Decentralization and Local Government Borrowing in Indonesia

In this paper, we examine the decentralization reforms now underway in Indonesia, focusing on their effects on local government borrowing. Our general conclusion is that the laws and their implementing regulations seem designed mainly to deal with macroeconomic considerations of the central government, and not to create a system to allow local governments to gain access to credit markets. Indeed, this seems likely to be a reasonable immediate goal, given that the pre-conditions for successful local government borrowing are not currently present in Indonesia. However, the long run goal must remain the creation of a viable framework in which local governments face hard budget constraints but are still able to have access to capital markets. It is here where the current framework in Indonesia is inadequate. To this end, we suggest a number of policies that will help in a transition period from the current reliance on direct administrative control of local borrowing to a greater reliance on market discipline policy. In the next section, we briefly discuss the current macroeconomic conditions of Indonesia, and outline the major features of Laws No. 22/1999 and 25/1999, including their provisions that deal with local government borrowing. In section III, we present a general "framework" that establishes some conditions under which different approaches to local government borrowing can be successful, and we apply this framework to local governments in Indonesia in the section IV. We conclude in section V

Culture Differences and Tax Morale in the United States and Europe

In recent years much research has investigated whether values, social norms, and attitudes differ across countries and whether these differences have measurable effects on economic behavior. One area in which such studies are particularly relevant is tax compliance, given both the noted differences across countries in their levels of tax compliance and the marked inability of standard economic models of taxpayer compliance to explain these differences. In the face of these difficulties, many researchers have suggested that the intrinsic motivation for individuals to pay taxes - what is sometimes termed their "tax morale" - differs across countries. However, isolating the reasons for these differences in tax morale is notoriously difficult. In a common approach, studies sometimes referred to as "cultural studies" have often relied upon controlled laboratory experiments conducted in different countries because such experiments can be set up with identical experimental protocols to allow cultural effects to be isolated. In this paper we first analyze a cross-section of individuals in Spain and the United States using the World Values Survey (WVS). In line with previous experiments, our findings indicate a significantly higher tax morale in the United States than in Spain, controlling in a multivariate analysis for additional variables. We then extend our multivariate analysis to include 14 European countries in the estimations. Our results again indicate that the United States has the highest tax morale across all countries, followed by Austria and Switzerland. We also find a strong negative correlation between the size of shadow economy and the degree of tax morale in those countries

Audit Certainty, Audit Productivity, and Taxpayer Compliance

Strategies for dealing with evasion include such standard policies as stricter enforcement (e.g., increased audit rates, more extensive audits, larger penalties). However, the exact responses of taxpayers to these enforcement measures are quite difficult to measure with existing field data, and so are not known precisely. In this paper we use experimental methods to examine how individuals respond in their compliance decisions to a "certain" probability of audit and to information concerning the "productivity" of an audit. Our design informs some individuals that their return will be audited with certainty prior to making their compliance decision, while other individuals receive information that they will not be audited; we also inform individuals of the productivity of the audit by stating how much unreported income will be discovered via the audit. We find that the announcement of audits increases the compliance rate of those who are told that they will be audited. However, the compliance rate of those who know that they will not be audited falls, and the net effect is that overall compliance falls. Working Paper 06-4

Can Developing Countries Impose an Individual Income Tax?

No Abstrac

The Effects of Communication Among Taxpayers on Compliance

Taxpayer audits are thought to have a direct deterrent effect on the individuals actually audited. In addition, audits are believed to have an indirect deterrent effect on individuals not audited as these individuals learn (or are told) about the audits of other taxpayers. However, the effects on compliance of the ways in which taxpayers learn about - and communicate among themselves - audit rates are not known. In this study, we use laboratory experiments to examine the effects of three types of information and communication on compliance. In all sessions, each subject knows the probability of audit and the results of their own audit (if any). In our base case session, each subject knows only the result of his or her audit, and subjects receive no information about audit results of other subjects. In a second treatment (termed "official" communication), subjects are also told by the experimenter the actual number of audits conducted during a period. In a third treatment (or "unofficial" communication), subjects are offered the opportunity to send a "message" to the other participants about their audit experience. Our preliminary results indicate that "unofficial" communication has a strong indirect effect that increases compliance, but that "official" communication may not encourage voluntary compliance

Audit Information Dissemination, Taxpayer Communication, and Compliance Behavior

Taxpayer audits are a central feature of the voluntary compliance system in the United States federal individual income tax. Audits are thought to have a direct deterrent effect on the individuals actually audited. Audits are also believed to have an indirect deterrent effect on individuals not audited, and in fact there is some empirical evidence that audit rates affect compliance beyond the audited individuals themselves. However, empirical studies cannot measure or control for taxpayer awareness of audit risk, and they also cannot uncover the behavioral channels through which the direct and indirect effects operate; that is, the ways in which taxpayers learn about - and communicate among themselves - audit rates, and the subsequent effects on compliance, are not known and cannot be discovered by empirical studies. In this study, we use laboratory experiments to examine several types of information dissemination and taxpayer communication about audit frequency and audit results. These experiments allow us to test hypotheses about the effects of two types of communication of audit policies and results, in order to explore the direct and the indirect effects of audits: "official" information disseminated by the "government" (e.g., the experimenter) and "unofficial", or informal, communications among "taxpayers" (e.g., the subjects). Our results indicate that "unofficial" communications have a strong indirect effect on compliance: messages that indicate that a subject was not audited or was able to cheat actually reduce compliance, while messages that a subject was audited or paid his or her taxes increase compliance. Also, "official" announcements of information may not always encourage voluntary compliance. Working Paper 06-4

The Price Effect of Georgia's Temporary Suspension of State Fuel Taxes

This report explores the effect of the fuel tax suspension on the price of gasoline in Georgia. FRC Report 14

Recent Changes in State and Local Funding for Education in Georgia

This report examines how the 2001 recession affected K-12 education spending in Georgia school systems. FRC Report 20

The Price Effect of Georgia's Temporary Suspension of State Fuel Taxes - Brief

This report explores the effect of the fuel tax suspension on the price of gasoline in Georgia. FRC Brief 14

Recent Changes in State and Local Funding for Education in Georgia - Brief

This report examines how the 2001 recession affected K-12 education spending in Georgia school systems. FRC Brief 20