Institutional Arrangements and Fiscal Performance: The Latin American Experience

This paper considers whether institutional factors, in this instance electoral systems and procedures, affect Latin American countries` fiscal performance as measured by the size of the public sector, fiscal deficits, the size of the public debt, and the degree of procyclality of fiscal policy. The authors find that electoral systems characterized by large district magnitude and high political fragmentation have larger governments, larger deficits, and more procyclical fiscal policies. Transparent and hierarchical budget procedures, on the other hand, lead to lower deficits and levels of debt.

Institutional Arrangements and Fiscal Performance: The Latin American Experience

This paper explores the links between institutional arrangements and fiscal performance in" Latin America. We consider four measures of fiscal performance, namely expenditures, the size of fiscal deficits and debt, and the response of fiscal policy to business" fluctuations; and two institutional dimensions, namely, electoral systems and budgetary processes. " We find evidence that electoral systems characterized by a large degree of proportionality large district magnitude, tend to have larger governments, larger deficits and a more procyclical" response to the business cycle. We also find that more transparent and hierarchical budgetary" procedures lead to lower deficits and debt. Contrary to the findings of Hallerberg and von Hagen" for European countries, we find no evidence that centralized budgetary arrangements neutralize the" potentially adverse impact on fiscal deficits of a larger degree of proportionality of the electoral" system.

The carbonyl-lock mechanism underlying non-aromatic fluorescence in biological matter

Challenging the basis of our chemical intuition, recent experimental evidence reveals the presence of a new type of intrinsic fluorescence in biomolecules that exists even in the absence of aromatic or electronically conjugated chemical compounds. The origin of this phenomenon has remained elusive so far. In the present study, we identify a mechanism underlying this new type of fluorescence in different biological aggregates. By employing non-adiabatic ab initio molecular dynamics simulations combined with a data-driven approach, we characterize the typical ultrafast non-radiative relaxation pathways active in non-fluorescent peptides. We show that the key vibrational mode for the non-radiative decay towards the ground state is the carbonyl elongation. Non-aromatic fluorescence appears to emerge from blocking this mode with strong local interactions such as hydrogen bonds. While we cannot rule out the existence of alternative non-aromatic fluorescence mechanisms in other systems, we demonstrate that this carbonyl-lock mechanism for trapping the excited state leads to the fluorescence yield increase observed experimentally, and set the stage for design principles to realize novel non-invasive biocompatible probes with applications in bioimaging, sensing, and biophotonics.Recent experimental evidence shows a new type of intrinsic fluorescence in biomolecules void of aromatic chemical compounds whose origin is unclear. Here, the authors use non-adiabatic AIMD simulations to show a potential carbonyl-lock mechanism originating this phenomenon

External shocks, fiscal stabilization and political constraints

This dissertation explores the links between Institutional Arrangements and Fiscal Performance in Latin America and based on this links, it proposes an Oil Stabilization Fund for the Venezuelan Government. Four measures of fiscal performance, namely, the level of government expenditures, the size of budget deficits and public debt, and the response of fiscal policy to business fluctuations, and two institutional dimensions, namely, electoral systems and budgetary process are considered. I find evidence that electoral systems characterized by a large degree of proportionality, i.e., a large district magnitude, and by large degree of political fragmentation, tend to have larger governments, larger deficits and a more procyclical response to the business cycle. I also find that more transparent and hierarchical budgetary procedures lead to lower deficits and debt. Contrary to the findings of Hallerberg and von Hagen for European countries, we find no evidence that centralized budgetary arrangements neutralize the potentially adverse impact on fiscal deficits of a larger degree of proportionality of the electoral system. Given the importance of the budgetary institutions and the distortions introduced by the “commons-pool problem”, this dissertation concerned with optimal saving/spending rules for a commodity-exporting countries, which face some constraints in their ability to borrow. I find that for an impatient government in a stationary environment, assets are expensive to hold, but can provide a useful tool for stability between government expenditures and income. Such buffers are more effective and less costly the less positively autocorrelated is the income stream. Savings will be procyclical in the usual way. In a non-stationary environment, income smoothing is weak, and either there is almost no saving or even saving could be contracyclical, with adverse effects on income stabilization. In this case, it is necessary to introduce adjustment cost in the utility function in order to find an optimal saving/spending rule. The dissertation conclude that, even for low risk aversion parameters the much higher volatility encountered in the Venezuelan oil income processes compared to developed countries justifies high levels of precautionary savings. The Oil Stabilization Fund proposed here decrease the volatility of the fiscal expenditures in more than 40 percent

