Equilibrium Search with Time-Varying Unemployment Benefits

In this paper, we show how time-varying unemployment benefits can generate equilibrium wage dispersion in an economy in which identical firms post wages and homogeneous workers search for acceptable offers. We allow for matching frictions and for free entry and exit of vacancies, and we model time-varying unemployment benefits in a simple and natural way. We characterize the equilibrium, and we derive the comparative statics effects of changes in the unemployment compensation system on the equilibrium wage distribution and the unemployment rate.

Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications

TBEquilibrium Directed Search

The Effects of Labor Market Policies in an Economy with an Informal Sector

In many economies, there is substantial economic activity in the informal labor market, beyond the reach of government policy. Labor market policies, which by definition apply only to the formal-sector can have important spillover effects on the informal sector. The relative sizes of the informal and formal sectors adjust, the skill composition of the workforce in the two sectors changes, etc. In this paper, we build an equilibrium search and matching model to analyze the effects of labor market policies in an economy with an informal sector. Our model extends Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) by allowing for ex ante worker heterogeneity with respect to formal-sector productivity. We analyze the effects of labor market policy on informal- and formal-sector output, on the division of the workforce into unemployment, informal-sector employment and formal-sector employment, and on wages. Finally, our model allows us to examine the distributional implications of labor market policy; specifically, we analyze how labor market policy affects the distributions of wages and productivities across formal-sector matches.search, matching, informal sector

Search by Committee

We consider the problem of sequential search when the decision to stop searching is made by a committee. We show that a symmetric stationary equilibrium exists and is unique given that the distribution of rewards is log concave. Committee members set a lower acceptance threshold than do single-agent searchers. In addition, mean preserving spreads in the distribution of rewards may lower each member's continuation value | an impossibility in the single-agent setting. If committee members are very patient or very impatient, expected search duration is lower than it would be for a single agent, but, for intermediate levels of patience, this comparison may be reversed. Holding the fraction of votes required to stop fixed, expected search duration rises with committee size on patient committees but falls with committee size on impatient committees. Finally, we consider the effect of varying the number of votes required to stop, holding committee size constant. We show that the welfare-maximizing vote threshold increases in the rate of patience and that there is a finite bound on patience such that unanimity is welfare maximizing.sequential search, voting, committees

Efficiency in a Search and Matching Model with Endogenous Participation

We show that in a search/matching model with endogenous participation in which workers are heterogeneous with respect to market productivity, satisfying the Hosios rule leads to excessive vacancy creation. The reason is that the marginal worker does not internalize the effect of his or her participation on average productivity.search, matching, participation, Hosios rule, efficiency

The Effects of Labour Market Policies in an Economy with an Informal Sector

In this paper, we build an equilibrium search and matching model of an economy with an informal sector. Our model extends Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) by allowing for ex ante worker heterogeneity with respect to formal-sector productivity. We use the model to analyze the effects of labour market policy on informal-sector and formal sector output, on the division of the workforce into unemployment, informal-sector employment and formal-sector employment, and on wages. Finally, we examine the distributional implications of labour market policy; specifically, we analyse how labour market policy affects the distributions of wages and productivities across formal-sector matches. Keywords: Informality and Labour Market Policy

Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Application

We analyze a model of directed search in which unemployed job seekers observe all posted wages. We allow for the possibility of multiple applications by workers and ex post competition among vacancies. For any number of applications, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which vacancies post a common wage. When workers apply to only one vacancy, a single wage is paid and the resulting equilibrium is efficient. When workers make multiple applications, there is dispersion in wages paid, and equilibrium may be inefficient. We show that our results also hold in a steady-state version of the model.

Directed Search in the Housing Market

In this paper, we present a directed search model of the housing market. The pricing mechanism we analyze reflects the way houses are bought and sold in the United States. Our model is consistent with the observation that houses are sometimes sold above, sometimes below and sometimes at the asking price. We consider two versions of our model. In the first version, all sellers have the same reservation value. In the second version, there are two seller types, and type is private information. For both versions, we characterize the equilibrium of the game played by buyers and sellers, and we prove efficiency. Our model offers a new way to look at the housing market from a search-theoretic perspective. In addition, we contribute to the directed search literature by considering a model in which the asking price (i) entails only limited commitment and (ii) has the potential to signal seller type.directed search, housing

Efficiency in a Search and Matching Model with Endogenous Participation

We show that in a search/matching model with endogenous participation in which workers are heterogeneous with respect to market productivity, satisfying the Hosios rule leads to excessive vacancy creation. The reason is that the marginal worker does not internalize the effect of his or her participation on average productivity.participation, efficiency, matching, search, Hosios rule

A Procedure for Testing the Signalling Hypothesis

This paper develops a procedure for testing the signaling hypothesis as advanced by Spence, et. al. The approach used is to examine directly the question of whether employers use education for purely informational purposes in their hiring decisions. An application of the method to a recruitment by the Swedish auto manufacturer Volvo is presented