Clean Evidence on Peer Pressure

While confounding factors typically jeopardize the possibility of using observational data to measure peer effects, field experiments over the potential for obtaining clean evidence. In this paper we measure the output of subjects who were asked to stuff letters into envelopes, with a remuneration completely independent of output. We study two treatments. In the ""pair"" treatment two subjects work at the same time in the same room. Peer effects are possible in this situation and imply that outputs within pairs should be similar. In the ""single"" treatment, which serves as a control, subjects work alone in a room and peer effects are ruled out by design. Our main results are as follows: First, we find clear and unambiguous evidence for the existence of peer effects in the pair treatment. The standard deviations of output are significantly smaller within pairs than between pairs. Second, average output in the pair treatment largely exceeds output in the single treatment, i.e., peer effects raise productivity. Third, low productivity workers are significantly more sensitive to the behavior of peers than are high productivity workers. Our findings yield important implications for the design of the workplace.peer effects, field experiments, incentives

Unemployment and Consumption: Are Job Losses Less Painful near the Mediterranean?

In this paper we analyze the relationship between unemployment and consumption. We study this relationship with panel data on households in five countries: Spain and Italy (the South), and Germany, Britain, and the US (the North). Our empirical results indicate that an increase in the duration of unemployment spells of male household heads is associated with smaller consumption losses in Spanish and Italian households. We discuss this finding in the light of different market and institutional frameworks. Given that the coverage and generosity of social welfare institutions are both higher in the North, and that credit and insurance markets are also more developed in the North than in the South, existing theories of consumption indicate that in the South consumption should fall more than in the North when the male household head becomes unemployed. This and other evidence supports the hypothesis that extended family networks, which appear to be stronger near the Mediterranean, provide a fundamental source of insurance against unemployment in southern Europe.Consumption, savings, unemployment

How often should you open the door? Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents

This paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the goal is to determine his loyalty to the match and if the cost of ending the relationship increases over time. The intuition is simple: by monitoring too much we learn less on how the partner will behave when he is not monitored. Only by giving to the partner the possibility to mis-behave he might be tempted to do it, and only in this case there is a chance to learn his type at a time where separation would be possible at a relatively low costMonitoring; probation; effort; asymmetric information

Biological Gender Differences, Absenteeism and the Earning Gap

In most Western countries illness-related absenteeism is higher among female workers than among male workers. Using the personnel dataset of a large Italian bank, we show that the probability of an absence due to illness increases for females, relative to males, approximately 28 days after a previous illness. This difference disappears for workers age 45 or older. We interpret this as evidence that the menstrual cycle raises female absenteeism. Absences with a 28-day cycle explain a significant fraction of the male-female absenteeism gap. To investigate the effect of absenteeism on earnings, we use a simple signaling model in which employers cannot directly observe workers' productivity, and therefore use observable characteristics %u2013 including absenteeism %u2013 to set wages. Since men are absent from work because of health and shirking reasons, while women face an additional exogenous source of health shocks due to menstruation, the signal extraction based on absenteeism is more informative about shirking for males than for females. Consistent with the predictions of the model, we find that the relationship between earnings and absenteeism is more negative for males than for females. Furthermore, this difference declines with seniority, as employers learn more about their workers' true productivity. Finally, we calculate the earnings cost for women associated with menstruation. We find that higher absenteeism induced by the 28-day cycle explains 11.8 percent of the earnings gender differential.

Wage Differentials in Italy: Market Forces, Institutions, and Inflation

During the 1970s, Italy experienced an extreme compression of wage differentials, similar to the better-known situation in Sweden. Most evidence suggests that this compression came to a stop around 1982-83, coincident with a major institutional change (in the form of the escalator clause in Italian union contracts), a major economic change (the slowdown in inflation), a major technological change (industrial restructuring and the computer revolution), and a major political change (the loss of support for unions and their egalitarian pay policies). While we cannot definitively distinguish among the relative influences of institutions, market forces, technology and politics on the evolution of earnings inequality in Italy, our analysis of skill level wage differentials and our comparisons at the individual level with the more laissez-faire system of the United States suggest that both inflation and egalitarian wage-setting institutions have importantly influenced Italian wage compression in the regular sector of the economy. Yet, this very compression may well have contributed to the flight away from the regular sector of the economy at both ends of the skill distribution, plausibly leading to a greater overall degree of inequality for the whole economy than is apparent from our analysis of wage differentials in the regular sector.

Gender Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores

Gender-Based Taxation (GBT) satisfies Ramsey’s rule of optimality because it taxes at a lower rate the more elastic labor supply of women. This holds when different elasticities between men and women are taken as exogenous. We study GBT in a model in which labor supply elasticities emerge endogenously from the bargained allocation of goods and time in the family. We explore the cases of superior bargaining power for men, higher men wages and higher women productivity in home duties. In all cases, men commit to a career in the market and take less home duties than women. As a result, their market work becomes less substitutable to home duty and their labor supply responds less to changes in the market wage. When society can resolve its distributional concerns efficiently with gender-specific lump sum transfers, GBT with higher marginal tax rates on (single and married) men is optimal. In addition, GBT affects the intrafamily bargaining, leading to a more balanced allocation of labor market outcomes across spouses and a smaller gender gap in labor supply elasticities.

Don't Spread Yourself Too Thin: The Impact of Task Juggling on Workers' Speed of Job Completion

We show that task juggling, i.e., the spreading of effort across too many active projects, decreases the performance of workers, raising the chances of low throughput, long duration of projects and exploding backlogs. Individual speed of job completion cannot be explained only in terms of effort, ability and experience: work scheduling is a crucial "input" that cannot be omitted from the production function of individual workers. We provide a simple theoretical model to study the effects of increased task juggling on the duration of projects. Using a sample of Italian judges we show that those who are induced for exogenous reasons to work in a more parallel fashion on many trials at the same time, take longer to complete similar portfolios of cases. The exogenous variation that identifies this causal effect is constructed exploiting the lottery that assigns cases to judges together with the procedural prescription requiring judges to hold the first hearing of a case no later than 60 days from filing.individual production function, work scheduling, duration of trials