gamma-vectors of edge subdivisions of the boundary of the cross polytope

For any flag simplicial complex $\Theta$ obtained by stellar subdividing the boundary of the cross polytope in edges, we define a flag simplicial complex $\Gamma(\Theta)$ (dependent on the sequence of subdivisions) whose $f$-vector is the $\gamma$-vector of $\Theta$. This proves that the $\gamma$-vector of any such simplicial complex satisfies the Frankl-F\"{u}redi-Kalai inequalities, partially solving a conjecture by Nevo and Petersen \cite{np}. We show that when $\Theta$ is the dual simplicial complex to a nestohedron, and the sequence of subdivisions corresponds to a flag ordering as defined in \cite{ai}, that $\Gamma(\Theta)$ is equal to the flag simplical complex defined there.Comment: 18 pages, 1 figur

A relation on 132-avoiding permutation patterns

Rudolph conjectures that for permutations $p$ and $q$ of the same length, $A_n(p) \le A_n(q)$ for all $n$ if and only if the spine structure of $T(p)$ is less than or equal to the spine structure of $T(q)$ in refinement order. We prove one direction of this conjecture, by showing that if the spine structure of $T(p)$ is less than or equal to the spine structure of $T(q)$, then $A_n(p) \le A_n(q)$ for all $n$. We disprove the opposite direction by giving a counterexample, and hence disprove the conjecture

Why are the Critics so Convinced that Globalization is Bad for the Poor?

Proponents of globalization often conclude that its critics are ignorant or self-motivated. In doing so, they have missed a valuable opportunity to discover both how best to communicate the benefits of globalization, and how to improve on the current model of globalization. This paper examines the values, beliefs and facts that lead critics to the view that globalization is bad for the poor. We find that critics of globalization tend to be concerned about non-monetary as well as monetary dimensions of poverty, and more concerned about the total number of poor than the incidence of poverty. In regard to inequality, critics tend to refer more to changes in absolute inequality, and income polarization, rather than the inequality measures preferred by economists. It is particularly important to them that no group of poor people is made worse off by globalization. Finally, we argue that the perceived concentration of political and economic power that accompanies globalization causes many people to presume that globalization is bad for the poor, and the continued ambiguities in the empirical findings mean that this presumption can be readily supported with evidence.

Foreign Firms: Powerful or Persecuted?

International economists often refer to multinational enterprises and foreign firms interchangeably, yet one of the enduring divisions in the globalization debate is whether international law should be strengthened to protect foreign firms from predatory host governments, or rather strengthened to protect host governments from powerful multi- national firms. We contribute to this debate conceptually by distinguishing between foreign firms and multinational firms. We then use firm level data on government-firm relations from eighty countries to contribute empirical evidence on the debate. We find that multinational firms (both foreign and local) are indeed relatively influential over government, and find no evidence that foreign firms (multinational or otherwise) suffer significant disadvantages in terms of self-reported influence. --Multinational Firms,Foreign Firms,Political Economy,Government

Powerful Multinational or Persecuted Foreigners: ‘Foreignness’ and Influence over Government

One of the enduring themes of the globalization debate is whether international law should be strengthened to protect foreign firm from discriminatory host governments, or rather strengthened to protect host governments from powerful multinational firms. This paper uses firm-level data from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) to lend some empirical evidence to the debate. In doing so it contributes to academic understanding of what a `foreign firm' is, and challenges the notion that institutional superiority makes OECD governments less prone to anti-foreign bias. Although the terms `foreign firm' and `multinational subsidiary' are often used interchangeably, in the WBES data the managers of only about half of the firms with more than ten percent foreign ownership view themselves as part of a multinational. This distinction between multinational and non-multinational foreign firms was important in regression analysis of self-reported influence over government. In non- OECD countries - where we find no evidence of anti-foreign bias - multinationals appear significantly more influential than other firms. Meanwhile, in OECD countries, foreign non-multinationals do appear at a disadvantage in terms of influence relative to domestic firms, but this `liability of foreignness' does not appear to extend to foreign-multinational affiliates.Multinational Firms, Foreign Firms, Political Economy, Government

Firm Characteristics and Influence on Government Rule-Making: theory and evidence

An adversarial game is used to model the amount of influence a firm has over a government regulator, and its equilibrium level of regulation, as a function of firm fundamentals. The effective influence of a firm is identified as comprising both intrinsic and exerted components; where the latter involves distorting regulation via a transfer to the regulator. Understanding the source of a firm's high influence is found to be important for -among other things - predicting whether it faces higher or lower regulatory constraint than other firms. Data from the World Business Environment Survey provides strong evidence in support of model hypotheses across a wide range of government agents, countries, and regulatory areas. Of particular relevance to public debate, large firms are found to be more likely to be influential, but also more likely to experience regulatory constraint than smaller firms.Political Economy; Regulation; Influence

Gamma-polynomials of flag homology spheres

Chapter 1 contains the main definitions used in this thesis. It also includes some basic theory relating to these fundamental concepts, along with examples. Chapter 1 includes an original result, Theorem 1.5.4, answering a question of Postnikov-Reiner-Williams, which characterises the normal fans of nestohedra. Chapter 2 contains the content of the paper [2], of which Theorem 2.0.6 is the main result. As mentioned, [2] shows that the Nevo and Petersen conjecture holds for simplicial complexes in sd(Σd−1). . Chapter 3 includes the content of the paper [1], where we show that the Nevo and Petersen conjecture holds for the dual simplicial complexes to nestohedra in Theorem 3.0.4. Chapter 4 contains the content of the paper [3] in which we prove Conjecture 0.0.4 in Theorem 4.1.2 by showing that tree shifts lower the γ-polynomial of graph-associahedra. Chapter 4 also includes Theorem 4.2.1, which shows that flossing moves also lower the γ-polynomial of graph-associahedra. In Chapter 5 we include smaller results that have been made. This chapter includes a result proving Gal’s conjecture for edge subdivisions of the order complexes of Gorenstein* complexes, and shows that this result can be attributed to the work of Athanasiadis in [4]. Chapter viii INTRODUCTION 5 also includes some work we have done towards answering Question 14.3 of [26] for interval building sets