117,596 research outputs found

    Leniency Programs for Multimarket Firms: The Effect of Amnesty Plus on Cartel Formation

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    We examine the effect of the Amnesty Plus policy on firms' incentives to engage in cartel activities. Amnesty Plus is a proactive antitrust enforcement strategy aimed at attracting amnesty applications by encouraging firms already convicted in one market to report collusive agreements in other markets. It has been heavily advertised that Amnesty Plus weakens cartel stability. We show to the contrary that Amnesty Plus does not always have this desirable effect. Only under specific conditions, Amnesty Plus deters a cartel which would have been sustainable under an antitrust policy without Amnesty Plus. Otherwise, Amnesty Plus is either neutral or even stabilizes a cartel. We also show that firms can exploit their multimarket contact to reduce the effectiveness of the Amnesty Plus policy.Amnesty Plus; Leniency Program; Multimarket Contact; Antitrust Policy

    What are the consequences of an amnesty for undocumented immigrants?

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    The United States has not created a major amnesty program that would allow undocumented immigrants to legalize their status since 1986. As the number of undocumented immigrants has surged in recent decades, momentum for a new amnesty program has gained ground. This paper discusses the current position of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. economy and the likely economic consequences of an amnesty program. The results of the 1986 amnesty indicate several lessons for designing an amnesty plan that would improve the lives of the currently undocumented, minimize adverse effects on other groups, and stem the continuing tide of undocumented immigrants.

    Leniency Programs in a Multimarket Setting: Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus

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    We examine the effect of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on firms' initial selfreporting decision, in one market, by altering their whistle-blowing incentives in another market. Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus are proactive US strategies which aim at triggering multiple confessions by increasing the incentives of already convicted firms to report in a second market where they collude. Predictably, conditional on the conviction of one cartel, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus strengthen firms' incentives to report the remaining cartel. However, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus have an ambiguous impact on firms' incentives to apply for amnesty in the first place: On the one hand, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may help to sustain a cartel, otherwise reported under the EC Leniency Program. On the other hand, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may induce immediate reporting of both cartels whereas only one of them would have been reported under the EC Leniency Program.Amnesty Plus; Leniency Program; Multimarket Contact; Self-reporting

    Leniency programs for multimarket firms: The effect of Amnesty Plus on cartel formation

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    We examine the effect of the Amnesty Plus policy on the incentives of firms to engage in cartel activities. Amnesty Plus is aimed at attracting amnesty applications by encouraging firms, convicted in one market, to report their collusive agreements in other markets. It has been vigorously advertised that Amnesty Plus weakens cartel stability. We show to the contrary that Amnesty Plus may not have this desirable effect, and, if improperly designed, may even stabilize a cartel. We suggest a simple discount-setting rule to avoid this anticompetitive effect.Amnesty Plus, Leniency program, multimarket contact, antitrust policy

    The Prodigal Son: Amnesty

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    The politics of amnesty in Nigeria: a comparative analysis of the Boko Haram and Niger Delta insurgencies

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    Special Edition issue - Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Sub-Saharan AfricaThis paper presents a comparative analysis of the Niger Delta amnesty programme and the proposed amnesty for Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria. The motivation for comparing the two groups derives from the growing demand from some notable groups and individuals, mainly from the northern part of Nigeria, that the Boko Haram insurgents be granted amnesty just as the Niger Delta armed militants. One of such strong voices in favour of amnesty for Boko Haram insurgents is the Sultan of Sokoto, AlhajiSa’adAbubakar, who, on the 7th of March 2013, called for “total and unconditional” amnesty for Boko Haram. Sultan Abubakar’s demand has attracted mixed reaction as it is largely supported by the northern group-Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) and rejected by others such as the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN). The most serious reaction comes from the presidency in its commission, on April 24th 2013, of a presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North. After an extension by 2 months of its initial 90 days task, the Turaki-led Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North has finally submitted its recommendations to the president. Two key recommendations are: the need to set up an advisory committee for continuous dialogue with Boko Haram (as the leadership of Boko Haram refused to dialogue) and a victims’ support fund to help victims of Boko Haram.Publisher PD

    Do amnesty programs encourage illegal immigration? Evidence from the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)

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    This paper examines whether allowing certain undocumented immigrants to legalize their status leads to additional illegal immigration. The authors focus on the effects of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, which granted amnesty to over three million undocumented immigrants. They find that apprehensions of persons attempting to illegally cross the U.S.-Mexico border declined immediately following passage of the law but returned to normal levels during the period when illegal immigrants could file for amnesty and in the years thereafter. The authors’ findings suggest that the amnesty program did not change long-term patterns of illegal immigration from Mexico.Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986

    Amnesty

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    Amnesty, Enforcement and Tax Policy

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    Amnesties are widely used in society to rehabilitate past sinners, to collect resources, such as library books, that would otherwise be unrecoverable, and to make enforcement easier by reducing the ranks of delinquents. Over the past four years, tax amnesties have emerged as a major instrument of state revenue policy. Twenty states conducted amnesties. Record collections were made by New York (360million)andIllinois(incometaxamnestydollars3.4360 million) and Illinois (income tax amnesty dollars 3.4% of collections). Amnesties took in dollars that would probably have escaped otherwise, and tax rolls were bolstered. Tax amnesties also have costs, however. They may anger honest taxpayers, diminish the legitimacy of the tax system by pardoning past evasion, and decrease compliance by making future amnesties seem more likely. Shou1.d the federal government, aswirl in tax reform and suffering from an estimated 100 billion tax evasion problem, now offer an amnesty of its own? What type of federal program would most likely be offered? What would it be likely to accomplish? State tax amnesties have generally bean coupled with enhanced enforcement efforts, a feature intended to preserve the legitimacy of the tan system. The amnesty/enforcement combination twists the penalty schedule, lowering it non raising it later, in that way encouraging prompt payment. With no past sins to hide, future compliance also becomes less costly, hence more probable. Any federal amnesty, we predict, would be accompanied by a strengthening of enforcement. After reviewing the state experience, we speculatively estimate that a federal amnesty/enforcement to annual revenues on the order of $10 billion.

    A Theory of Immigration Amnesties

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    This paper presents a first attempt at understanding some of the many issues involved in the granting of an amnesty to illegal immigrants. We consider government behavior with respect to allocations on limiting infiltration (border control) and apprehending infiltrators (internal control) and with respect to the granting of amnesties, the timing of amnesties, and limitations on eligibility for those amnesties. We demonstrate the effects of government actions on allocations and the flow of immigrants, and how the interactions between these factors combine to yield an optimal amnesty policy. We also consider various extensions such as intertemporal transfers of policing funds, risk-aversion, and -fuzziness, in declarations regarding eligibility for an amnesty aimed at apprehending and deporting undesirables.Amnesty, Immigration, Illegal Immigration, Border Controls, Internal Controls.
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