ICSID, public opinion and the effect of (hypothetical) elite messaging

This Perspective presents a unique survey of American public opinion on ICSID, and via a survey experiment demonstrates that attempts to increase public support by Republicans or Democrats would likely backfire. Only bi-partisan framing of ICSID can positively move public opinion

ICSID，公众舆论及精英信息的（潜在）影响

This Perspective presents a unique survey of American public opinion on ICSID, and via a survey experiment demonstrates that attempts to increase public support by Republicans or Democrats would likely backfire. Only bi-partisan framing of ICSID can positively move public opinion

The Impact of International Organizations on the Environment: An Empirical Analysis

When analyzing the impact of international organizations on the environment, two main issues arise. First, we have to quantify the participation of the organizations on countries they deal with. Second, the environmental impact of this involvement has to be measured. This paper attempts to do this. We employ panel data to empirically analyze whether and to what extent the presence of IMF, World Bank, regional Multilateral Development Banks, WTO and Global Environmental Facilities has an impact on environmental governance and outcomes. Our results for a large number of countries and years show that the international organizations affect the environment directly via their impact on CO2 emissions. Projects financed by World Bank, ADB, UNDP, and membership in the WTO increase emissions, while IADB projects reduce emissions. EBRD and UNEP do not significantly affect CO2 emissions, while the AfDB increases emissions after 1985 only. Taking the indirect impact through trade liberalization into account, however, the WTO reduces emissions, while the IADB increases emissions. There is some evidence that the international organizations investigated here also influence SO2 emissions, water pollution, and round wood production; environmental governance is not affected

Replication Data for: Mapping the Boundaries of Elite Cues: How Elites Shape Mass Opinion Across International Issues

These data set provide replication data for Guisinger, Alexandra and Elizabeth Saunders, "Mapping the Boundaries of Elite Cues: How Elites Shape Mass Opinion Across International Issues" in International Studies Quarterly

Mapping the Boundaries of Elite Cues: How Elites Shape Mass Opinion across International Issues

When and how do elite messages shape mass opinion on international issues? Do informational or partisan components of elite cues dominate? Recent survey experiments offer conflicting insights. We argue that issue context matters, and that the single-issue nature of most survey experiments masks systematic variation in how elite cues affect attitudes across international issues. These effects depend on the baseline distribution of mass opinion on the issues themselves. Two characteristics of underlying opinion prove crucial: first, the share of those not aligned with expert opinion, and second, the degree of partisan polarization. Where polarization is limited, information effects should dominate. Where issues are polarized, information intake should be limited by partisan attribution. We test these hypotheses using nine survey experiments across a range of issues, including the rise of China, climate change, international institutions, and the use of force. At one extreme, all messages—even those endorsed by generic or opposition experts—can shift opinion; at the other, only partisan-attributed messages matter. Our findings are important not only for understanding public opinion about international issues but also for those interested in mobilizing opinion in a democratic setting

Foreign Policy in a Diverse Society

The Foreign Policy in a Diverse Society project will conduct a series of public opinion surveys and survey experiments fielded targeting underrepresented populations as well as a representative cross-section of the U.S. population

Exchange Rate Proclamations and Inflation-Fighting Credibility

If governments choose economic policies that often run counter to their public commitments, are those commitments meaningless? We argue that government proclamations can be critical in signaling economic policy intentions. We focus on the realm of exchange rate policy, in which countries frequently implement an exchange rate regime that differs from the officially declared regime. We argue that the official exchange rate regime is one of the most important signals of a government's economic policy preferences. When a government makes a de jure public commitment to a fixed exchange rate, it sends a signal to domestic and international markets of its strict monetary-policy priorities. In contrast, a government that proclaims a floating exchange rate signals a desire to retain discretion over monetary policy, even if it has implemented a de facto fixed rate. We use data on 110 developed and developing countries from 1974 to 2004 to test two hypotheses: first, that governments that adopt de facto fixed exchange rates will experience less inflation when they back up their actions with official declarations; and second, that governments that abide by their commitments—as demonstrated by a history of following through on their public declarations of a fixed exchange rate regime—will establish greater inflation-fighting credibility. Within developing countries, democratic institutions enhance this credibility. Results from fixed-effects econometric models provide strong support for our hypotheses.Yale University (MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies