Persistent Real Exchange Rates

Three well known facts that characterize exchange rate data are: (a) the high correlation between bilateral nominal and real exchange rates; (b) the high degree of persistence in real exchange rate movements; and (c) the high volatility of real exchange rates. This paper attempts a joint, albeit partial, rationalization of these facts in an environment with no staggered contracts and where prices are preset for only one quarter. There are two key innovations in the paper. First, we augment a standard two-country open economy model with learning-by-doing in production at the firm level. This induces monopolistically competitive firms to endogeneize the productivity effect of their price setting behavior. Specifically, firms endogenously choose not to adjust prices by the full proportion of a positive monetary shock in order to take advantage of the productivity benefits of higher production. Second, we introduce habits in leisure. This makes the labor supply decision dynamic and adds an additional source of propagation. We show that the calibrated model can quantitatively reproduce significant fractions of the aforementioned facts. Moreover, as in the data, the model also produces a positive correlation between the terms of trade and the nominal exchange rate.Real exchange rate movements, endogenous price stickiness, learning-by-doing

Output Costs, Currency Crises, and Interest Rate Defense of a Peg

Central banks typically raise short-term interest rates to defend currency pegs. Higher interest rates, however, often lead to a credit crunch and an output contraction. We model this trade-off in an optimizing, first-generation model in which the crisis may be delayed but is ultimately inevitable. We show that higher interest rates may delay the crisis, but raising interest rates beyond a certain point may actually bring forward the crisis due to the large negative output effect. The optimal interest rate defense involves setting high interest rates (relative to the no defense case) both before and at the moment of the crisis. Furthermore, while the crisis could be delayed even further, it is not optimal to do so.

A Tale of Two States

Indian states, development

Living with the Fear of Floating: An Optimal Policy Perspective

As documented in recent studies, developing countries (classified by the IMF as floaters or managed floaters) are extremely reluctant to allow for large nominal exchange rate fluctuations. This 'fear of floating' is reflected in the fact that, in spite of being subject to larger shocks, developing countries exhibit lower exchange rate variability and higher reserve variability than developed countries. Moreover, there is a positive correlation between changes in the exchange rate and interest rates and a negative correlation between both changes in reserves and the exchange rate and changes in interest rates and reserves. We build a simple model that rationalizes these key features as the outcome of an optimal policy response to monetary shocks. The model incorporates three key frictions: an output cost of nominal exchange rate fluctuations, an output cost of higher interest rates to defend the currency, and a fixed cost of intervention.

Delaying the Inevitable: Optimal Interest Rate Policy and BOP Crises

The classical model of balance of payments crises implicitly assumes that the central bank sits passively as international reserves dwindle. In practice, however, central banks typically defend pegs aggressively by raising short-term interest rates. This paper analyzes the feasibility and optimality of raising interest rates to delay a potential BOP crisis. Interest rate policy works through two distinct channels. By raising demand for domestic, interest-bearing liquid assets, higher interest rates tend to delay the crisis. Higher interest rates, however, increase public debt service and imply higher future inflation, which tends to bring forward the crisis. We show that, under certain conditions, it is feasible to delay the crisis, but raising interest rates beyond a certain point may actually hasten the crisis. A similar non-monotonic relationship emerges between welfare and the increase in interest rates. It is thus optimal to engage in some active interest rate defense but only up to a certain point. In fact, there is a whole range of interest rate increases for which it is feasible to delay the crisis but not optimal to do so.

A tale of two states: Maharashtra and West Bengal

In this paper the authors study the economic evolution between 1960 and 1995 of two states in India — Maharashtra and West Bengal. In 1960, West Bengal’s per capita income exceeded that of Maharashtra. By 1995, it had fallen to just 69 percent of Maharashtra’s per capita income. The authors employ a "wedge" methodology based on the first order conditions of a multi-sector neoclassical growth model to ascertain the sources of the divergent economic performances. Their diagnostic analysis reveals that a large part of West Bengal’s development woes can be attributed to: (a) low sectoral productivity, especially in manufacturing and services; and (b) sectoral misallocation in labor markets. These patterns, together with additional evidence on developments in the labor market, the manufacturing sector, and voting behavior, suggest a systematic worsening of the business environment in manufacturing in West Bengal during this period.India

Optimal Monetary Policy under Asset Market Segmentation

This paper studies optimal monetary policy in a small open economy under flexible prices. The paper’s key innovation is to analyze this question in the context of environments where only a fraction of agents participate in asset market transactions (i.e., asset markets are segmented). In this environment, we first show that there exist state contingent rules (based either on the rate of money growth or the devaluation rate) that can implement the first-best equilibrium. Such rules, however, would require the monetary authority to respond to contemporaneous shocks and would thus be difficult to implement. We then proceed to analyze optimal monetary policy rules within the class of non-state contingent rules. Our main result is that amongst non-state contingent rules, policies targeting monetary aggregates (which allow for nominal exchange rate flexibility) welfare-dominate rules that target the exchange rate. In particular, we find that a fixed exchange rate is never optimal. Our analysis would thus tend to support monetary policy arrangements that allow for nominal exchange rate flexibilityOptimal monetary policy, asset market segmentation

Global current account adjustment: a decomposition

The rising current account deficit in the USA has attracted considerable attention in recent years. We use the “business cycle accounting” methodology to identify the principal distortions that have affected the external accounts of the US. In particular, we measure distortions in the optimality conditions of a simple two-country general equilibrium model using data from the US and the other G7 countries. We then feed these measured distortions into the model individually and use the simulated counterfactual paths of the current account to determine the contribution of each of these “wedges” to the overall external imbalance of the USA. We find that no single wedge in isolation can account closely for the observed current account. However, a combination of productivity differences and deviations from risk-sharing between the US and the rest of the G7 does the best job in accounting for most of the measured movement of the US current account.