Cost estimating issues in the Russian integrated system planning context

An important factor in the credibility of an optimal capacity expansion plan is the accuracy of cost estimates given the uncertainty of future economic conditions. This paper examines the problems associated with estimating investment and operating costs in the Russian nuclear power context over the period 1994 to 2010

Human performance: An essential element in materials control and accountability

The importance of the role of human performance in the successful and effective operation of many activities throughout many industries has been well documented. Most closely related to the materials control and accountability area is the work in human factors that has been ongoing in the U.S. nuclear industry since the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant accident in 1979. Research related to the role of human reliability, human-system interface, and organization and management influences has been and is still being conducted to identify ways to enhance the safe and effective operation of nuclear facilities. This paper will discuss these human performance areas and how they relate to the materials control and accountability area. Particular attention will be focussed on the notion of {open_quotes}safety culture{close_quotes} and how it can be defined and measured for understanding the values and attitudes held by individuals working in the materials control area. It is widely believed that the culture of an organization, which reflects the expectations and values of the management of an organization, is a key element to the operation of that organization. The human performance element is one which has not received a great deal of consideration in the materials control and accountability area and yet it will be demonstrated that it is an essential component to ensure the success of safeguards activities

Routine inspection effort required for verification of a nuclear material production cutoff convention

On 27 September 1993, President Clinton proposed {open_quotes}... a multilateral convention prohibiting the production of highly enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear explosives purposes or outside of international safeguards.{close_quotes} The UN General Assembly subsequently adopted a resolution recommending negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty (hereinafter referred to as {open_quotes}the Cutoff Convention{close_quotes}) banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The matter is now on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, although not yet under negotiation. This accord would, in effect, place all fissile material (defined as highly enriched uranium and plutonium) produced after entry into force (EIF) of the accord under international safeguards. {open_quotes}Production{close_quotes} would mean separation of the material in question from radioactive fission products, as in spent fuel reprocessing, or enrichment of uranium above the 20% level, which defines highly enriched uranium (HEU). Facilities where such production could occur would be safeguarded to verify that either such production is not occurring or that all material produced at these facilities is maintained under safeguards

Routine inspection effort required for verification of a nuclear material production cutoff convention

On 27 September 1993, President Clinton proposed {open_quotes}... a multilateral convention prohibiting the production of highly enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear explosives purposes or outside of international safeguards.{close_quotes} The UN General Assembly subsequently adopted a resolution recommending negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty (hereinafter referred to as {open_quotes}the Cutoff Convention{close_quotes}) banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The matter is now on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, although not yet under negotiation. This accord would, in effect, place all fissile material (defined as highly enriched uranium and plutonium) produced after entry into force (EIF) of the accord under international safeguards. {open_quotes}Production{close_quotes} would mean separation of the material in question from radioactive fission products, as in spent fuel reprocessing, or enrichment of uranium above the 20% level, which defines highly enriched uranium (HEU). Facilities where such production could occur would be safeguarded to verify that either such production is not occurring or that all material produced at these facilities is maintained under safeguards

WASP and electricity capacity expansion planning for emerging countries

The WIEN Automatic System Planning Package (WASP) is typical of electrical generation capacity expansion planning models in general use today. It was developed by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) hence the name WIEN. It is available without charge to member states. Assistance in its use is available from IAEA staff and in addition it is well documented. The user of WASP should be aware of its uses and limitations especially, though not exclusively, in its application to emerging countries. This paper presents an overview of capacity expansion planning and its place in the economic planning process with reference to the emerging countries; describes in a general way the use of WASP; cautions care in the interpretation of WASP results; and suggests the way in which WASP can be used to assess innovative electric generating technologies

A role for arms control and technology in peace-keeping operations

This paper describes a potential role for arms control monitoring technology in peace-keeping operations. The basic idea is to utilize monitoring technology developed or suggested for treaty verification (primarily Conventional Forces Europe (CFE), but other treaties as well) to minimize the exposure of humans as part of ``peace-keeping`` forces in various trouble spots throughout the world. The impetus comes from the dangers and high costs of stationing peace-keeping of forces in areas such as Bosnia-Herzegovina. Aside from the costs associated with such efforts the loss of life has escalated recently from 743 peace keepers lost from 1948 to 1988, to 180 lives lost in 1993 alone. Some potential advantages to using technology for certain monitoring roles are discussed in the paper and include: minimizing exposure/risk to peace-keeping personnel from hostile fire, hostage taking, etc.; sharable technology will allow all parties to view results, assess violations or transgressions, etc.; can be applied to equipment, railways, roads, etc., to confirm human and other monitoring capabilities; and provides data to settle disputes on which side initiated hostilities

Open Skies and monitoring a fissile materials cut-off treaty

The Treaty on Open Skies (Open Skies) is intended among other things to provide, in the words of its preamble, means ``to facilitate the monitoring of compliance with existing or future arms control agreements.`` Open Skies permits overflights of the territory of member states by aircraft equipped with an array of sensors of various types. Their types and capabilities are treaty-limited. To find useful application in monitoring a cut-off treaty Open Skies would need to be amended. The number of signatories would need to be expanded so as to provide greater geographical coverage, and restrictions on sensor-array capabilities would need to be relaxed. To facilitate the detection of impending violations of a cut-off convention by Open Skies overflights, the data base provided by parties to the former should include among other things an enumeration of existing and former fuel cycle and research facilities including those converted to other uses, their precise geographic location, and a site plan

A suggested approach to applying IAEA safeguards to plutonium in weapons components

It is the announced policy of the United States to make fissile material removed from its nuclear weapons stockpile subject to the US-IAEA voluntary safeguards agreement. Much of this material is plutonium in the form of pits. The application of traditional IAEA safeguards would reveal Restricted Data to unauthorized persons which is prohibited by US law and international treaties. Prior to the availability of a facility for the conversion of the plutonium in the pits to a non-sensitive form this obvious long-term solution to the problem is foreclosed. An alternative near-term approach to applying IAEA safeguards while preserving the necessary degree of confidentiality is required. This paper identifies such an approach. It presents in detail the form of the US declaration; the safeguards objectives which are met; inspection techniques which are utilized and the conclusion which the IAEA could reach concerning the contents of each item and the aggregate of all items. The approach would reveal the number of containers and the aggregate mass of plutonium in a set of n containers presented to the IAEA for verification while protecting data of the isotopic composition and plutonium mass of individual components. The suggested approach provides for traceability from the time the containers are sealed until the conversion of the plutonium to a non-sensitive form

Study guide to accompany Allentuck/Bivens consumer choice: the economics of personal living

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