On σ\sigma-quasinormal subgroups of finite groups

Let $G$ be a finite group and $\sigma =\{\sigma_{i} | i\in I\}$ some partition of the set of all primes $\Bbb{P}$, that is, $\sigma =\{\sigma_{i} | i\in I \}$, where $\Bbb{P}=\bigcup_{i\in I} \sigma_{i}$ and $\sigma_{i}\cap \sigma_{j}= \emptyset$ for all $i\ne j$. We say that $G$ is $\sigma$-primary if $G$ is a $\sigma _{i}$-group for some $i$. A subgroup $A$ of $G$ is said to be: ${\sigma}$-subnormal in $G$ if there is a subgroup chain $A=A_{0} \leq A_{1} \leq \cdots \leq A_{n}=G$ such that either $A_{i-1}\trianglelefteq A_{i}$ or $A_{i}/(A_{i-1})_{A_{i}}$ is $\sigma$-primary for all $i=1, \ldots, n$, modular in $G$ if the following conditions hold: (i) $\langle X, A \cap Z \rangle=\langle X, A \rangle \cap Z$ for all $X \leq G, Z \leq G$ such that $X \leq Z$, and (ii) $\langle A, Y \cap Z \rangle=\langle A, Y \rangle \cap Z$ for all $Y \leq G, Z \leq G$ such that $A \leq Z$. In this paper, a subgroup $A$ of $G$ is called $\sigma$-quasinormal in $G$ if $L$ is modular and ${\sigma}$-subnormal in $G$. We study $\sigma$-quasinormal subgroups of $G$. In particular, we prove that if a subgroup $H$ of $G$ is $\sigma$-quasinormal in $G$, then for every chief factor $H/K$ of $G$ between $H^{G}$ and $H_{G}$ the semidirect product $(H/K)\rtimes (G/C_{G}(H/K))$ is $\sigma$-primary.Comment: 9 page

Hidden regret in insurance markets: adverse and advantageous selection

We examine insurance markets with two types of customers: those who regret suboptimal decisions and those who don.t. In this setting, we characterize the equilibria under hidden information about the type of customers and hidden action. We show that both pooling and separating equilibria can exist. Furthermore, there exist separating equilibria that predict a positive correlation between the amount of insurance coverage and risk type, as in the standard economic models of adverse selection, but there also exist separating equilibria that predict a negative correlation between the amount of insurance coverage and risk type, i.e. advantageous selection. Since optimal choice of regretful customers depends on foregone alternatives, any equilibrium includes a contract which is o¤ered but not purchased