Travelling agents : political change and bureaucratic turnover in India

We develop a framework to empirically examine how politicians with electoral pressures control bureaucrats with career concerns as well as the consequences for bureaucrats’ career investments. Unique micro-level data on Indian bureaucrats support our key predictions. Politicians use frequent reassignments (transfers) across posts of varying importance to control bureaucrats. High-skilled bureaucrats face less frequent political transfers and lower variability in the importance of their posts. We find evidence of two alternative paths to career success: officers of higher initial ability are more likely to invest in skill, but caste affinity to the politician’s party base also helps secure important positions

Is there a political cycle in bureaucrat assignments? : evidence from the Indian Administrative Service

We use data on bureaucrat assignments from the Indian Administrative Service to examine whether there is a political cycle in bureaucrat assignments. We find a significant increase in bureaucrat transfers during election years. Detailed month-level data indicates that this is not primarily driven by the incumbents’ desire to influence elections. We find that the increased bureaucratic turnover is much more likely to be caused by the actions of the incoming government after elections

Traveling agents : political change and bureaucratic turnover in India

Political principals face high-powered electoral pressures while bureaucrat-agents face longer term, low-powered incentives. Given constitutional constraints, what "carrots and sticks" do politicians employ to control bureaucrats and how do bureaucrats respond to such incentives? We use a simple career concerns framework and a unique dataset from the Indian Administrative Service to address these issues. State level politicians (Chief Ministers) exert control over bureaucrats when they assume office, through a novel mechanism of reassignment (transfers) to new jobs. Transfers are less likely if district politicians belong to the same party as the Chief Minister, i.e. he appears to treat local politicians and bureaucrats as substitutes. We use a framework where bureaucrats differ in their willingness to invest in job expertise or political loyalty. Consistent with this framework, we find in our data that more able bureaucrats and those with greater job-specific experience are less likely to be reassigned when a new politician assumes office. In accordance with politicians district reassignment patterns, we do not find robust evidence of any negative impact of such politically-induced transfers on development and policy outcomes at the district level

The Power of Political Voice: Women's Political Representation and Crime in India

Using state-level variation in the timing of political reforms, we find that an increase in female representation in local government induces a large and significant rise in documented crimes against women in India. Our evidence suggests that this increase is good news, as it is driven primarily by greater reporting rather than greater incidence of such crimes. In contrast, we find no increase in crimes against men or gender-neutral crimes. We also examine the effectiveness of alternative forms of political representation: large scale membership of women in local councils affects crime against them more than their presence in higher level leadership positions.crime; women’s empowerment; minority representation; voice

The Power of Political Voice: Women's Political Representation and Crime in India

Using state-level variation in the timing of political reforms, we find that an increase in female representation in local government induces a large and significant rise in documented crimes against women in India. Our evidence suggests that this increase is good news, driven primarily by greater reporting rather than greater incidence of such crimes. In contrast, we find no increase in crimes against men or gender-neutral crimes. We also examine the effectiveness of alternative forms of political representation: large scale membership of women in local councils affects crime against them more than their presence in higher level leadership positions.crime, women's empowerment, minority representation, voice

Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India

We develop a framework to empirically examine how politicians with electoral pressures control bureaucrats with career concerns and the consequent implications for bureaucrats' career investments. Unique microlevel data on Indian bureaucrats support our key predictions. Politicians use frequent reassignments (transfers) across posts of varying importance to control bureaucrats. High-skilled bureaucrats face less frequent political transfers and lower variability in the importance of their posts. We find evidence of two alternative paths to career success: officers of higher initial ability are more likely to invest in skill, but caste affinity to the politician's party base also helps secure important positions

Replication data for: Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India

N/

Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India

Politicians face high-powered electoral pressures while bureaucrats face longer-term, low powered incentives. Given constitutional constraints, what incentives do politicians employ to control bureaucrats and how do bureaucrats respond to such incentives? These issues are addressed using a sample model where politicians use posts of varying importance to motivate bureaucrats, who respond by investing in skill or political loyalty to get important posts. Using data from the Indian Administrative Service, evidence for several key implications upon entering office are analysed. [WP no. 178].India, politicians, political, Indian, policy implementation, outcomes, electoral, bureaucrats, incentives, travelling, constitutional constraints, bureaucracy, data,