard mass closure group (401). At 1 year after surgery, 672 patients (83.7 per cent) were included in the primary outcome analysis; 50 of 339 patients (14.8 per cent) in the Hughes group and 57 of 333 (17.1 per cent) in the standard closure group had incisional hernia (OR 0.84, 95 per cent c.i. 0.55 to 1.27; P = 0.402). At 2 years, 78 patients (28.7 per cent) in the Hughes repair group and 84 (31.8 per cent) in the standard closure group had incisional hernia (OR 0.86, 0.59 to 1.25; P = 0.429). Adverse events were similar in the two groups, apart from the rate of surgical-site infection, which was higher in the Hughes group (13.2 versus 7.7 per cent; OR 1.82, 1.14 to 2.91; P = 0.011). CONCLUSION: The incidence of incisional hernia after colorectal cancer surgery is high. There was no statistical difference in incidence between Hughes closure and mass closure at 1 or 2 years. REGISTRATION NUMBER: ISRCTN25616490 (http://www.controlled-trials.com)

Traders, Teachers, and Tyrants: Democracy, Globalization, and Public Investment in Education

This article develops a model of the redistributive political economy of education spending, focusing on the role of democracy and economic openness in determining the provision of education. I argue that democratization should be associated with higher levels of public education spending, lower private education spending, and a shift from tertiary education spending toward primary education spending. Furthermore, I argue that integration with the international economy should lead to higher public education spending, conditioned on regime type and income, and should push the balance between tertiary and primary education toward states particular comparative advantages. These propositions are tested on a data set of more than one hundred states from 1960 to 2000, using a variety of panel data techniques, including instruments for democracy. The logic of the causal mechanism developed in the formal model is also tested on a number of case histories, including the Philippines, which shows great variation in democracy and openness, and India and Malaysia, which constitute unusual cases that lie off the diagonal of open democracies and autarkic autocracies.The author would like to thank Beth Simmons, Torben Iversen, Michael Hiscox, Jeffry Frieden, Jim Alt, Teri Caraway, John Freeman, Jane Gingrich, David Samuels, W. Phillips Shively, Mark Kayser, John Ahlquist, and Michael Kellerman for highly useful comments and criticisms. In addition, I thank the current and past editors, Lou Pauly, Emanuel Adler, David Stasavage, and Lisa Martin, and three anonymous reviewers for their suggestions.

TAKING CREDIT Redistribution and Borrowing in an Age of Economic Polarization

Several recent studies link rising income inequality in the United States to the global financial crisis, arguing that US politicians did not respond to growing inequality with fiscal redistribution. Instead, Americans saved less and borrowed more to maintain relative consumption in the face of widening economic disparities. This article proposes a theory in which fiscal redistribution dampens the willingness of citizens to borrow to fund current consumption. A key implication is that pretax inequality will be more tightly linked with credit in less redistributive countries. The long-run partisan composition of government is, in turn, a key determinant of redistributive effort. Examining a panel of eighteen OECD democracies, the authors find that countries with limited histories of left-wing participation in government are significantly more likely see credit expansion as prefisc inequality grows compared to those in which the political left has been more influential

TAKING CREDIT Redistribution and Borrowing in an Age of Economic Polarization

Several recent studies link rising income inequality in the United States to the global financial crisis, arguing that US politicians did not respond to growing inequality with fiscal redistribution. Instead, Americans saved less and borrowed more to maintain relative consumption in the face of widening economic disparities. This article proposes a theory in which fiscal redistribution dampens the willingness of citizens to borrow to fund current consumption. A key implication is that pretax inequality will be more tightly linked with credit in less redistributive countries. The long-run partisan composition of government is, in turn, a key determinant of redistributive effort. Examining a panel of eighteen OECD democracies, the authors find that countries with limited histories of left-wing participation in government are significantly more likely see credit expansion as prefisc inequality grows compared to those in which the political left has been more influential