Taxes and quality: A market-level analysis

Aconventional assumption of product homogeneity when the commodity of interest is actually heterogeneous will lead to errors in an analysis of the incidence of policies, such as taxes. In this article, an equilibrium displacement model is used to derive analytical solutions for price, quantity, and quality effects of ad valorem and per unit taxes. The results show how parameters determine the effects of tax policies on quality. The potential for tax-induced distortions in quality, and the distributive consequences of those distortions, are illustrated in a case study of the market for Australian wine.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

STATE TRADING VERSUS EXPORT SUBSIDIES: THE CASE OF CANADIAN WHEAT

Canada and the United States have used different trade policies to support their wheat industries. Canada conferred sole export powers to the Canadian Wheat Board, allowing it to price discriminate among markets. The U.S. government has funded transfers to its wheat producers from taxpayers, instead, through export subsidies. This study compares these two ways of supporting producers in terms of their transfer efficiency and overall deadweight losses, the incidence on different domestic interest groups, and their consequences for third party traders. In the analysis we consider the implications of market power of wheat marketing firms for the comparison of policy alternatives in the context of the Canadian wheat industry.International Relations/Trade,

Levy-funded research choices by producers and society

Commodity levies are used increasingly to fund producer collective goods such as research and promotion. In the present paper we examine theoretical relationships between producer and national benefits from levy‐funded research, and consider the implications for the appropriate rates of matching government grants, applied with a view to achieving a closer match between producer and national interests. In many cases the producer and national optima coincide. First, regardless of the form of the supply shift, when product demand is perfectly elastic, or all the product is exported, domestic benefits and costs of levy‐funded research all go to producers and they have appropriate incentives. Second, if research causes a parallel supply shift, the producer share of research benefits is the same as their share of costs of a levy, and their incentives are compatible with national interests. In such cases, a matching grant would cause an over‐investment in research from a national perspective. However, if demand is less than perfectly elastic, and research causes a pivotal supply shift, the producer share of benefits is smaller than their share of costs of the levy, and they will under‐invest in research from a national point of view. A matching grant can be justified in such cases, however the magnitude of the optimal grant is sensitive to market conditions.Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies,

WHEAT DISPUTES UNDER NAFTA

International Relations/Trade,

Demand Enhancement through Food-Safety Regulation: Benefit-Cost Analysis of Collective Action in the California Pistachio Industry

Food safety shocks can threaten the health of consumers, create havoc within an industry and result in severe losses to producers. Governments often attempt to enhance food safety by mandating standards and inspection of food products to supplement the voluntary efforts by private firms. This paper assesses a form of collective action that falls between typical government mandates and purely private action. The California pistachio industry recently established a U.S. federal marketing order. This order sets quality standards and requires inspection and certification, aiming to reduce the likelihood of dangerous or poor quality pistachios being sold to consumers and to provide some quality assurance to consumers. Simulation results indicate that, across the full range of parameters used in the analysis, the benefit-cost analysis was always favorable to the new policy. Continuing work is extending the analysis to account for some particular features of the pistachio industry, to consider alternative policies, and to draw inferences for the application of similar policies to other California specialty crops.Food Safety, Collective Action, Specialty Crops, Government Regulation, Marketing Orders, Pistachios, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Q18, Q13, I18, H4,

ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF MANDATED GRADING AND TESTING TO AVOID A NEGATIVE FOOD SAFETY EVENT: EX ANTE ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL MARKETING ORDER FOR PISTACHIOS

The California pistachio industry led an initiative to establish a federal marketing order, which mandates quality standards and an inspection program to assure food safety and consistency in the quality of California pistachios. We develop a stochastic dynamic simulation model of the pistachio market to investigate quantitatively the likely effects of such collective action enforced by government mandates. Simulation results indicate that, across the full range of parameters used in the analysis, the benefit-cost analysis was always favorable to the proposed policy. The measured benefits to producers, the nation, or the world always well exceeded the corresponding measure of costs, typically by many times.Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety,

Industry-mandated testing to improve food safety: the new US marketing order for pistachios

Food safety shocks can threaten the health of consumers, create havoc within an industry and result in severe losses to producers. Governments often attempt to aid food safety by mandating standards and inspection of food products to supplement the efforts by private firms and industries. This article assesses a form of collective action that falls between typical government mandates and purely private action. The California pistachio industry recently established a U.S. federal marketing order, which sets quality standards and inspection to reduce the likelihood of dangerous or poor quality pistachios. Simulation results indicate that, across the full range of parameters used in the analysis, the benefit-cost analysis was always favorable to the new policy. In the case of California pistachios, collective action is likely to be a helpful tool to ensure a safe product and increase benefits to producers and consumers.food safety, food scare, collective action, marketing orders, pistachios, public good, food regulations, cost-benefit analysis, Agribusiness, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety,

Structural Changes in U.S. Agricultural Production and Productivity

Livestock Production/Industries,

Economic Consequences of Mandated Grading and Food Safety Assurance: Ex Ante Analysis of the Federal Marketing Order for California Pistachios

Crop Production/Industries, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Marketing,

Agricultural R&D Policy: A Tragedy of the International Commons

Over the past 50 years public agricultural research has contributed enormously to humanity, enabling the supply of food to grow faster than demand in spite of a rapidly growing population, income growth, and shrinking natural resources. Nonetheless, in many countries we see waning public support for agricultural R&D, especially in Africa, a diversion of research resources from farm productivity towards other agendas, and early warning signs of a slowdown in agricultural productivity. The world has continued to collectively underinvest in agricultural R&D because of domestic and international market failures associated with appropriability problems. Governments have failed to effectively address these problems, often doing too little, too late. This tragedy of the international commons may be getting worse. In the past, developing countries benefited considerably from technological spillovers from developed countries, but because of changes occurring in developed countries, spillovers from developed countries may not be available to developing countries in the same ways or to the same extent . In this article, the factors contributing to persistent global underinvestment in agricultural R&D are described from a developing country perspective, estimates of agricultural R&D spending trends are presented, and incentive mechanisms for increasing rates of investment in agricultural R&D are described and assessed