253 research outputs found

    Voting over informal risk-sharing rules

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    People vote over risk-sharing rules to cope with random revenues. Risk-sharing rules are enforced through peer pressure : those who comply exert a negative externality on those who do not. People are differently affected by this externality. The author determines the elected risk-sharing rules and the level of compliance. It turns out that full risk-sharing is achieved only if everybody complies. Partial risk-sharing is more often achieved with, sometime, some level of non-compliance. In many cases, a majority of people votes over and complies with the risk-sharing rule that maximizes their own expected payoff.RISK SHARING; MUTUAL INSURANCE; ENFORCEMENT; PEER PRESSURE; POLITICAL ECONOMY

    On the governance of start-ups

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    This paper examines an entrepreneur-investor relationship in a stylized model where (i) investment needs are unknown ex ante and arise sequentially (ii) a major decision must be reached at a maturity strage, (iii) this decision depends on entrepreneur's private information, observable by the investor at some cost. The two partners agree on a corporate governance system which includes a split of futre cash-flows and an allocation of control on the above decision contingently on investment. It turns out that control is assigned to the entrepreneur for low investment levels and then switches to the investor when investment exceeds a threshold. Classification-JEL: G24; G32; L22CONTINGENT CONTROL; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; VENTURE CAPITAL; BIOTECHNOLOGY

    Sequential communication with ex post participation constraints

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    The paper examines the implementation of Bayesian allocation rules that satisfy non-negative ex post payoffs for one player in a two-players bilateral asymmetric information setting. It focuses on sequential mechanisms in which players communicate in turn among themselves. First, it shows that, under general conditions, any such allocation rule can be equivalently implemented by a sequential mechanism. Second, when allocation rules are negotiated ex ante, the order matters. The player who communicates first must have bargaining power of unbouded ex post payoffs. Classification-JEL: D23; D82IMPLEMENTATION; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; CONTRACT; PRINCIPAL AGENT

    On the redistributive impact of privitazing a resource under imperfect enforcement

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    We consider the redistributive effects of privatizing a resource previously exploited under free access. We assume that illegal extraction is punished but that the sanction is bounded by individual's wealth. First, we show that a segment of intermediate-wea lth individuals is the most adversely affected from the regime change, while the poorest segment is not only less severely affected, but may actually gain from it. Next, we show how the authorities may prefer to choose an intermediate enforcement level in order to maximize the political acceptability of the regime switch among the local community.PROPERTY RIGHTS; ENFORCEMENT; WEALTH DISTRIBUTION; NATURAL RESOURCES; ILLEGAL EXTRACTION

    When and why does it pay to be green ?

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    The conventional wisdom about environmental protection is that it comes at an additional cost on firms imposed by the government, which may erode their global competitiveness. However, during the last decade, this paradigm has been challenged by a number of analysts. In particular, Porter (Porter, 1991; Porter and van der Linde, 1995) argues that pollution is often associated with a waste of resources (material, energy, etc.), and that more stringent environmental policies can stimulate innovations that may compensate for the costs of complying with these policies. This is known as the Porter hypothesis. In fact, there are many ways through which improving the environmental performance of a company can lead to a better economic or financial performance, and not necessarily to an increase in cost. To be systematic, it is important to look at both sides of the balance sheet.First, a better environmental performance can lead to an increase in revenues through the following channels: i) a better access to certain markets; ii) the possibility to differentiate products and iii) the possibility to sell pollution-control technology. Second, a better environmental performance can lead to cost reductions in the following categories: iv) regulatory cost; v) cost of material, energy and services (this refers mainly to the Porter hypothesis); vi) cost of capital, and vii) cost of labour. Although these different possibilities have been identified from a conceptual or theoretical point of view for some time (Reinhardt, 2000; Lankoski, 2000, 2006), to our knowledge, there was no systematic effort to provide empirical evidences supporting the existence of these opportunities and assessing their “magnitude”. This is the objective of this paper. For each of the seven possibilities identified above [i) through vii)], we present the mechanisms involved, a systematic view of the empirical evidence available, and a discussion of the gaps in the empirical literature. The objective of the paper is not to show that a reduction of pollution is always accompanied by a better financial performance, it is rather to argue that the expenses incurred to reduce pollution can sometime be partly or completely compensated by gains made elsewhere. Through a systematic examination of all the possibilities, we also want to identify the circumstances most likely to lead to a “win-win” situation, i.e., better environmental and financial performance.ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY;INNOVATION;PORTER HYPOTHESIS;ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION;POLLUTION;CAPITAL MARKET;GREEN PRODUCTS

