Demazure roots and spherical varieties: the example of horizontal SL(2)-actions

Let $G$ be a connected reductive group, and let $X$ be an affine $G$-spherical variety. We show that the classification of $\mathbb{G}_{a}$-actions on $X$ normalized by $G$ can be reduced to the description of quasi-affine homogeneous spaces under the action of a semi-direct product $\mathbb{G}_{a}\rtimes G$ with the following property. The induced $G$-action is spherical and the complement of the open orbit is either empty or a $G$-orbit of codimension one. These homogeneous spaces are parametrized by a subset ${\rm Rt}(X)$ of the character lattice $\mathbb{X}(G)$ of $G$, which we call the set of Demazure roots of $X$. We give a complete description of the set ${\rm Rt}(X)$ when $G$ is a semi-direct product of ${\rm SL}_{2}$ and an algebraic torus; we show particularly that ${\rm Rt}(X)$ can be obtained explicitly as the intersection of a finite union of polyhedra in $\mathbb{Q}\otimes_{\mathbb{Z}}\mathbb{X}(G)$ and a sublattice of $\mathbb{X}(G)$. We conjecture that ${\rm Rt}(X)$ can be described in a similar combinatorial way for an arbitrary affine spherical variety $X$.Comment: Added Section 4; modified main result, Theorem 5.18 now; other change

Too Big to Fail — U.S. Banks’ Regulatory Alchemy: Converting an Obscure Agency Footnote into an “At Will” Nullification of Dodd-Frank’s Regulation of the Multi-Trillion Dollar Financial Swaps Market

The multi-trillion-dollar market for, what was at that time wholly unregulated, over-the-counter derivatives (“swaps”) is widely viewed as a principal cause of the 2008 worldwide financial meltdown. The Dodd-Frank Act, signed into law on July 21, 2010, was expressly considered by Congress to be a remedy for this troublesome deregulatory problem. The legislation required the swaps market to comply with a host of business conduct and anti-competitive protections, including that the swaps market be fully transparent to U.S. financial regulators, collateralized, and capitalized. The statute also expressly provides that it would cover foreign subsidiaries of big U.S. financial institutions if their swaps trading could adversely impact the U.S. economy or represent the use of extraterritorial trades as an attempt to “evade” Dodd-Frank. In July 2013, the CFTC promulgated an 80-page, triple-columned, and single-spaced “guidance” implementing Dodd-Frank’s extraterritorial reach, i.e., that manner in which Dodd-Frank would apply to swaps transactions executed outside the United States. The key point of that guidance was that swaps trading within the “guaranteed” foreign subsidiaries of U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers were subject to all of Dodd-Frank’s swaps regulations wherever in the world those subsidiaries’ swaps were executed. At that time, the standardized industry swaps agreement contemplated that, inter alia, U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers’ foreign subsidiaries would be “guaranteed” by their corporate parent, as was true since 1992. In August 2013, without notifying the CFTC, the principal U.S. bank holding company swaps dealer trade association privately circulated to its members standard contractual language that would, for the first time, “deguarantee” their foreign subsidiaries. By relying only on the obscure footnote 563 of the CFTC guidance’s 662 footnotes, the trade association assured its swaps dealer members that the newly deguaranteed foreign subsidiaries could (if they so chose) no longer be subject to Dodd-Frank. As a result, it has been reported (and it also has been understood by many experts within the swaps industry) that a substantial portion of the U.S. swaps market has shifted from the large U.S. bank holding companies swaps dealers and their U.S. affiliates to their newly deguaranteed “foreign” subsidiaries, with the attendant claim by these huge big U.S. bank swaps dealers that Dodd-Frank swaps regulation would not apply to these transactions. The CFTC also soon discovered that these huge U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers were “arranging, negotiating, and executing” (“ANE”) these swaps in the United States with U.S. bank personnel and, only after execution in the U.S., were these swaps formally “assigned” to the U.S. banks’ newly “deguaranteed” foreign subsidiaries with the accompanying claim that these swaps, even though executed in the U.S., were not covered by Dodd-Frank. In October 2016, the CFTC proposed a rule that would have closed the “deguarantee” and “ANE” loopholes completely. However, because it usually takes at least a year to finalize a “proposed” rule, this proposed rule closing the loopholes in question was not finalized prior to the inauguration of President Trump. All indications are that it will never be finalized during a Trump Administration. Thus, in the shadow of the recent tenth anniversary of the Lehman failure, there is an understanding among many market regulators and swaps trading experts that large portions of the swaps market have moved from U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers and their U.S. affiliates to their newly deguaranteed foreign affiliates where Dodd- Frank swaps regulation is not being followed. However, what has not moved abroad is the very real obligation of the lender of last resort to rescue these U.S. swaps dealer bank holding companies if they fail because of poorly regulated swaps in their deguaranteed foreign subsidiaries, i.e., the U.S. taxpayer. While relief is unlikely to be forthcoming from the Trump Administration or the Republican-controlled Senate, some other means will have to be found to avert another multi-trillion-dollar bank bailout and/or a financial calamity caused by poorly regulated swaps on the books of big U.S. banks. This paper notes that the relevant statutory framework affords state attorneys general and state financial regulators the right to bring so-called “parens patriae” actions in federal district court to enforce, inter alia, Dodd- Frank on behalf of a state’s citizens. That kind of litigation to enforce the statute’s extraterritorial provisions is now badly needed

