140 research outputs found
Tax Reform and Target Savings
If the United States switched to a broad-based consumption tax, than all forms of saving would enjoy the tax-preferred status reserved primarily for retirement saving vehicles under the current income tax system. Because pensions have other unique characteristics besides their tax advantage, current results on the effect of pensions on saving may provide an unreliable guide to the saving response to fundamental tax reform. The net effect of reform on saving depends critically on household motives for saving. This paper documents the considerable variation in the reasons why households save and presents a buffer stock model of saving that allows for both life cycle and target saving. To the extent that specific targets that are not currently tax-favored motivate the saving of households in their preretirement years, fundamental tax reform that results in the elimination of current pension plans will reduce saving.
Potential Paths of Social Security Reform
This paper presents several alternative Social Security reform options in which the projected level of benefits for every future cohort of retirees is as high or higher than the benefits projected in current law. These future benefits can be achieved without any increase in the payroll tax or in other tax rates. Under each option, the Social Security Trust Fund is solvent and ends with a sustainable positive and growing balance. Each option combines the current pay-as-you-go system of defined benefits with an investment-based personal retirement account (PRA). Assets in the PRA can be bequeathed if the individual dies before normal retirement age. We also consider the option in which an individual can take all or part of his accumulated PRA balanced as a lump sum at normal retirement age. The basic plan that we present in greatest detail combines a transfer to the personal retirement account of a portion of the individual's payroll tax equal to 1.5 percent of earnings if the individual agrees to deposit an equal out-of-pocket amount. The additional national saving that results from this option leads to increased business investment and therefore to increased general tax revenue; a portion of that revenue, equal to 1 percent of the PRA balances , is transferred to the Social Security Trust Fund. The other options that we present include plans with no out-of-pocket contributions by individuals and others with no transfer of general revenue to the Trust Fund. We also discuss the implications of different rates of return on the PRA balances and, more generally, the issue of risk, including a market-based method of guaranteeing the real principal of all PRA deposits.
The Transition Path in Privatizing Social Security
This paper analyzes the transition from the existing pay-as-you-go Social Security program to a system of funded Mandatory" Individual Retirement Accounts (MIRAs). Because of the high return on real capital relative to the very low return in a mature pay-as-you-go program, the benefits that can be financed with the existing 12.4 percent payroll tax could eventually be funded with mandatory contributions of only 2.1 percent of payroll. A transition to that fully funded program could be done with a surcharge of less than 1.5 percent of payroll during the early part of the transition. After 25 years, the combination of financing the pay-as-you-go benefits and accumulating the funded accounts would require less than the current 12.4 percent of payroll. The paper also discusses how a MIRA system could deal with the benefits of low income employees and with the risks associated with uncertain longevity and fluctuating market returns.
Maintaining Social Security Benefits and Tax Rates through Personal Retirement Accounts: An Update Based on the 1998 Social Security Trustees Report
A program of Personal Retirement Accounts (PRAs) funded by deposits equal to 2.3 percent of earnings (up to the Social Security maximum) would permit retirees to receive more income in retirement than with the current Social Security program while at the same time making it unnecessary to increase the 12.4 percent payroll tax in response to the aging of the population. The gross cost of these deposits, approximately 0.9 percent of GDP, could be financed for more than a decade out of the budget surpluses currently projected by the Congressional Budget Office. By the year 2030, the additional corporate tax revenue that results from the enlarged capital stock financed by PRA assets would be able to finance fully these personal tax credits. During the intervening years (about 2020 to 2030), a reduction of other government spending or an increase in taxes would be needed if budget deficits are to be avoided. If implemented, the PRA program would not only increase retirement income and stabilize the Social Security payroll tax, but would also substantially increase national saving and GDP. NOTE: This is a revised version of "Two Percent Personal Retirement Accounts: Their Potential Effects on Social Security Tax Rates and National Saving," by Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick, issued in April, 1998 as working paper 6540.
