What Does CEOs’ Personal Leverage Tell Us About Corporate Leverage?

We find that firms behave remarkably similarly to how their CEOs behave personally when it comes to leverage choices. We start our analysis by compiling a comprehensive sample of home purchases and financings among S&P 1,500 CEOs. Debt financing in a CEO’s most recent home purchase is used as a revealed preference of the CEO’s personal attitude towards debt. We find a robust positive relation between personal and corporate leverage. We also find that firms tend to hire CEOs with a similar personal attitude towards debt as the previous CEO. When the new and previous CEOs have different personal preferences, corporate leverage changes in the direction of the new CEO’s personal leverage. These results support a model with endogenous matching of CEOs to firms. We also find that the positive relation between CEOs’ personal leverage and corporate leverage is stronger in firms with poor governance, suggesting that CEOs imprint their personal preferences on the firms they manage when they are able to do so. These results suggest that heterogeneity in CEOs’ personal attitudes towards debt partly explains differences in corporate capital structures, and suggest more generally that an analysis of CEOs’ personalities and personal traits may provide important information about the financial policies of the firms they manage.Corporate leverage; personal leverage; CEO characteristics

The Impact of the Structure of Debt on Target Gains

Consistent with prior literature, we find that increases in target leverage have a positive impact on returns to target shareholders irrespective of the source of debt. Even so, financing with bank debt has a remarkably different impact. If a target firm’s debt is primarily sourced from banks, as opposed to when debt is dominated by public or private non-bank debt, we find that an increase in target leverage from the 25th to the 75th percentile (1) raises the probability of a bid leading to a successful takeover by 14%, but (2) lowers returns to target shareholders by 5.2% in the event a takeover occurs. We also examine two explanations that arise naturally in M & A’s for this economically significant differential negative impact of bank debt on target shareholders. (3) Supporting the coinsurance effect as an explanation, we find that an increase in leverage from the 25th to the 75th percentile lowers returns to target shareholders by 8.7% if target debt is relatively risky and bank-dominated. (4) We also find support for the “hold-up” effect as another explanation. Now the increase in leverage decreases target shareholders’ returns by 7.5% if debt is bank-dominated and there is a single bank relationship. Finally, the transaction time to complete a takeover is also relatively smaller when debt is bank-dominated, since banks can more efficiently shift their debt to the typically more secure bidders.

The Impact of Competition and Corporate Structure on Productive Efficiency: The Case of the U.S. Electric Utility Industry, 1990-2004

In this study, we present empirical evidence on the productive efficiency of electric utilities in the United States over the period, 1990-2004. This is a period marked by major attempts to introduce competition in the industry with the expectation that it will lead firms to improve their productive efficiency and ultimately to lower consumer prices. The actual experience has been surprising, since electricity prices have either fallen little or even risen sharply in some states. Relying on recent advances in the estimation of productive efficiency, we find that firms in jurisdictions that adopted competitive mechanisms have lower productive efficiency compared to firms in jurisdictions where rate-of-return regulation was retained. Furthermore, we provide evidence that firms in states that adopted competition have experienced decreases in productive efficiency, while firms in states with traditional regulation saw increases in efficiency over time. Since the introduction of deregulation has brought greater discretion to managers, we also examine the impact of various organizational choices on productive efficiency. Interestingly, the separation of the generation function from other functions, a hallmark of the effort to deregulate the industry, is associated with an adverse impact on productive efficiency. These findings question the claim that competition necessarily fosters higher productive efficiency. Alternatively, true competition may have been circumvented.

Debt, Debt Structure and Corporate Performance after Unsuccessful Takeovers: Evidence from Targets that Remain Independent

Significant increases in the level of target leverage have been previously documented, following unsuccessful takeover attempts. This increased leverage may signal managerial commitment to improved performance, suggesting that corporate performance and leverage should be positively related. If, however, the increased leverage leads to further managerial entrenchment, then corporate performance and leverage should be negatively related. In this paper, we reexamine both motivations for the observed increase in leverage. Furthermore, we argue that changes in the composition of debt are also important, besides changes in the level of leverage. In particular, bank debt has frequently been assigned a proactive, beneficial monitoring role in the literature. Besides confirming the increase in the level of leverage, we also document increases in bank debt surrounding cancelled takeovers. As a result, we find a more complex relation between corporate performance and debt use: Overall, the relation between corporate performance and leverage is negative, as predicted by a dominant entrenchment effect. However, increases in bank debt reduce the adverse effect of the increase in the level of leverage.