Contributors to life satisfaction in parents of an adult child with Down syndrome [Conference Abstract]

Aim: This study investigated: (1) concurrent relationships between measures of family life and parental satisfaction with life in parents of an adult with Down syndrome and (2) influence of early family functioning on current parental satisfaction. Method: Sixty-two families were interviewed using a semi-structured interview, and responded to a series of questionnaires related to family functioning when their child with Down syndrome was between 7 and 15 years. Fifteen years later parents were asked to provide data on their current situation, including mental health, and satisfaction and difficulties with respect to care-giving in relation to their adult child. Results: Over half the families provided data to the second phase of the study. Life circumstances were appreciably worse for a small group of families than had been the case 15 years previously; however, these changes were generally unrelated to their parenting role. Overall, parents reported experiencing satisfaction from their care-giving role and did not report high levels of difficulties emanating from this role. Conclusions: Most parents demonstrated good levels of personal functioning, although there was a small group for whom this was not the case. Earlier functioning did not make a strong contribution to current levels of life satisfaction

Financial crises and the attainment of the SDGs: an adjusted multidimensional poverty approach

This paper analyses the impact of financial crises on the Sustainable Development Goal of eradicating poverty. To do so, we develop an adjusted Multidimensional Poverty Framework (MPF) that includes 15 indicators that span across key poverty aspects related to income, basic needs, health, education and the environment. We then use an econometric model that allows us to examine the impact of financial crises on these indicators in 150 countries over the period 1980–2015. Our analysis produces new estimates on the impact of financial crises on poverty’s multiple social, economic and environmental aspects and equally important captures dynamic linkages between these aspects. Thus, we offer a better understanding of the potential impact of current debt dynamics on Multidimensional Poverty and demonstrate the need to move beyond the boundaries of SDG1, if we are to meet the target of eradicating poverty. Our results indicate that the current financial distress experienced by many low-income countries may reverse the progress that has been made hitherto in reducing poverty. We find that financial crises are associated with an approximately 10% increase of extreme poor in low-income countries. The impact is even stronger in some other poverty aspects. For instance, crises are associated with an average decrease of government spending in education by 17.72% in low-income countries. The dynamic linkages between most of the Multidimensional Poverty indicators, warn of a negative domino effect on a number of SDGs related to poverty, if there is a financial crisis shock. To pre-empt such a domino effect, the specific SDG target 17.4 on attaining long-term debt sustainability through coordinated policies plays a key role and requires urgent attention by the international community