13 research outputs found

    What Makes Stock Exchanges Succeed? Evidence from Cross-Listing Decisions

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    Despite the increasing integration of capital markets, geography has not yet become irrelevant to finance. Between 1986 and 1997, European public companies have increasingly listed abroad, especially in the U.S. We relate the cross-listing decisions to the characteristics of the destination exchanges (and countries) relative to those of the home exchange (and country). European companies appear more likely to cross-list in more liquid and larger markets, and in markets where several companies from their industry are already cross-listed. They are also more likely to cross-list in countries with better investor protection, and more efficient courts and bureaucracy, but not with more stringent accounting standards.cross-listings, going public, initial public offerings, geography, stock market competition

    Dually-Traded Italian Equities: London vs. Milan

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    Italian blue chip stocks are now actively traded in two markets: the dealers' market of SEAQ International in London and the traditional auction market in Milan. Analysing their interaction, we find that: 1.The London market for Italian equities has grown rapidly relative to the Milan stock exchange, but has not reduced trading volume in Milan; 2.Milan prices are generally - but not always - within London quotes; 3.London market makers appear to use price information from Milan to set their quotes, but this informational spillover is rather weak; 4.the growth of the London market for Italian stocks is probably due less to cost factors than to its other characteristics, such as greater depth and immediacy, location and other features typical of dealership markets.Auction Markets; Competition Among Stock Exchanges; Dealership Markets

    The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring and the Decision to Go Public

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    Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation

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    This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock-based incentives elicit not only productive effort, but also costly information manipulation. We analyze the tradeoffs involved in conditioning pay on long- versus short-term performance and characterize a second-best optimal compensation scheme. The paper shows manipulation, and investors' uncertainty about it, affects the equilibrium pay contract and the informational efficiency of asset prices. The paper derives a range of new cross-sectional comparative static results and sheds light on corporate governance regulations.corporate governance; Executive compensation; long- versus short-term; manipulation uncertainty

    Transparency and Liquidity: a Comparison of Auction and Dealership Markets with Informed Trading

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    Articolo proposto per lo Smith Breeden Prize del 199

    The Geography of Equity Listing: Why Do European Companies List Abroad?

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    The Geography of Equity Listing: Why Do Companies List Abroad?

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    This Paper documents the aggregate trends in the foreign listings of companies and analyses both their distinctive pre-listing characteristics and their post-listing performance relative to other companies. In the 1986-97 interval, many European companies listed abroad, but did so mainly on US exchanges. At the same time, the number of US companies listed in Europe decreased. The cross-listings of European companies appear to have sharply different motivations and consequences depending on whether they cross-list in the United States or within Europe. In the first case, companies pursue a strategy of rapid expansion and large equity issues after the listing. They rely increasingly on export markets and tend to belong to high-tech industries. In the second case, companies do not grow more than the control group, and increase their leverage after the cross-listing. The only features common to all cross-listing companies are their large size and their tendency to be recently privatized companies.Cross-Listings; Geography; Going Public; Initial Public Offerings

    What Makes Stock Exchanges Succeed? Evidence from Cross-Listing Decisions

    No full text
    Despite the increasing integration of capital markets, geography has not yet become irrelevant to finance. Between 1986 and 1997, European public companies have increasingly listed abroad, especially in the US. We relate the cross-listing decisions to the characteristics of the destination exchanges (and countries) relative to those of the home exchange (and country). European companies appear more likely to cross-list in more liquid and larger markets, and in markets where several companies from their industry are already cross-listed. They are also more likely to cross-list in countries with better investor protection, and more efficient courts and bureaucracy, but not with more stringent accounting standards.Cross-Listings; Geography; Going Public; Initial Public Offerings; Stock Market Competition

    Corporate Law and Governance

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    This chapter surveys the theoretical and empirical research on the main mechanisms of corporate law and governance, discusses the main legal and regulatory institutions in different countries, and examines the comparative governance literature. Corporate governance is concerned with the reconciliation of conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders and the resolution of collective action problems among dispersed investors. A fundamental dilemma of corporate governance emerges from this overview: large shareholder intervention needs to be regulated to guarantee better small investor protection; but this may increase managerial discretion and scope for abuse. Alternative methods of limiting abuse have yet to be proven effective.Corporate governance, ownership, takeovers, block holders, boards
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