Life is uncertain, eat dessert first: Uncertainty causes uncontrolled and unemotional eaters to consume more sweets

Sometimes even dieters with the best self-control overindulge. Uncertain situations may undermine the self-control of even well-controlled eaters. This study was designed to test the hypothesis that uncertainty increases unhealthy snacking. Participants were either told that they would be giving a speech, that they would be listening to a speech, or that they would find out later whether they were to give a speech or not. Among participants who typically reported good control over their eating or scored low on emotional eating, participants who were uncertain about whether they would be giving a speech ate more candy than participants who expected to not have to give a speech and even those who expected to have to give a speech. Participants who reported poor control over their eating or scored high on emotional eating did not eat significantly more when uncertain. These findings suggest that, for people who are typically able to control their eating, uncertainty increases snacking more than certainty of a negative outcome

A Multisite Preregistered Paradigmatic Test of the Ego-Depletion Effect

We conducted a preregistered multilaboratory project (k = 36; N = 3,531) to assess the size and robustness of ego-depletion effects using a novel replication method, termed the paradigmatic replication approach. Each laboratory implemented one of two procedures that was intended to manipulate self-control and tested performance on a subsequent measure of self-control. Confirmatory tests found a nonsignificant result (d = 0.06). Confirmatory Bayesian meta-analyses using an informed-prior hypothesis (δ = 0.30, SD = 0.15) found that the data were 4 times more likely under the null than the alternative hypothesis. Hence, preregistered analyses did not find evidence for a depletion effect. Exploratory analyses on the full sample (i.e., ignoring exclusion criteria) found a statistically significant effect (d = 0.08); Bayesian analyses showed that the data were about equally likely under the null and informed-prior hypotheses. Exploratory moderator tests suggested that the depletion effect was larger for participants who reported more fatigue but was not moderated by trait self-control, willpower beliefs, or action orientation.</p

Foraging extends beyond food: hoarding of mental energy and information seeking in response to uncertainty

When an environment is uncertain, humans and other animals benefit from preparing for and attempting to predict potential outcomes. People respond to uncertainty both by conserving mental energy on tasks unrelated to the source of the uncertainty and by increasing their attentiveness to information related to the uncertainty. This mental hoarding and foraging allow people to prepare in uncertain situations

Is there a downside to good self-control?

Most discussions of self-control have focused on its benefits rather than its costs. The most important cost appears to be the depletion of limited self-control resources. Acts of self-control both consume and require self-control resources, and, until these resources can be replenished, people's ability to perform many adaptive behaviors is compromised. These impairments affect not only self-control but also intelligent thought, effective decision making, and initiative. The limited resource itself presents further potential costs, insofar as the person must manage the limited resource (e.g., conserving for future demands), and managing the resource itself is presumably another demand for self-regulation and hence a drain on the limited resource. Trait self-control, in contrast, appears to have few or no downsides

Ego depletion and the limited resource model of self-control

People break diets, procrastinate in the face of looming deadlines, imbibe too much alcohol the night before a midterm, struggle to save money, and lash out at loved ones and family members. They do all these things despite their best intentions not to. Why do people engage in such personally, interpersonally, and socially destructive behaviors? This chapter suggests that a major reason why people fail at self-control is because it relies on a limited resource. We define self-control as the capacity to alter one's responses; it is what enables people to forego the allure of short-term pleasures to institute responses that bring long-term rewards. One of the core functions of self-control may be to facilitate culture, which often requires that people curtail selfishness for the sake of effective group functioning. The first part of the chapter gives an overview of how self-control operates, including the possible biological basis of self-control. It covers a substantial body of literature suggesting that self-control operates on a limited resource, which becomes depleted with use. The second part of the chapter reviews the benefits of good self-control and the costs of bad self-control across a large variety of domains, such as consumption, self-presentation, decision making, rejection, aggression, and interpersonal relationships

Illusions of learning: irrelevant emotions inflate judgments of learning

People use assessments of how much they have learned to choose and recommend instructors, seminars, and weekend trips. How do people assess how much they have learned? Recent theorizing has depicted emotion as a cue for learning, and so people may be misled by recent emotional states to infer that they have learned more than they actually have. Four studies showed that people associated emotion with learning and believed, often falsely, that they learned more when in an emotional than unemotional state. Factual lessons were coupled with manipulations of arbitrary, irrelevant emotional states. Participants rated that they learned more after an emotion had been induced than in emotionally neutral control conditions. These differences remained significant after controlling for actual learning as measured by objective tests, which was unaffected by emotion. This illusion of learning caused by emotion was robust with respect to changes of procedure and sample, including whether the emotion came before or after the information to be learned. Alternative explanations were ruled out, including that emotion would intensify ratings generally, that emotion would make incoming information seem particularly personally relevant, that emotion increased engagement in the research, and that illusory learning would depend on retrospective exaggeration of one's prior ignorance. Because irrelevant emotions can increase people's judgments that they have learned something, incidental emotional experiences could increase a person's likelihood of deciding to take another class with a particular instructor, to sign up for another leadership seminar, or to engage in a risky (but emotion-filled) excursion

Does Emotion Cause Behavior (Apart from Making People Do Stupid, Destructive Things)?

1 Psychology is often described as the scientific study of behavior. In practice it studies many other things, including thoughts and feelings, and indeed by some measures the direct observation of behavior has been disappearing from many laboratories and journals (Baumeister, Vohs, &amp; Funder, 2007). Yet in principle the study of thoughts, feelings, and other phenomena is justified partly on the basis that understanding these things will help illuminate behavior. This chapter focuses on the relationship between emotion and behavior. It will present two main theories about that relationship. They are not equals. One is widely accepted, is simple, and enjoys the benefits of tradition and parsimony. The other has none of those advantages. By rights, therefore, the one deserves to be given the benefit of the doubt, and the second theory should only be considered seriously if the first one is found to be seriously inadequate to account for the evidence. But I shall propose that it has finally been revealed by the gradual accumulation of evidence to be seriously inadequate if not downright wrong. Hence a new theory is needed — preferably one that can fit the observed facts, especially including the ones that have gradually discredite