External shocks, fiscal stabilization and political constraints

This dissertation explores the links between Institutional Arrangements and Fiscal Performance in Latin America and based on this links, it proposes an Oil Stabilization Fund for the Venezuelan Government. Four measures of fiscal performance, namely, the level of government expenditures, the size of budget deficits and public debt, and the response of fiscal policy to business fluctuations, and two institutional dimensions, namely, electoral systems and budgetary process are considered. I find evidence that electoral systems characterized by a large degree of proportionality, i.e., a large district magnitude, and by large degree of political fragmentation, tend to have larger governments, larger deficits and a more procyclical response to the business cycle. I also find that more transparent and hierarchical budgetary procedures lead to lower deficits and debt. Contrary to the findings of Hallerberg and von Hagen for European countries, we find no evidence that centralized budgetary arrangements neutralize the potentially adverse impact on fiscal deficits of a larger degree of proportionality of the electoral system. Given the importance of the budgetary institutions and the distortions introduced by the “commons-pool problem”, this dissertation concerned with optimal saving/spending rules for a commodity-exporting countries, which face some constraints in their ability to borrow. I find that for an impatient government in a stationary environment, assets are expensive to hold, but can provide a useful tool for stability between government expenditures and income. Such buffers are more effective and less costly the less positively autocorrelated is the income stream. Savings will be procyclical in the usual way. In a non-stationary environment, income smoothing is weak, and either there is almost no saving or even saving could be contracyclical, with adverse effects on income stabilization. In this case, it is necessary to introduce adjustment cost in the utility function in order to find an optimal saving/spending rule. The dissertation conclude that, even for low risk aversion parameters the much higher volatility encountered in the Venezuelan oil income processes compared to developed countries justifies high levels of precautionary savings. The Oil Stabilization Fund proposed here decrease the volatility of the fiscal expenditures in more than 40 percent

Institutional Arrangements and Fiscal Performance: The Latin American Experience

This paper considers whether institutional factors, in this instance electoral systems and procedures, affect Latin American countries' fiscal performance as measured by the size of the public sector, fiscal deficits, the size of the public debt, and the degree of procyclality of fiscal policy. The authors find that electoral systems characterized by large district magnitude and high political fragmentation have larger governments, larger deficits, and more procyclical fiscal policies. Transparent and hierarchical budget procedures, on the other hand, lead to lower deficits and levels of debt

Institutional Arrangements and Fiscal Performance: The Latin American Experience

this paper. Arnaldo Posadas provided excellent research assistance. NOTE FROM THE AUTHORS: Unfortunately at the present moment, we do not have this document=s graphics and tables available in electronic form. Please check later with us for future availability on PDF, or send a request to [email protected] for a free printed copy of this document. Please refer to code 367 when ordering

Institutional Arrangements and Fiscal Performance: The Latin American Experience

This paper considers whether institutional factors, in this instance electoral systems and procedures, affect Latin American countries` fiscal performance as measured by the size of the public sector, fiscal deficits, the size of the public debt, and the degree of procyclality of fiscal policy. The authors find that electoral systems characterized by large district magnitude and high political fragmentation have larger governments, larger deficits, and more procyclical fiscal policies. Transparent and hierarchical budget procedures, on the other hand, lead to lower deficits and levels of debt