Economics Imperialism Reconsidered

This paper revisits the economics imperialism thesis and argues that rational choice imperialism is a more pointed understanding of interdisciplinary shifts over the past half century that give increasing priority to economic arguments over methods from other social sciences. It considers rational choice imperialism from the perspective of asking whether it contributes to greater scientific understanding through promoting greater theoretical synthesis and unity. It concludes that because much rational choice-based research is purely analytic, its contributory potential is derivational. Without further research to introduce empirical elements into rational choice research, this method's movement into other fields of study, including political science, does not necessary contribute to superior understanding of social phenomena

Prisoners of Reason: Game Theory and Neoliberal Political Economy

Is capitalism inherently predatory? Must there be winners and losers? Is public interest outdated and free-riding rational? Is consumer choice the same as self-determination? Must bargainers abandon the no-harm principle? Prisoners of Reason recalls that classical liberal capitalism exalted the no-harm principle. Although imperfect and exclusionary, modern liberalism recognized individual human dignity alongside individuals' responsibility to respect others. Neoliberalism, by contrast, views life as ceaseless struggle. Agents vie for scarce resources in antagonistic competition in which every individual seeks dominance. This political theory is codified in non-cooperative game theory; the neoliberal citizen and consumer is the strategic rational actor. Rational choice justifies ends irrespective of means. Money becomes the medium of all value. Solidarity and good will are invalidated. Relationships are conducted on a quid pro quo basis. However, agents can freely opt out of this cynical race to the bottom by embracing a more expansive range of coherent action

The Long Term Viability of Team Reasoning

This article argues that contrary to the selfish gene idea popularized by Richard Dawkins, given the diverse encounters organisms faced throughout their evolutionary history, that team reasoning potentially would be viability. Opposing the conventional wisdom, this opens the possibility that members of species could cooperate in a mixture of games including Prisoners Dilemma, Hawk-Dove, and Hi Lo. The paper builds on Richard Bacharach's theory of team reasoning and presents a replicator dynamic model to construct an analytic model argument