Is identity per se irrelevant? A contrarian view of self-verification effects

Self-verification theory (SVT) posits that people who hold negative self-views, such as depressive patients, ironically strive to verify that these self-views are correct, by actively seeking out critical feedback or interaction partners who evaluate them unfavorably. Such verification strivings are allegedly directed towards maximizing subjective perceptions of prediction and control. Nonetheless, verification strivings are also alleged to stabilize maladaptive self-perceptions, and thereby hindering therapeutic recovery. Despite the widespread acceptance of SVT, I contend that the evidence for it is weak and circumstantial. In particular, I contend that that most or all major findings cited in support of SVT can be more economically explained in terms of raison oblige theory (ROT). ROT posits that people with negative self-views solicit critical feedback, not because they want it, but because they their self-view inclines them regard it as probative, a necessary condition for considering it worth obtaining. Relevant findings are reviewed and reinterpreted with an emphasis on depression, and some new empirical data reported

Implicit self-esteem and narcissism: rethinking the link

Several studies have found that explicit and implicit self-esteem interact to predict narcissism. These findings have been interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that narcissists have high but fragile self-esteem. However, we contend that these findings are neither empirically consistent nor conceptually coherent. We instead hypothesize that explicit and implicit self-esteem should predict narcissism independently, respectively in a positive and negative direction. In a large multi-session study, we examined the interrelationships between narcissism, explicit self-esteem, and three indices of implicit self-esteem (showing good psychometric properties and some convergent validity). No evidence emerged that explicit and implicit self-esteem interacted to predict narcissism. However, as predicted, two measures of implicit self-esteem were inversely related to narcissism. Potential explanations for divergent findings are considered

The why's the limit: curtailing self-enhancement with explanatory introspection

Self-enhancement is linked to psychological gains (e.g., subjective well-being, persistence in adversity) but also to intrapersonal and interpersonal costs (e.g., excessive risk taking, antisocial behavior). Thus, constraints on self-enhancement may sometimes afford intrapersonal and interpersonal advantages. We tested whether explanatory introspection (i.e., generating reasons for why one might or might not possess personality traits) constitutes one such constraint. Experiment 1 demonstrated that explanatory introspection curtails self-enhancement. Experiment 2 clarified that the underlying mechanism must (a) involve explanatory questioning rather than descriptive imagining, (b) invoke the self rather than another person, and (c) feature written expression rather than unaided contemplation. Finally, Experiment 3 obtained evidence that an increase in uncertainty about oneself mediates the effect

Intellectual Arrogance and Intellectual Humility: An Evolutionary-Epistemological Account

In this paper, we scrutinize intellectual arrogance and intellectual humility through an evolutionary lens. Our basic thesis might be summarized as follows. Human cognition, though it partly transcends the natural order, remains rooted in it: it is half-emancipated, half-embodied. In particular, it bears the lowly stamp of competitive dynamics that form part of the adaptive behavioral repertoire of all complex animals. Such dynamics, transmuted to the mental realm in human beings, help to explain, in psychological terms, why argumentation and ratiocination can be sometimes motivationally biased, but sometimes dispassionately truth-oriented too. Alongside furnishing our evolutionary-epistemological account of intellectual humility, we embed the construct in a wider nomological net, and report some recent empirical findings illustrating the automaticity of the tendency towards intellectual arrogance. We conclude by considering the role spirituality and religion might play in either helpfully fostering intellectual humility or inadvertently fostering intellectual arrogance

Through a glass, less darkly? Reassessing convergent and divergent validity in measures of implicit self-esteem

Self-esteem has been traditionally assessed via self-report (explicit self-esteem: ESE). However, the limitations of self-report have prompted efforts to assess self-esteem indirectly (implicit self-esteem: ISE). It has been theorized that ISE and ESE reflect the operation of largely distinct mental systems. However, although low correlations between measures of ISE and ESE empirically support their discriminant validity, similarly low correlations between different measures of ISE do not support their convergent validity. We explored whether such patterns would reemerge if more recently developed, specific, and reliable ISE measures were used. They did, although some convergent validity among ISE measures emerged once confounds resulting from conceptual mismatch, individual differences, and random variability were minimized. Nonetheless, low correlations among ISE measures are not primarily caused by the usual psychometric suspects, and may be the result of other factors including subtle differences between structural features of such measures