LA TRANSPARENCE DE L'ENTREPRISE ET LA STRUCTURE DE PROPRIETE: CAS DES ENTREPRISES FRANÇAISES

Ce papier étudie la relation entre le niveau de transparence de l'entreprise et sa structure de propriété sur le marché français. L'intérêt de notre étude est de donner une explication à la diversité des publications observée dans un contexte d'actionnariat concentré. En se basant sur la multiplicité des supports de la communication financière nous avons évalué simultanément les rapports annuels et les sites Web officiels des entreprises appartenant à l'indice SBF 120, a fin d'apprécier plus pertinemment la qualité de la communication financière des entreprises françaises cotées. Les résultats montrent que le niveau de transparence de la firme est négativement associé à la concentration d'actionnariat et au contrôle familial. Ces preuves mettent en évidence les problèmes de transparence qui existent dans les structures concentrées et soulignent le rôle des actionnaires contrôleurs dans l'expropriation des actionnaires minoritaires.Transparence de l'entreprise, communication financière, structure de propriété gouvernance de l'entreprise.

La transparence de l'entreprise et la structure de propriété : cas des entreprises françaises

International audienceThe purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between firm's transparency level and ownership structure of French listed companies. The interest of our study is to explain the diversity of corporate disclosure behavior in concentrated frameworks. Given the multiplicity of disclosure means, we use both annual reports and institutional websites of French listed companies on the SBF250 index to assess efficiently corporate disclosure quality. The findings show that firm transparency is negatively associated with the ownership concentration and family-control. Ours findings evidence corporate transparency problems and deadline the insider's role in the minority expropriation.Ce papier étudie la relation entre le niveau de transparence de l'entreprise et sa structure de propriété sur le marché français. L'intérêt de notre étude est de donner une explication à la diversité des publications observée dans un contexte d'actionnariat concentré. En se basant sur la multiplicité des supports de la communication financière nous avons évalué simultanément les rapports annuels et les sites Web officiels des entreprises appartenant à l'indice SBF 120, a fin d'apprécier plus pertinemment la qualité de la communication financière des entreprises françaises cotées. Les résultats montrent que le niveau de transparence de la firme est négativement associé à la concentration d'actionnariat et au contrôle familial. Ces preuves mettent en évidence les problèmes de transparence qui existent dans les structures concentrées et soulignent le rôle des actionnaires contrôleurs dans l'expropriation des actionnaires minoritaires

La transparence de l'entreprise et la structure de propriété : cas des entreprises françaises

International audienceThe purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between firm's transparency level and ownership structure of French listed companies. The interest of our study is to explain the diversity of corporate disclosure behavior in concentrated frameworks. Given the multiplicity of disclosure means, we use both annual reports and institutional websites of French listed companies on the SBF250 index to assess efficiently corporate disclosure quality. The findings show that firm transparency is negatively associated with the ownership concentration and family-control. Ours findings evidence corporate transparency problems and deadline the insider's role in the minority expropriation.Ce papier étudie la relation entre le niveau de transparence de l'entreprise et sa structure de propriété sur le marché français. L'intérêt de notre étude est de donner une explication à la diversité des publications observée dans un contexte d'actionnariat concentré. En se basant sur la multiplicité des supports de la communication financière nous avons évalué simultanément les rapports annuels et les sites Web officiels des entreprises appartenant à l'indice SBF 120, a fin d'apprécier plus pertinemment la qualité de la communication financière des entreprises françaises cotées. Les résultats montrent que le niveau de transparence de la firme est négativement associé à la concentration d'actionnariat et au contrôle familial. Ces preuves mettent en évidence les problèmes de transparence qui existent dans les structures concentrées et soulignent le rôle des actionnaires contrôleurs dans l'expropriation des actionnaires minoritaires

How does corporate voluntary disclosure affect asymmetric information and adverse selection?

International audienceThis paper investigates whether the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure mitigates asymmetric information and adverse selection in the Euronext Paris stock exchange. We apply a disclosure index as a proxy for the extent of voluntary disclosure and use different spread measures to estimate both asymmetric information and adverse selection. Our findings show a negative relationship between the disclosure index and asymmetric information and adverse selection proxies. An analysis of sub-indexes provides additional mixed results. Several asymmetric information measures are negatively related to the volume of financial, non-financial and voluntary governance information in corporate annual reports. Nevertheless, the effect of strategic information volume is statistically significant only for effective bid-ask spreads. On the whole, these results are consistent with the view that high corporate voluntary disclosure is associated with narrow spreads and low adverse selection costs

Board director disciplinary and cognitive influence on corporate value creation

International audiencePurpose – This paper aims to investigate board director disciplinary and cognitive influence on corporate value creation.Design/methodology/approach – Fixed-effect regressions are used to check whether gender diversity, education, independence and size of the board of directors affect measures of corporate value creation.Findings – The empirical results show that corporate value creation is positively influenced by the cross effect of the board independence and the presence of women. They also point out a positive impact of the cross effect of board independence and management education. They reveal that the board of directors contributes significantly to corporate value creation, particularly when there is a mix of independent, female and management-qualified directors.Originality/value – The evidence presented and discussed in this paper should be of interest to managers and regulators. The methodological approach and the empirical results extend the existing literature. They enrich the limited empirical research devoted to this theme, especially in a continental European context, i.e. France. They shed light on the effect of board of directors’ disciplinary and cognitive influence on corporate value creation

Corporate Governance And Voluntary Disclosure In France

International audienceThis paper investigates the effect of corporate governance practices on the extent of voluntary disclosure in France. Using a panel of 206 non-financial French listed firms during the period 2006–2009, we find evidence that voluntary disclosure in annual reports increases with managerial ownership, board and audit committee independence, board meeting frequency, and external audit quality. We also find that frequency of audit committee meetings and diligence of board and auditing are associated with decreased disclosure. Additional findings show that larger, more profitable, and less indebted firms have greater voluntary disclosure

Signaling Firm Performance Through Corporate Voluntary Disclosure

International audienceThe present study empirically investigates the link between corporate voluntary disclosure and firm performance. The empirical analyses show a positive relationship between disclosure indexes and firm performance proxies. They provide evidence that the level of voluntary information disclosed in annual reports plays a significant signaling role of firm performance. However, the extent of this role depends on the nature of the voluntary disclosure, i.e. strategic, financial or corporate governance information

Voluntary information disclosure and sell-side analyst coverage intensity

International audiencePurpose – This paper aims to investigate whether a high level of voluntary disclosure attracts sell-side analysts. In other words, the authors check whether the number of analysts following a given firm increases with the extent of voluntary information that corporate managers provide in annual reports.Design/methodology/approach – The paper relies on regression analyses to study the relationship between the level of coverage by sell-side analysts and the extent of voluntary disclosure for a sample of 155 non-financial firms listed on the Euronext Paris stock exchange and members of the SBF 250 index.Findings – The empirical results show that the number of analysts following a given firm increases with the extent of voluntary disclosure. Consequently, the authors conclude that analysts are interested in the volume of information provided voluntarily by corporate managers. Their interest varies across the voluntary-information categories (strategic, financial, non-financial and governance) disclosed in annual reports.Originality/value – This study extends previous research by investigating sell-side analysts’ preferences in terms of voluntary-information categories in annual reports. A better understanding of the effects of sub-categories of voluntary information is useful to corporate managers wishing to meet market expectations and attract sell-side analysts. In fact, the authors verify how each category of disclosed information (strategic, financial, non-financial and governance) affects the analyst coverage intensity. In addition, the authors apply our study in the rather interesting empirical setting that is France, which is characterized by a low investor protection and a large number of active analysts