Zombie Firms and Economic Stagnation in Japan

It is often claimed that one contributing factor to Japan's weak economic performance over the past decade is that Japanese banks have continued to provide financial support for highly inefficient, debt-ridden companies, commonly referred to as "zombie" firms. Such poor banking practices in turn prevent more productive companies from gaining market share, strangling a potentially important source of productivity gains for the overall economy. To explore further the zombie-firm hypothesis, we use industry- and firm-level Japanese data and find evidence that productivity growth is low in industries reputed to have heavy concentrations of zombie firms. We also find that the reallocation of market share is going in the wrong direction in these industries, adding to already weak productivity performance. In addition, we find evidence that financial support from Japanese banks may have played a role in sustaining this perverse reallocation of market share.Productivity, banking system, creative destruction

Countering contagion: Does China's experience offer a blueprint?

China did not succumb to the Asian crisis of 1997-99, despite two apparent sources of vulnerability: a weak financial system and increased export competition from the Asian crisis economies. This article argues that both sources of vulnerability were more apparent than real. China's experience (especially its use of capital controls) does not offer a blueprint for other countries, because other countries would not want to replicate China's inefficient, non-market-oriented financial system.Banks and banking - China ; Economic conditions - China ; China

Modern Currency Wars: The United States Versus Japan

In the currency wars of the 1920s and 1930s, various nations fell off the gold standard and in so doing experienced deep devaluations. But under the postwar dollar standard, the central position of the US was key to maintaining the peace, until the Bretton Woods system of fixed dollar exchange parities fell apart after the so-called "Nixon Shock" of 1971. Now, without much fear of retaliation, the US can initiate more limited currency warfare - as with American "Japan bashing" from the late 1970s to mid-1990s to appreciate the yen, or "China bashing" since 2002 to appreciate the renminbi. Japan succumbed to this bashing, and the yen appreciated too much in 1985, with the result that Japan fell into a zero-interest liquidity trap and economic stagnation for almost two decades. However, in 2013, through massive quantitative easing by the Bank of Japan (BOJ), the yen depreciated about 25% against the dollar, stoking fears of a return to Japan bashing by the US. However, this sharp depreciation simply restored the purchasing power parity of the yen with the dollar so it should even out in the long run. In the short run, we show that yen depreciation could adversely affect the smaller East Asian economies. Since 2008, quantitative easing by the BOJ has been similar to that carried out by the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the European Central Bank. So the BOJ can only be faulted as a currency belligerent if there is a further significant yen depreciation. Led by the US, now all mature industrial countries are addicted to near-zero interest liquidity traps in both the short and long terms. These ultra low interest rates are causing lasting damage to the countries' financial systems, and to those of emerging markets, which naturally have higher interest rates. But exiting from the trap creates a risk of chaos in long-term bond markets and is proving surprisingly difficult

What Drives Home Bias? Evidence from Fund Managers' Views

A survey of fund managers reveals home bias for these sophisticated investors in an unrestricted setting. Proximity, perceived informational advantage and higher expected returns are confirmed as accompanying factors. In addition, the home bias of equity managers is also related to institutional, informational and behavioral characteristics. The perceived informational advantage does not seem to be valid. Multivariate analyses indicate that home bias is mainly related to relative return optimism, non-fundamental information and peculiar behavior towards risk. We interpret these as characteristics of less than fully rational behavior. It is consistently found that this pattern does not apply to bond managers.Eine Befragung von Fondsmanagern offenbart die Heimatverzerrung (sog. Home Bias) dieser erfahrenen Investoren in unbegrenzten Rahmenbedingungen. Nähe, empfundene Informationsvorteile und höhere erwartete Renditen werden als Begleitumstände bestätigt. Zusätzlich ist der Home Bias von Aktienfondsmanagern mit institutionellen und informatorischen Gegebenheiten sowie mit bestimmten Verhaltensmustern verbunden. Der empfundene Informationsvorteil scheint sich jedoch nicht zu bewahrheiten. Multivariate Analysen zeigen, dass der Home Bias hauptsächlich mit relativem Renditeoptimismus, der Nutzung nicht-fundamentaler Informationen und besonderem Risikoverhalten verbunden ist. Wir interpretieren diese Eigenschaften als unvollkommen rationales Verhalten. Konsistent zeigt sich, dass dieses Muster nicht für Rentenfondsmanager gilt

Information Costs And Home Bias: An Analysis Of U.s. Holdings Of Foreign . . .

: We aim to provide insight into the observed equity home bias phenomenon by analyzing the determinants of U.S. holdings of equities across a wide range of countries. In particular, we explore the role of information costs in determining the country distribution of U.S. investors' equity holdings using a comprehensive new data set on U.S. ownership of foreign stocks. We find that U.S. holdings of a country's equities are positively related to the share of that country's stock market that is listed on U.S. exchanges, even after controlling for capital controls, trade links, transaction costs, and historical risk-adjusted returns. We attribute this finding to the fact that foreign firms that list on U.S. exchanges are obliged to provide standardized, credible financial information, thereby reducing information costs incurred by U.S. investors. This obligation stems from U.S. investor protection regulations, which include stringent disclosure requirements, reconciliation of financial stat..

Information Costs and Home Bias: An Analysis of U.S. Holdings of Foreign Equities

We use for the first time in the literature high quality data on cross-border holdings along with quantitative measures of various barriers to international investment to test extant hypotheses on the home bias in equity holdings. We find that the effects of direct barriers to international investment, when statistically significant, are not economically meaningful. More important are information asymmetries that owe to the poor quality and low credibility of financial information in many countries. While a direct measure of information costs is not available, some foreign firms have reduced these costs by publicly listing their securities in the United States, where investor protection regulations elicit standardized, credible financial information. We find that a proxy for the reduction in information asymmetries---the portion of a country's market that has a public U.S. listing---is a major determinant of a country's weight in U.S. investors' portfolios. Foreign countries whose firms do not alleviate information costs by opting into the U.S. regulatory environment are more severely underweighted in U.S. equity portfolios

China and Emerging Asia: Comrades or Competitors?

Do increases in China's exports reduce exports of other emerging Asian economies? We find that correlations between Chinese export growth and that of other emerging Asian economies are actually positive (though usually not significant), even after controlling for trading-partner income growth and real effective exchange rates. We also present results from a VAR estimation of aggregate trade equations on the relative importance of foreign income and exchange rates in determining Asian export growth. Although exchange rates do matter for export performance, the income growth of trading partners matters even more. In addition, we examine specific products and find evidence that a considerable shifting of trade patterns is taking place, consistent with a. 'flying geese' pattern in which China and ASEAN-4 move into the product space vacated by the NIEs. Overall, our results suggest that China and emerging Asia are both comrades (overall) and competitors (in specific products)