Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics

We explore the extent to which altruism, as measured by giving in a dictator game (DG), accounts for play in a noisy version of the repeated prisoner's dilemma. We find that DG giving is correlated with cooperation in the repeated game when no cooperative equilibria exist, but not when cooperation is an equilibrium. Furthermore, none of the commonly observed strategies are better explained by inequity aversion or efficiency concerns than money maximization. Various survey questions provide additional evidence for the relative unimportance of social preferences. We conclude that cooperation in repeated games is primarily motivated by long-term payoff maximization and that even though some subjects may have other goals, this does not seem to be the key determinant of how play varies with the parameters of the repeated game. In particular, altruism does not seem to be a major source of the observed diversity of play.Economic

Economic Systems and Risk Preferences: Evidence from East and West Germany

For standard economic models it is typically assumed that preferences are given and stable. But do economic systems shape individuals' risk preferences? Using the reunification of East and West Germany as a natural experiment I evaluate differences in financial risk taking comparing Eastern and Western German households for almost two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Controlling for a large set of socio-economic variables East Germans having been ``treated'' by a command economy were more prone to taking financial risk than West German citizens. The differences were quantitatively relevant after the fall of the Iron Curtain and almost vanished by 2008

How to Decrease the Amortization Bias: Experience vs. Rules

We conduct an experimental study that tests the effectiveness of de-biasing a certain form of exponential growth bias found in household finance debt decisions, called the amortization bias. We provide 251 bachelor students at a German university with a short tutorial based on one of three learning methods: experiential learning, learning a simple “I Owe More” debt rule-of-thumb, as well as learning an extended, but more accurate version of the “I Owe More” debt rule. Immediately after completing these tutorials, we retest for the amortization bias and find a significant bias improvement in all three treatments. More importantly, after confronting the same participants with similar debt scenarios approximately three weeks later, we find that those who had previously received a debt tutorial maintain a significantly larger bias improvement over the control group. However, during this short period, most of the individuals who learned the simple and complex rules-of-thumb could no longer apply the rule and reverted back to their biased answers, while the experiential learning group best retained their improvement in bias. We find evidence in this experiment that experience-based learning may be better suited to produce long-lasting improvements for attenuating the amortization bias

Civic Capital in Two Cultures: The Nature of Cooperation in Romania and USA

We experimentally investigate the nature of cooperation in various repeated games, with subjects from Romania and USA. We find stark cross-country differences in the propensity to sustain multilateral cooperation through bilateral rewards and punishments. U.S. groups perform well because sufficiently many cooperators are willing to discipline free riders. Romanian cooperators are less prone to jeopardize their productive bilateral relationships for the benefit of the group, collectively failing to provide adequate discipline. Our analysis indicates that the performance differences constitute a group-level phenomenon, being largely due differences in shared beliefs rather than differences in individuals' preferences

Skilled But Unaware of It: Occurrence and Potential Long-Term Effects of Females' Financial Underconfidence

We find strong gender- and education-related differences in the distribution of actual and perceived financial sophistication: Whereas financial literacy rises in formal education, confidence increases in education for men but decreases for women. We show that the financial decisions of highly-educated men benefit strongly from this excess confidence, while the underconfidence of highly-educated women, in contrast, impairs their long-term financial planning