Hayek’s theory of social evolution in the light of Darwin’s Descent of Man

This article proposes to reassess Hayek’s theory of cultural evolution in the light of Darwin’s Descent of Man. It is shown that Hayek and Darwin refers to the same theory of human nature which is borrowed from the founding fathers of political economy, Hume and Smith. Their respective conceptions of order, as well as the mechanisms and the product of evolution are then the consequence of this theory of human nature.Cultural evolution, Biological evolution, Darwin, Hayek

Calabresi, "law and economics" and the Coase theorem

In this paper, we show that, in 1961 and before he had read "The Problem of Social Cost", Calabresi reached exactly the same conclusions as the one reached by Coase and summarized by Stigler as the "Coase theorem" but he believed that this result was valid only in the theoretical world of the economists. We also analyze how Calabresi's thought evolved, in particular including transaction costs in his reasoning, but nonetheless remained faithful to his conclusions about the practical validity of the Coase theorem. Calabresi's conclusions remained ignored by economists and by most of legal scholars until the early 1970s. It was only when scholars started to emphasize the unrealistic assumptions upon which rest the Coase theorem that they also started to pay attention to Calabresi. His works were quoted and essentially used to emphasize the limits of the Coase theorem. Calabresi and Coase were then put on the same footing; the works of the former presented as more complete and more practical than the works of the later.Calabresi, economic analysis of law, Coase theorem, invariance, problem of social cost.

Posner, Economics and the Law: from Law and Economics to an Economic Analysis of Law.

The purpose of this article is to discuss Posner's economic analysis of law and to analyse the differences between his economic analysis of law and law and economics. We propose and demonstrate a twofold original argument. First, we show that Posner does not only propose an economic analysis of the working of the legal system but also that his approach has changed in the early 1970s, shifting from a law and economics perspective in which the focus is put on the working of the economic system to an economic analysis of law in which the emphasis is put on the functioning of the legal system. He appears then no longer influenced by Aaron Director and Ronald Coase but rather by Gary Becker. Therefore, and this is the second part of our demonstration, we show that the evolution in Posner's works essentially derives from the influence of Becker and the adoption by the former of the methodological views of the latter. More precisely, we claim that Posner no longer retains a -- restrictive -- definition of economics by subject matter but that he aligns himself on Becker and his broader definition of economics placing nonmarket decisions and method at the core of the discipline. In other words, we argue that Posner is the first who transposes Becker’s definition of economics in law and economics and that this is precisely what makes Posner's economic analysis of law possible and specific, and also of particular importance.

The political economy of European federalism

In spite of the clear objective assigned to the integration process in the 1950s, the institutional status of the European Union remains ambiguous and uneasy to define. The argument that we present in this article is that Europe has always hesitated between two forms of federalism. We use an agency framework and demonstrate that before the landmark cases Van Gend en Loos and Costa v. E.N.E.L., the European Union is mainly a confederation but it already contains elements of a federation. Afterwards, the institutional structure of the Union evolves towards a more centralised federalism but still shows lasting elements of a confederation.Federation, confederation, political economy, European Union.

Machiavelli’s Possibility Hypothesis

This paper discusses the thesis that in Arrow’s Possibility Theorem the dictator (merely) serves as a solution to the logical problem of aggregating preference while Machiavelli’s dictator, the Prince, has the historical function to bring order into a world of chaos and thus make society ready for the implementation of a republican structure.Dictator, aggregation of preferences, republic, democracy

Optimization, Path Dependence and the Law: Can Judges Promote Efficiency?

The thesis that judges could (voluntarily or not) promote efficiency through their decisions has largely been discussed since Posner put it forward in the early 1970s. There nonetheless remains a methodological aspect that has never (to our knowledge) been analyzed and that we address in this paper. We thus show that both promoters and critics of the judge-and-efficiency thesis similarly use a definition of optimization in which history, constraints and path-dependency are viewed as obstacles that must be removed to reach the most efficient outcome. This is misleading. Efficiency cannot be defined in absolute terms, as a “global ideal” that would mean being free from any constraint, including historically deposited ones. That judges are obliged to refer to the past does not mean that they are unable to make the most efficient decision because constraints are part of the optimization process; or optimization is necessarily path- dependent. Thus, the output of legal systems cannot be efficient or inefficient per se. This is what we argue in this paper.Judicial decision making; Historical inertia; Inefficiency; Adaptationism; Spandrelism; Global ideal; Rationality; Lock-in institutions.

Why hayek is a Darwinian (after all)? Hayek and Darwin on social evolution

This article proposes to reassess Hayek's theory of cultural evolution in the light of Darwin's Descent of Man. It is shown that Hayek and Darwin refers to the same theory of human nature, which is borrowed from the founding fathers of political economy, Hume and Smith. Their respective conceptions of order, as well as the mechanisms and the product of evolution, are then the consequence of this theory of human nature

An Introduction to Juergen Backhaus’s “Lawyers’ economics vs. economic analysis of law”

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