Will Women Save more than Men? A Theoretical Model of Savings and Marriage

This paper presents an inter-temporal model of individual behavior with uncertainty about marriage and divorce and which accommodates the possible presence of economies or diseconomies of scale from marriage. We show that a scenario of higher marriage rates and higher divorce rates will be associated with higher savings rates in the presence of economies of marriage and with lower savings rates in the presence of diseconomies of marriage. In the context of traditional gender roles, this implies higher saving rates by young men and lower saving rates by young women than in less traditional countries, the opposite being the case with saving rates of married women relative to those of married men. We establish the relevance of traditional gender roles and marital status to understanding cross-country variation in gender differentials in savings behavior.savings behavior, marriage, divorce, economics of marriage, gender roles

Economics, Judaism, and Marriage (in Hebrew)

This paper points to parallels between the economic approach to marriage and Jewish Law. The economic approach is applied to the sex ratio question, the price of Torah scholars, the need for marriage brokers, marriage contracts and polygamy, all topics also addressed by Jewish law

A market approach to intermarriage

A market approach to intermarriage is developed in the tradition of economic theory. The model includes a supply of women's work in home production and a demand for such work by men. Separate markets exist for different types of work in household production, including different ethnic or religious groups. Some individuals intermarry in the sense that they partner with people from another group. I derive testable predictions regarding the determinants of intermarriage.The model is applied to explain why some Jewish men intermarried with Gentile women and others did not. Controlling for preferences for homogamy (based on Jewish education) it is predicted that men who prefer exogamy will pay a price in terms of being more educated than their Gentile wife, or having fewer previous marriages. Data from the 1970-71 Jewish Population Survey in the USA are used to test the predictions

Do immigrants pay a price when marrying natives? Lessons from the US time use survey

We compare the allocation of time of native men and women married to immigrants against their counterparts in all-native couples using the American Time Use Survey for the years 2003–18. We find that when intermarried to a native man, immigrant women pay an assimilation price to the extent that, compared to native women in all-native marriages, they work longer hours at paid work, household chores, or both, while their husbands do no extra work. In some cases, they work for just an extra hour per day. Immigrant men do not pay such a price. Some work 34 min less at household chores than native men in all-native marriages, while the native women who marry immigrant men seem to pay a price related to their situation that would be in an all-native marriage. An explanation based on the operation of competitive marriage markets works for immigrant women, but not for immigrant men. Traditionally, gender-based privileges may allow immigrant men to prevent native women from getting a price for the value that intermarriage generates for their husbands. Such a “male dominance” scenario also helps explain why immigrant men married to native daughters of immigrants from the same region get more benefits from intermarriage than other immigrants

Savings and Economies of Marriage: Intra-Marriage Financial Distributions as Determinants of Savings

This paper presents an inter-temporal model of individual savings behavior with intra-marriage financial distributions and uncertainty about marriage and divorce. Spouses paying these distributions experience diseconomies of marriage; the spouses who receive them benefit from economies of marriage. We show that higher likelihoods of marriage and divorce are associated with lower (higher) personal savings rates in the presence of diseconomies (economies) of marriage. These results hint at the possibility that structural patterns of social behavior may be at the root of the lack of effectiveness of conventional policy instruments, such as tax incentives, to promote personal savings.savings behavior, marriage, divorce, economies of marriage, gender roles