Should the death tax die? And should it leave an inheritance?

In this paper we examine the possibility of earmarking inheritance taxes to the financing of a transfer to the poor, aimed at reducing the payoff from small crime and at fostering the fulfillment of basic social responsibilities. A simple model of a society in which there are two types of agents either supplying legal labor or participating in criminal activity is presented. The effects of the transfer are examined with reference to two policy designs and to attitudes toward risk\ of the agents. Financing the transfer through inheritance taxation may be advisable as a way of collecting the needed revenue from agents who are likely to maintain strong enough incentives to good.Inheritance Tax, Crime, Wealth Transfers

The Simple Economics of Class Action: Private Provision of Club and Public Goods

This article uses economic categories to show how the reorganisation of civil procedure in the case of class action is not merely aimed at providing a more efficient litigation technology, as hierarchies (and company law) might do for other productive activities, but that it also serves to create a well defined economic organization ultimately aimed at producing a set of goods, first and foremost among which are justice and efficiency. Class action has the potential to recreate, in the judicial domain, the same effects that individual interests and motivations, governed by the perfect competition paradigm, bring to the market. Moreover, through economic analysis it is possible to rediscover not only the productive function of this legal machinery, but also that partial compensation of victims and large profits for the class counsel, far from being a side-effect, are actually a necessary condition for reallocation of the costs and risks associated with the legal action.class action, collective litigation, mass tort, club, liability, deterrence

The Simple Economics of Class Action: Private Provision of Club and Public Goods

This article uses economic categories to show how the reorganisation of civil procedure in the case of class action is not merely aimed at providing a more efficient litigation technology, as hierarchies (and company law) might do for other productive activities, but that it also serves to create a well defined economic organization ultimately aimed at producing a set of goods, first and foremost among which are justice and efficiency. Class action has the potential to recreate, in the judicial domain, the same effects that individual interests and motivations, governed by the perfect competition paradigm, bring to the market. Moreover, through economic analysis it is possible to rediscover not only the productive function of this legal machinery, but also that partial compensation of victims and large profits for the class counsel, far from being a side-effect, are actually a necessary condition for reallocation of the costs and risks associated with the legal action.class action, collective litigation, mass tort, club, liability, deterrence

Risk Attitudes and the Shift of Liability from the Principal to the Agent.

This paper studies the problem of illegal behavior within a principal-agent framework. The agent performs an illegal activity which benefits the principal, and can exert an effort that negatively affects the likelihood of detection of the violation.Two opposite legal regimes are considered: in the first, only the risk neutral principal is strictly liable; in the second, only the risk averse agent is The monetary sanction and the probability of detection function are the same in both cases. Our models shows that shifting the liability upon the risk averse agent reduces the principal net benefit, thus favoring deterrence of wrongdoing; however, it can also either increase or reduce the agent effort in cheating. For a specific model we are able to characterize cases in which a reduction in cheating prevails, and shifting the liability upon the agent has clear-cut beneficial effects on compliance.

Proprieta' intellettuale ed industria farmaceutica: Ricerche nel campo della proprieta' intellettuale dei farmaci

The purpose of the paper is to analyse the complez relationship between Intellectual Property (IP) and Pharmaceutical Industry. Chapter 1 introduces the main issues of Intellectual Property, Innovation and Scientific Research. Chapter 2 surveys alternative measures to the protection of IP, such as public subsidies for research and innovation and public purchase of intellectual property rights. Chapter 3 analyzes different incentives for innovation on the demand side. Chapter 4 deals with the peculiar characters of the innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry . Chapter 5 analyzes alternatives incentives on the supply side. Chapter 6 studies incentives schemes on the demand side for the Pharmaceutical Industry . Chapter 7 summarizes some tentative conclusive remarks and set an agenda for future research.

Einaudi e i servizi pubblici, ovvero come contrastare i monopolisti predoni e la burocrazia corrotta

Comunicazione per il CONVEGNO DI STUDI "La riforma sociale (1894-1935) nel sistema politico, sociale e politico-economico italiano e internazionale, Torino, 30-31 marzo 2001, Fondazione Luigi Einaudi; Dipartimento di Studi politici, Università di Torino, Dipartimento Polis, Università del Piemonte Orientale.

L'impatto economico e sociale dell'Universita' del Piemonte Orientale Amedeo Avogadro

This paper measures the short term economic impact of the University of Piemonte Orientale (Italy) on the geographic area which defines its demographic recruitment basin. The 3 poles University has a significant impact on current flows (income, consumption, investments, employment ) even if the main effect is the strong increase in human capital accumulation in the area, a phenomenon whose implications reach the medium long term horizon. The overall , direct and indirect economic impact is about 150-300 millions, on local income and about 2000-4000 units on local employment, according to different (low and high) multiplier.