22 research outputs found

    Micromechanical Properties of Injection-Molded Starch–Wood Particle Composites

    Get PDF
    The micromechanical properties of injection molded starch–wood particle composites were investigated as a function of particle content and humidity conditions. The composite materials were characterized by scanning electron microscopy and X-ray diffraction methods. The microhardness of the composites was shown to increase notably with the concentration of the wood particles. In addition,creep behavior under the indenter and temperature dependence were evaluated in terms of the independent contribution of the starch matrix and the wood microparticles to the hardness value. The influence of drying time on the density and weight uptake of the injection-molded composites was highlighted. The results revealed the role of the mechanism of water evaporation, showing that the dependence of water uptake and temperature was greater for the starch–wood composites than for the pure starch sample. Experiments performed during the drying process at 70°C indicated that the wood in the starch composites did not prevent water loss from the samples.Peer reviewe

    CEO compensation and performance in family firms

    Full text link
    This study examines CEO compensation in family firms, with a particular focus on the effects exerted by governance characteristics such as ownership concentration, wedge between voting and cash-flow rights rights, and the presence of shareholder agreements. On a sample of Italian-listed companies over the period 1998-2002, we provide empirical evidence that family firms pay CEOs systematically more then other firms, and that the ownership structure exerts a significant effect on CEO compensation. In family firms, CEO pay is indeed positively affected by low ownership concentration, as well as a low wedge between voting and cash flow rights. Moreover, the presence of shareholders agreements has a moderating role on the level of CEO compensation. These effects are more pronounced in family than in non-family firms. The analysis of the relationship between excess compensation and future firm performance reveals that the higher compensation granted to the CEO by family firms is related to worse stock and accounting returns and could therefore be interpreted as a form of rent extraction. This result holds only for lower degrees of ownership concentration, higher wedge, and in absence of shareholder agreements, and supports the hypothesis that the prevalent agency conflict within Italian-listed family firms is between family owners and minority shareholders, instead of between shareholders and managers. The higher compensation granted to the CEO could be the premium for the loyalty of the CEO to the family and for allowing the family to extract private benefits of control

    Bibliography

    Full text link
    corecore