    Sharing a river among satiable countries

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    With diminishing global water reserves the problem of water allocation becomes increasingly important. We consider the problem of efficiently sharing a river among a group of satiable countries. Inducing countries to efficiently cooperate requires monetary compensations via international agreements. We show that cooperation of the other countries exerts a positive externality on the benefit of a coalition. Our problem is to distribute the benefit of efficiently sharing the river under these constraints. If the countries outside of a coalition do not cooperate at all, then the downstream incremental distribution is the unique compromise between the absolute territorial sovereignty (ATS) doctrine and the unlimited territorial integrity (UTI) doctrine. If all countries outside a coalition cooperate, then there may not exist any distribution satisfying the UTI doctrine.WATER ALLOCATION;EXTERNALITIES

    Cooperation and equity in the river sharing problem

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    This paper considers environments in which several agents (countries, farmers, cities) share water from a river. Each agent enjoys a concave benefit function from consuming water up to a satiation level. Noncooperative extraction is typically inefficient and any group of agents can gain if they agree on how to allocate water with monetary compensations. The paper describes which allocations of water and money are acceptable to riparian agents according to core stability and several criteria of fairness. It reviews some theoretical results. It then discusses the implementation of the proposed allocation with negotiation rules and in water markets. Lastly, it provides some policy insights.WATER ALLOCATION;GAME;CORE;WATER MARKET;NEGOTIATION;RULES;EXTERNALITIES

    Environmental policy, innovation and performance : new insights on the Porter hypothesis

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    Jaffe and Palmer (1997) present three distinct variants of the so-called Porter Hypothesis. The “weak” version of the hypothesis posits that environmental regulation will stimulate certain kinds of environmental innovations. The “narrow” version of the hypothesis asserts that flexible environmental policy regimes give firms greater incentive to innovate than prescriptive regulations, such as technology-based standards.Finally, the “strong” version posits that properly designed regulation may induce cost-saving innovation that more than compensates for the cost of compliance. In this paper, we test the significance of these different variants of the Porter Hypothesis using data on the four main elements of the hypothesised causality chain (environmental policy, research and development, environmental performance and commercial performance). The analysis is based upon a unique database which includes observations from approximately 4200 facilities in seven OECD countries. In general, we find strong support for the “weak” version, qualified support for the “narrow” version, and qualified support for the “strong” version as well.PORTHER HYPOTHESIS;ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY;INNOVATION;ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE;BUSINESS PERFORMANCE

    Sharing a Polluted River Network

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    A polluted river network is populated with agents (e.g., firms, villages, municipalities, or countries) located upstream and downstream. This river network must be cleaned, the costs of which must be shared among the agents. We model this problem as a cost sharing problem on a tree network. Based on the two theories in international disputes, namely the Absolute Territorial Sovereignty (ATS) and the Unlimitted Territorial Integrity (UTI), we propose three different cost sharing methods for the problem. They are the Local Responsibility Sharing (LRS), the Upstream Equal Sharing (UES), and the Downstream Equal Sharing (DES), respectively. The LRS and the UES generalize Ni and Wang ("Sharing a polluted river", Games Econ. Behav., 60 (2007), 176-186) but the DES is new. The DES is based on a new interpretation of the UTI. We provide axiomatic characterizations for the three methods. We also show that they coincide with the Shapley values of the three different games that can be defined for the problem. Moreover, we show that they are in the cores of the three games, respectively. Our methods can shed light on pollution abatement of a river network with multiple sovereignties

    Applying Interconnected Game Theory to Analyze Transboundary Waters: A Case Study of the Kura-Araks Basin

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    A number of environmental problems are international in nature, including many water management issues. Rivers, for example, do not recognize political boundaries. Therefore, pollution generated in one country can affect neighboring countries, while water extraction in an upstream country can affect water flow and water availability in a downstream country. The situation creates an interdependency among countries, which might lead to disputes over the management of transboundary water. Therefore, coordination among the countries is necessary for effective management of these transboundary resources. The focus of a recently published study (Khachaturyan and Schoengold, 2018) is the transboundary Kura-Araks Basin (see Figure 1 for its location), which is a major river system in the South Caucasus, with about 11 million people living in the basin. The countries in the basin are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran, and Turkey, with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia having over 80 percent of the streamflow. The Kura-Araks Basin is a primary source of water for agricultural, industrial, and municipal uses in the South Caucasian countries. The study determines whether there are economic benefits to be gained from cooperation in the management of the Kura River (shared between Azerbaijan and Georgia), and under what conditions cooperation is an achievable outcome. Azerbaijan withdraws about 35 percent of the total available renewable water resources while Georgia only withdraws about 3 percent
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