A Novel Blind Signature Based Upon ECDLP

Encryption and decryption techniques protect the condentiality of information exchanged in a network whereas digital signature is electronic signing of data that provide senders authentication using its secret key and verication using its public key and other domain parameters. A combination of encipherment and digital signing of message immunes it from most of the active attacks such as modification of data, masquerading and repudiation Elliptic curve discrete logarithmic problem (ECDLP) is the problem of finding the scalar multiplier knowing the corresponding points on an elliptic curve. ECDLP is very complex and dicult to solve compared to any standard inverse operation of a one-way-trapdoor function such as Discrete Logarithm Problem or Factorization problem. Blind signature allows a user to obtain a signature from an authority on any document, in such a way that the authority learns nothing about the message that is being signed. The blindness is an important property which distinguishes the blind signature from other signature schemes. Blind signature is an important cryptographic primitive used in protocols such as electronic voting systems and cash payment systems. Since an ECDLP enjoys a large space and time complexity and blind signature ensures anonymity of clients message while obtaining a signature from a trusted party, we aim at designing a blind signature scheme based upon ECDLP which is supposed to have a low computation cost and low communication overhead. The signature should be such that it has a small size, it is highly secured and is resistant to elliptic curve cryptography based attacks such as forgery attack, MOV attack etc

Hardening Circuit-Design IP Against Reverse-Engineering Attacks

Design-hiding techniques are a central piece of academic and industrial efforts to protect electronic circuits from being reverse-engineered. However, these techniques have lacked a principled foundation to guide their design and security evaluation, leading to a long line of broken schemes. In this paper, we begin to lay this missing foundation. We establish formal syntax for design-hiding (DH) schemes, a cryptographic primitive that encompasses all known design-stage methods to hide the circuit that is handed to a (potentially adversarial) foundry for fabrication. We give two security notions for this primitive: function recovery (FR) and key recovery (KR). The former is the ostensible goal of design-hiding methods to prevent reverse-engineering the functionality of the circuit, but most prior work has focused on the latter. We then present the first provably (FR,KR)-secure DH scheme, $\mathrm{OneChaff}_{\mathrm{hd}}$. A side-benefit of our security proof is a framework for analyzing a broad class of new DH schemes. We finish by unpacking our main security result, to provide parameter-setting guidance