The Economics of Prefunding Social Security and Medicare Benefits
This paper presents a detailed analysis of the economics of prefunding benefits for the aged, focusing on Social Security but indicating some of the analogous magnitudes for prefunding Medicare Benefits. We use detailed Census and Social Security information to model the transition to a fully funded system based on mandatory contributions to individual accounts. The funded system we examine would permanently maintain the level of benefits now specified in current law and would require no new government borrowing (other than eventually selling the bonds in the Social Security trust fund). During the transition, the combined rate of payroll tax and mandatory saving rises at first by 2 percentage points (to a total of 14.4 percent) and then declines so that in less than 20 years it is less than the current 12.4 percent payroll tax. We estimate the impact of such prefunding on the growth of the capital stock and the level of national income and show that the combination of higher pretax wages and lower payroll taxes could raise wages net of income and payroll taxes by more than 35 % in the long run. We also discuss distributional issues and the way that the poor can be at least as well off as under Social Security. A stochastic simulation shows that a small increase in the mandatory saving rate would reduce the risk of receiving less than the scheduled level to less than one percent. Separate calculations are presented of the value of the 'forward-looking recognition bonds' and 'backward-looking recognition bonds' which the government might issue if it decides not to pay future social security benefits explicitly.
Allocating Payroll Tax Revenue to Personal Retirement Accounts to Maintain Social Security Benefits and the Payroll Tax Rate
In an earlier paper we analyzed a method of combining traditional tax financed pay-as-you-go Social Security benefits with annuities financed by Personal Retirement Accounts. We showed that such a combination could maintain the level of retirement income projected in current Social Security law while avoiding a future increase in the payroll tax rate. The current paper extends the earlier analysis in four ways: (1) We now specify that the funds deposited in the Personal Retirement Accounts come from allocating 2 percent of the 12.4 percent payroll tax instead of being additional funds provided from outside the system. (2) We discuss the effects of the uncertain return on investment based annuities. (3) We provide estimates of the cost of permitting bequests if individuals die either before retirement or during the first twenty years after retirement. (4) We update the statistical basis for our estimates to be consistent with the 2000 Social Security Trustees Report. Our analysis shows that a program of Personal Retirement Accounts funded by allocating 2 percent of the 12.4 percent payroll tax collections can maintain the retirement income projected in current law while avoiding any increase in the 12.4 percent payroll tax. The combination of the higher return on the assets in the Personal Retirement Accounts and the use of the additional corporate profits taxes that result from the increased national saving in Personal Retirement Accounts is sufficient to maintain the solvency of the Social Security Trust Fund even though the tax payments to the fund are reduced from 12.4 percent of taxable payroll to 10.4 percent of taxable payroll. Although there is a period of years when the Trust Fund must borrow, it is able to repay this borrowing with interest out of future tax collections. In the long run, the Trust Fund becomes very large, implying that it would be possible to reduce the payroll tax further or to increase retirement incomes above the levels projected in current law.
Disability Risk and the Value of Disability Insurance
We estimate consumers%u2019 valuation of disability insurance using a stochastic lifecycle framework in which disability is modeled as permanent, involuntary retirement. We base our probabilities of worklimiting disability on 25 years of data from the Current Population Survey and examine the changes in the disability gradient for different demographic groups over their lifecycle. Our estimates show that a typical consumer would be willing to pay about 5 percent of expected consumption to eliminate the average disability risk faced by current workers. Only about 2 percentage points reflect the impact of disability on expected lifetime earnings; the larger part is attributable to the uncertainty associated with the threat of disablement. We estimate that no more than 20 percent of mean assets accumulated before voluntary retirement are attributable to disability risks measured for any demographic group in our data. Compared to other reductions in expected utility of comparable amounts, such as a reduction in the replacement rate at voluntary retirement or increases in annual income fluctuations, disability risk generates substantially less pre-retirement saving. Because the probability of disablement is small and the average size of the loss %u2014 conditional on becoming disabled %u2014 is large, disability risk is not effectively insured through precautionary saving.
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