1,459,543 research outputs found
Anonymous
A dust-off pilot in Vietnam recalls the tragedy of the war seen through his eyes, his rescue missions.
Articles, stories, and other compositions in this archive were written by participants in the Mighty Pen Project. The program, developed by author David L. Robbins, and in partnership with Virginia Commonwealth University and the Virginia War Memorial in Richmond, Virginia, offers veterans and their family members a customized twelve-week writing class, free of charge. The program encourages, supports, and assists participants in sharing their stories and experiences of military experience so both writer and audience may benefit
Attacks by “Anonymous” WikiLeaks Proponents not Anonymous
On November 28, 2010, the world started watching the whistle blower website WikiLeaks to begin publishing part of the 250,000 US Embassy Diplomatic cables. These confidential cables provide an insight on U.S. international affairs from 274 different embassies, covering topics such as analysis of host countries and leaders and even requests for spying out United Nations leaders.\ud
The release of these cables has caused reactions not only in the real world, but also on the Internet. In fact, a cyberwar started just before the initial release. Wikileaks has reported that their servers were experiencing distributed denial-of-service attacks (DDoS). A DDoS attack consists of many computers trying to overload a server by firing a high number of requests, leading ultimately to service disruption. In this case, the goal was to avoid the release of the embassy cables.\ud
After the initial cable release, several companies started severed ties with WikiLeaks. One of the first was Amazon.com, that removed the WikiLeaks web- site from their servers. Next, EveryDNS, a company in which the domain wikileaks.org was registered, dropped the domain entries from its servers. On December 4th, PayPal cancelled the account that WikiLeaks was using to receive on-line donations. On the 6th, Swiss bank PostFinance froze the WikiLeaks assets and Mastercard stopped receiving payments to the WikiLeaks account. Visa followed Mastercard on December 7th.\ud
These reactions caused a group of Internet activists (or “hacktivists”) named Anonymous to start a retaliation against PostFinance, PayPay, MasterCard, Visa, Moneybrookers.com and Amazon.com, named “Operation Payback”. The retaliation was performed as DDoS attacks to the websites of those companies, disrupting their activities (except for the case of Amazon.com) for different periods of time.\ud
The Anonymous group consists of volunteers that use a stress testing tool to perform the attacks. This tool, named LOIC (Low Orbit Ion Cannon), can be found both as a desktop application and as a Web page.\ud
Even though the group behind the attacks claims to be anonymous, the tools they provide do not offer any security services, such as anonymization. As a consequence, a hacktivist that volunteers to take part in such attacks, can be traced back easily. This is the case for both current versions of the LOIC tool. Therefore, the goal of this report is to present an analysis of privacy issues in the context of these attacks, and raise awareness on the risks of taking part in them
Anonymous quantum communication
We present the first protocol for the anonymous transmission of a quantum
state that is information-theoretically secure against an active adversary,
without any assumption on the number of corrupt participants. The anonymity of
the sender and receiver is perfectly preserved, and the privacy of the quantum
state is protected except with exponentially small probability. Even though a
single corrupt participant can cause the protocol to abort, the quantum state
can only be destroyed with exponentially small probability: if the protocol
succeeds, the state is transferred to the receiver and otherwise it remains in
the hands of the sender (provided the receiver is honest).Comment: 11 pages, to appear in Proceedings of ASIACRYPT, 200
Quantum Anonymous Transmissions
We consider the problem of hiding sender and receiver of classical and
quantum bits (qubits), even if all physical transmissions can be monitored. We
present a quantum protocol for sending and receiving classical bits
anonymously, which is completely traceless: it successfully prevents later
reconstruction of the sender. We show that this is not possible classically. It
appears that entangled quantum states are uniquely suited for traceless
anonymous transmissions. We then extend this protocol to send and receive
qubits anonymously. In the process we introduce a new primitive called
anonymous entanglement, which may be useful in other contexts as well.Comment: 18 pages, LaTeX. Substantially updated version. To appear at
ASIACRYPT '0
Anonymous Rituals
Religion and ritual have been characterized as costly ways for conditional cooperators to signal their type, and thus identify and interact with one another. But an effective signal may be prohibitively expensive: if the cost of participation is too small, freeriders may send the signal and behave selfishly later. However, if the ritual reveals only the average level of signaling in a group, free-riders can behave selfishly without being detected, and even a low cost signal can separate types. While individuals cannot be screened out, members can learn the group�s profile of types. Under specified conditions, this information gain leads to greater cooperation and hence increases expected welfare. Furthermore, if crowding is unimportant relative to the conditional cooperation term, anonymous rituals will be preferred to ones which reveal individuals� behavior. Examples of anonymous institutions include church collections, voting, music, dance, and military customs.
Building Secure and Anonymous Communication Channel: Formal Model and its Prototype Implementation
Various techniques need to be combined to realize anonymously authenticated
communication. Cryptographic tools enable anonymous user authentication while
anonymous communication protocols hide users' IP addresses from service
providers. One simple approach for realizing anonymously authenticated
communication is their simple combination, but this gives rise to another
issue; how to build a secure channel. The current public key infrastructure
cannot be used since the user's public key identifies the user. To cope with
this issue, we propose a protocol that uses identity-based encryption for
packet encryption without sacrificing anonymity, and group signature for
anonymous user authentication. Communications in the protocol take place
through proxy entities that conceal users' IP addresses from service providers.
The underlying group signature is customized to meet our objective and improve
its efficiency. We also introduce a proof-of-concept implementation to
demonstrate the protocol's feasibility. We compare its performance to SSL
communication and demonstrate its practicality, and conclude that the protocol
realizes secure, anonymous, and authenticated communication between users and
service providers with practical performance.Comment: This is a preprint version of our paper presented in SAC'14, March
24-28, 2014, Gyeongju, Korea. ACMSAC 201
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